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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to defend Athenian democracy against a long-established 
suspicion that the Athenian government, with its radical form of popular participation, 
was not only incompetent but also dangerous.  There are two serious misunderstandings 
in this traditional view; one is the myth of the decline of Athens after the death of 
Pericles, the other being the outright denial of Athenian democracy by its philosophers, 
Xenophon and Plato.  These two common presumptions about Athenian history and 
philosophy are therefore examined. 
The historical examination focuses on three important events: the law reform, the 
reconciliation and the trial of Socrates.  All of them were conducted by Athenian 
democracy at the end of the fifth century B.C., a period of time that is often cited for the 
failure of democracy.  However, it is found that the democracy demonstrated its excellent 
ability to manage political conflicts through the laws and the reconciliation.  As to the 
infamous trial of Socrates, there were reasons for the popular suspicion of the 
Philosopher’s way of life. 
Following what we have learnt in the historical survey, we search for responses to the 
three events in the works of Xenophon and Plato.  There are passages, though often 
dismissed by scholars, indicate remarkable recognition of the democratic achievements in 
domestic politics.  As regards the trial of Socrates, there are also signs of second thoughts 
in their works that reveal understandings of the democracy’s condemnation of philosophy.  
The works of Socrates’ pupils show mixed evaluation rather than outright denial of 
Athenian democracy. 
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The traditional suspicion of Athenian democracy is therefore problematic due to its 
misconception of Athenian history and philosophy. 
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For a future Taiwan that is proud and independent. 
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Preface 
 
It was a foggy night in the early spring of 1988 in Taiwan when I heard of the death of 
the dictator, Chiang Ching-kuo.  I was then a first-year college student in animal science, 
and was working late at the biological laboratory.  ‘The President is dead!’ someone 
brought in the unexpected news.  ‘Great - at last!’ was the first thought in my mind. 
However, though it was my secret wish come true, I was at that time too young to realize 
the obvious fact that all people die, even a dictator who is either loved as a god or feared 
as a devil due to his seemingly omnipotent power.  When we returned to our dormitory, 
one of our roommates was mourning deeply for the passing away of ‘the Great Leader’.  
There was confusion and even a hint of anger in his eyes when he saw that most of us, 
rather than joining in with his mourning, appeared indifferent to the death of his beloved 
Leader.  I actually tried hard to keep my joy to myself, fully respectful of his notorious 
hot temper and gorilla-like build. 
Taiwan was a totalitarian country until its slow transformation into a democracy during 
the 1990s.  Before that, Chiang Kai-shek and his Party had firm control over most aspects 
of people’s lives.  A photo of Chiang Kai-shek hung in every classroom throughout the 
whole country, smiling at you like a most loving grandfather. It was a smile that I found 
years later again in a photo of Stalin.  There was of course no freedom of speech, and 
people became ignorant of the reality of their situation.  I struggled in my school years to 
put into my head the five thousand years of Chinese history, from its mythical beginnings 
to the glorious era of Chiang Kai-shek and his son, having not the least idea of the tens of 
thousands of Taiwanese killed by Chiang’s party only a few decades previously during its 
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suppression of a popular revolt, a memory that Taiwanese parents considered too 
dangerous to pass on to their children. 
In that era of terror when people were educated to be ignorant, western political thought, 
especially its liberal tradition, was a main ideological weapon against the Party’s 
systematic and repetitive indoctrination.1  I took in the words of John Locke, Jean 
Jacques Rousseau, John S. Mill and other western liberal thinkers, as if they were the 
antidote to the Party’s authoritarian doctrine that I had to learn to pass exams and had 
allowed to poison my soul.   
So began my journey into the history of western political thought.  An intellectual pursuit 
like mine brought about by traumatic experience may eventually bring out some relief 
from pain, or catharsis.   Yet, there will be no pleasure of knowledge that might be 
obtained from detached observation, as in the study of heavenly bodies, the evolution of 
life and other wonders of Nature.  Which one of them is worthier of pursuit?  Well, I am 
a person who often thinks that the grass is greener on the other side.  It is also ironical 
that, in search of freedom in the western intellectual tradition, what I often encountered 
was a well-established suspicion of popular participation that reminded me of the Party’s 
anti-democratic rhetoric. 
Presented in the thesis is a product of near twenty years’ trial and error.  I am happy with 
the progress I have made in the last four years at St Andrews, and believe that this thesis 
has something to offer to the study of political ideas. 
Ancient Greek political history and thought is probably one of the most difficult subjects 
for a student from a non-European background.  I am grateful for the help I have received 
                                                 
1
 Liberalism was tolerated to a limited extent perhaps because of Taiwan’s alliance with the U.S. in the cold 
war. 
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from many people in both Taiwan and St Andrews.  Professors Ying-wen Tsai, Yi-huah 
Jiang and Carl K.T. Shaw are leading scholars of western political thought in Taiwan.  
My thanks are due to their academic training that introduced me to the theoretical study 
of politics.  The lectures and discussions in their classrooms are memories I will cherish 
for life.  Special thanks are also due to Professors Tsai and Jiang for their financial 
support when it was most needed.  I would also like to thank Dr. Vasileios Vagios for his 
teaching of ancient Greek language and culture, in particular Aristophanes’ comedies, 
that opened my eyes to another fascinating aspect of Greek culture than the philosophies 
of Plato and Aristotle.  It was my great good fortune to have the help of Professor 
Christopher Smith throughout my years at St Andrews.  Without his guidance, it would 
have been impossible for me to manage the often too treacherous field of Athenian 
history.  The supervision of Professor Nick Rengger and Dr. Gabriella Slomp likewise 
helped me to deal with the philosophical implications of Athenian politics. I am also 
grateful to Professor Sarah Broadie who very kindly commented on my chapter on Plato.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Athenian democracy, though a regime long gone, holds an important place in our 
discussion of political ideas.  On the one hand, it constitutes an essential background for 
our understanding of Plato and other ancient Greek political philosophers.  It is a 
reasonable assumption held by many scholars that ancient Greek political thought 
emerged mainly as a response to its contemporary political experience, especially the 
Athenian one.  On the other hand, Athenian democracy is still the primary historical 
source for our understanding of an important type of popular government, this being the 
direct rule of the citizens.  Its culture and institutions once realized the essential 
democratic values such as freedom, equality and civic participation, all in its own radical 
style.  There is no other historical parallel case available to us.  Though few people would 
like to adopt the Athenian type of government in today’s world, it gives an indispensable 
historical lesson to our discussion of democratic theories. 1 
Classical Athens stands out in human history for its radical form of civic participation, 
which is still far greater, not only in degree but also in scale, than all the other political 
communities known to us.  The institutional design of Athenian democracy aimed to 
include as many citizens as practical into its decision-making process.  Its assembly 
required the attendance of six thousand citizens, which was practically the maximum 
                                                 
1
 However, it should be noted immediately that my research, thought appreciating certain achievements of 
Athenian democracy, does not attempt to justify its many enormous moral flaws such as its aggressive 
imperialism, its exploitation of slavery and the unequal treatment of women.  The main purpose of this 
thesis is to highlight the potential of participatory democracy that was once fulfilled by the Athenians, but 
continues to be neglected in our discussion of political thoughts. 
 2 
possible number of people for public discussion in ancient times.   All the Athenian law 
courts were full of hundreds or even thousands of citizens selected by lot as jurors.  There 
were more than one thousand positions in the central government, and almost all of them 
were staffed by common citizens who were selected by lot and then replaced with other 
citizens after one years’ service. 2 The level of participation in local government might be 
even higher.3  Finally, the scale of Athenian civic participation was not limited to the 
narrowly-defined political sphere; instead it extended to all aspects of civil life.  The 
citizens did not only participate in the Assembly and other governmental institutes, but 
also attended actively various kinds of public gatherings such as religious festivals, 
cultural events and military campaigns.4 
The radical institutional arrangements and culture of the Athenian democracy have been 
received with almost universal disapproval in the history of political thought since 
ancient times.  As shown in the next section, the Athenian direct democracy was simply 
taken as one of the most notorious cases of mob rule until the mid-nineteenth century.  
Even today, when its achievements in culture, philosophy and imperialism have been 
widely appreciated, the Athenian form of popular government is still viewed with deep 
suspicion.  It has frequently been said that the demos was not competent in governing a 
                                                 
2
 It is hard to exaggerate the intensity and extensiveness of popular participation in the Athenian society.  
For a concise summary of the Athenians’ participation in their central government, see Morgens H. Hansen 
(1999: 313): ‘an Assembly meeting was normally attended by 6000 citizens, on a normal court day some 
2000 citizens were selected by lot, and besides the 500 members of the Council there were 700 other 
magistrates; and those figures must be taken in conjunction with the fact that there were no more than 
30,000 male citizens over eighteen, and of those no more than 20,000 were over thirty.  The Assembly met 
thirty or forty times a year; the courts were summoned on about 200 days; the Council met on at least 250 
days; and some boards of magistrates, such as the archons, the market-inspectors and the Eleven, were on 
duty every day all year round.  Most notable of all in comparison with modern democracy is the level at 
which ordinary folk took part: they were not confined to choosing the decision-makers but , in their 
hundreds and thousands, prepared decisions, made them, and administered them in person.’ 
3
 Whitehead 1986: 226 ff. 
4
 Sinclair 1988: ch.3; B. Strauss 1996. 
 3 
society in person, since the people were not properly trained and equipped with the 
necessary knowledge for such sophisticated tasks.  Many scholars also consider this type 
of popular government dangerous, for the reason that the demos is liable to reckless 
behaviour under the urge of passion or demagogy. 
In the realm of ancient political thought the story of Athenian democracy, generally 
speaking, is the myth of the decline of Athens based on passages selected from the works 
of Thucydides, Xenophon, Plato and Aristotle.  Thucydides reported a series of moral and 
political mistakes committed by the democracy: the moral destruction during the plague 
in 430,5 the imperial arrogance in their invasion of Melos, the vanity of the Sicilian 
expedition in 413 and the overthrow of the democracy by the oligarchs in 411.6  
Xenophon reported the rash way in which the Athenians had rejected the legal procedure 
during an infamous trial in 406, where the mob had shouted that no law could ever 
intervene in the people’s decision.7  The climax of this drama for students of philosophy 
is undoubtedly the trial of Socrates in 399 reported by Xenophon and Plato.  It is 
generally believed that the people put to death a most righteous philosopher because of 
their ignorance. 
Furthermore, a famous section in Plato’s Republic describes the democracy as the second 
worst kind of regime in allowing its people to live as they liked under extreme equality 
and absolute freedom, liable to be deceived by demagogues and falling naturally into the 
worst regime of tyranny. 8  Democracy received better treatment in Aristotle’s Politics 
                                                 
5
 All dates of Athenian times are B.C. 
6
 Thuc. 2.52, 5.84 ff and Books 6-8.  
7
 Xen. Hell. 1.7.1 ff. 
8
 Pl. Resp. 560a ff. 
 4 
where it was considered not as bad as oligarchy and tyranny because of its advantage of 
popular cooperation.  However, scholars often emphasise another Aristotelian passage in 
which democracy was a corrupt regime that pursued partisan rather than common 
interests.9  
Following these selected passages, it is natural to get the impression that Athens at the 
end of the fifth century was effectively a lawless society.   The morality crisis, caused by 
the war with Sparta, plague, the success of Athenian democracy and its empire, and other 
factors, was beyond repair.  Passion and egoism, aggravating each other in turn, drove the 
Athenians against one another.  Those who wanted to help would be condemned by the 
ignorant people, as shown in the execution of Socrates.  Athens was therefore doomed to 
fall into a vicious circle of suspicion and vengeance as the civil war of Corcyra was 
portrayed in Thucydides’ description.10 
However, this story of the decline of Athens is far from an accurate account of its actual 
development.  The downfall of Athens from its imperial golden age is not the full story of 
Athenian democracy at the end of the fifth century B.C. but only the first half of it.  The 
other more neglected half, in contrast, reveals the democracy’s miraculous revival from 
the ruin of wars.  The demos, though in a very difficult situation, won the civil war and 
soon recovered its authority in 403.   Most historians agree that compared with other 
contemporary political communities, democratic Athens stood out for its domestic 
stability and harmony in the fourth century B.C. 
                                                 
9
 Arist. Pol 1281a40-b20, 1289b1-20. 
10
 Thuc. 3.81. 
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In regard to the trial of Socrates, the partisan nature of our main sources for this notorious 
incident, the apologies by Xenophon and Plato, is often neglected.  As a result, many 
scholars too easily presume the innocence of Socrates and the injustice of his execution.  
Therefore, before judging Athenian democracy on this trial, there is a need to reconstruct 
its historicity following the norms of historical studies and to the utmost extent that is 
allowed by the extant evidence. 
There are probably still doubts about the actual achievements of Athenian democracy.  
Some might ask why the Athenian writers such as Xenophon and Plato were so critical of 
the democracy if it was really successful in its lawful and reconciliatory projects.  Many 
scholars believe that these writers’ strict criticism should be the authoritative voice on our 
evaluation of the Athenian democracy, since they are not only great minds, but also had 
personal experience with the democracy.11  This objection can be met in two ways.  We 
may argue that these Athenian writers’ views are biased, since they were all from 
oligarchic backgrounds and were therefore hostile to the equal rule of the people.  The 
other way, which is adopted in this thesis, is to argue that they are not as critical of the 
democracy as many scholars tend to believe.  It will be proved in chapter five and six that 
when the works of Xenophon and Plato are examined carefully against the proper 
historical context of fourth-century Athens, recognition of the democracy’s success in 
law reform and reconciliation can be found.  We will even detect significant compromise 
in their attitudes towards the democracy’s execution of Socrates.  It is therefore 
problematic to support the negative view of democratic Athens with the words of 
Socrates’ pupils. 
                                                 
11
 Scholars of this belief are, for example, Schofield 1999: 1-2; Kraut 2000: 228; Wallach 2002: 13; Dunn 
2005: 38-50; Saxonhouse 2006: 4-, 48-9, 54. 
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With such reflection on the misconception of history and philosophy in the traditional 
suspicion of Athenian democracy, I provide a defence for Athenian democracy, focusing 
on its actual performance at the end of the fifth century B.C.  The first part of this thesis 
is a historical survey of three important events: the law reform, the reconciliation and the 
trial of Socrates.  We then turns to the works of Xenophon and Plato, in search of 
recognition of democratic Athens, as opposed to their apparent criticism. 
As to the discussion of this introductory chapter, it argues at first a need to re-evaluate the 
actual performance of Athenian democracy through a survey of accounts of Athenian 
democracy by historians, political philosophers and democratic theorists.  It then explains 
the rationale for selecting the three Athenian events: the law reform, the reconciliation 
and the trial of Socrates as the focus of research.  The third section provides reasons for 
the discussion of Xenophon and Plato.  At the end, a list of primary sources to be used in 
this thesis is provided.  
I. The Modern Image of Athenian Democracy  
This section provides a historical survey of the image of Athenian democracy since the 
middle of the nineteenth century when the idea of democracy started to gain currency.  It 
shows that, though democracy has become one of the predominant ideas in today’s 
political discourse, the Athenian form of government, which is still the primary historical 
source for our understanding of direct democracy, still receives serious doubts about its 
feasibility and desirability.  Such established suspicions of Athenian democracy have 
been challenged by a group of historians in their studies of Athenian history for over two 
decades.  However, as proved in our examination of the responses of scholars to this 
 7 
recent development of historical research, its theoretic implication for our understanding 
of direct democracy has not yet been properly appreciated by political philosophers and 
theorists.  There is therefore a need to readdress the issue of Athenian democracy. 
i. George Grote’s History of Greece in 1846 
It has been pointed out by many scholars that the fossilized negative image of democracy 
as mob rule started to decline not as early as the start of the American Revolution in 1775 
or of the French Revolution in 1789, but only after another sixty years when the British 
historian George Grote published the first part of his History of Greece in 1846.12  Before 
Grote, though Athens received some recognition for its achievement in visual art,13 its 
democracy was described in most historical and political writings as one of the worst 
regimes, ‘turbulent, factionalised, irrationally swayed by orators, and inconsistent in 
respect of public policy and justice.’14  Even Pericles was usually portrayed as a wicked 
politician rather than the greatest popular statesman as Thucydides had praised.15 
A sea change in the public evaluation of the democracy came after the mid-nineteenth 
century.16  However, the trend did not go as far as from one extremity of repugnance to 
the opposite of unconditional admiration.17  In fact, the suspicion of mob rule is never far 
                                                 
12
 See Hartog 1994: 41; Cartledge 1994: 29; Roberts 1994: ch. 9-11; E.M. Wood 1994; Dawson 2000: 187; 
Rhodes 2003: 32; Dupuis-Deri 2004: 120; Dunn 2005: 72, 92; especially Hansen 1992: 18.  Grote’s work is 
more an indication rather than the cause of this change of the image of democracy.  Other political 
developments at the same period of time, such as the enlargement of party organization and the universal 
suffrage for adult males in France and the US, probably played a much more important role than Grote’s 
History.  Dupuis-Deri 2004: 125-6. 
13
 Rhodes 2003: 32. 
14
 Dawson 2000: 187. 
15
 Hansen 1994b: 18. 
16
 There were various reasons for the celebration of Athens other than its democracy, such as its empire, 
culture and even slavery.  Hansen 1992: 19; 1994a: 35; Roberts 1994: 263; Dawson 2000: 190; Millett 
2000: 353; Rhodes 2003: 32, 47.  The ideological confrontation between liberalism and totalitarianism is 
another important reason in the twentieth century; See Roberts 1994: 291. 
17
 For the strategies of resistance against democracy after the days of Grote, see Morris & Raaflaub 1998: 4. 
 8 
away.  A distinction between the fifth-century and the fourth-century democracies 
emerged, or, what we can see as a contrast between the periods under the forceful 
leadership of Pericles and the subsequent period until its end in 322.  According to this 
distinction, the Periclean age distinguished itself with a magnificent empire following the 
Athens-led victory over the Persian invasion, while the later period was marked with the 
disastrous defeats in the Sicilian expedition and in the Peloponnesian War.  It is mainly 
the Periclean democracy and its empire that won praise and attention after Grote’s 
History, while the post-Periclean period was considered a lamentable terminal decline.18  
Paul Millett puts it concisely:19    
In its crudest form, this arrangement has three phases.  First, there is the rise of Athens to 
the climax of the “Golden Age” under the guiding hand of Perikles, its greatness 
exemplified by the power and wealth of the empire.  Then comes the climacteric of the 
Peloponnesian War, culminating in the defeat of Athens and the loss of empire.  The third 
stage is downhill all the way, via the so-called ‘crisis of the fourth century’ to Makedonian 
domination with the destruction of the democracy and the end of Athens as an 
independent polis.   
The myth of the Periclean democracy leads to a common conclusion that direct 
democracy does not necessarily coincide with mob rule, but can be one of the most 
meritorious forms of government as long as the desire and passion of the people is 
constrained and guided under great leadership.  By contrast, a democracy not blessed with 
                                                 
18
 The overwhelming preference of the Periclean or the fifth-century to the fourth-century democracy is 
well observed among scholars of ancient history.  Hansen 1992: 20-21, 1994a: 34; Trite 1997: 3; Dawson 
2000: 196; Millett 2000: 352-3, 362n33-35; Rhodes 2003: 39; Ober 2005: 31.  
19
 Millett 2000: 352. 
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great leaders or other sufficient external restraints is still considered doomed to excess 
and chaos.20  Following this line of reasoning, the quality of leadership becomes the 
central issue in the modern study of the Athenian democracy, responsible for the success 
or failure of the government, while the majority of the Athenians were silenced into a 
group of submissive subjects.  Thucydides’ famous comment that Athens was led to its 
apogee by the statesman Pericles and then brought to its destruction under successive 
demagogues is one of the best illustrations of this mode of explanation.21  Many ancient 
and modern writers, following in his steps, also tend to ascribe the collective performance 
of the demos after Pericles to the leading politicians.22   For example, it is Theramenes 
and other so-called moderate politicians who used to be credited with the deeds of the 
law reform and the reconciliation.23 
ii. Developments after the mid-1980s 
Since the mid-1980s there has been a rapid increase of interest in the fourth-century 
democracy amongst many scholars of ancient history.24  There were, for example, Martin 
Ostwald’s From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law in 1986 and Raphael 
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Sealey’s The Athenian Republic in 1987.  Though they did not cover the whole history of 
the fourth-century democracy, the constitutional stability during that century was taken as 
the central issue.  In their works, fourth-century Athens had completed the development 
of the rule of law under which the democracy, instead of being in the process of decline, 
was well-governed.  In 1989 Josiah Ober, one of the most innovative American 
proponents of Athenian democracy, published his first major work, Mass and Elite in 
Democratic Athens, arguing that the nearly two hundred years stability of the democracy 
in the fifth and the fourth centuries constituted ‘one of the original questions that led to 
the development by the Greeks of self-conscious political theory.’25  Another important 
study appeared in 1991, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes, which is 
the outcome of twenty years’ work by the eminent Danish scholar, Mogens H. Hansen, 
who, in addition to his many other important conclusions, urged a focus on the fourth 
century B.C., the period of time to which many of the extant Athenians sources refer.26 
To be sure, the importance of the fourth-century democracy had been noticed before the 
1980s.  As early as at the end of the nineteenth century, a German scholar named Adolph 
Holm clearly rejected the theme of the decline of the post-Periclean democracy, praising 
the peace and self-control of the fourth-century democracy.27  Arnold H.M. Jones in the 
1950s and Moses I. Finley in the 1970s also made important efforts to reverse the 
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tendency to focus on the Periclean age.28  However, it is after the mid-1980s that a 
substantial change took place.   
In the 1990s, along with the celebration of the two thousand and five hundredth 
anniversary of the birth of democracy, there were numerous journal articles and 
collections of conference papers by eminent scholars.29  A trend has emerged that the 
extraordinary phenomenon of constitutional stability and political harmony, especially in 
fourth-century Athens, is an important issue that has been neglected for too long and has 
not yet be provided with satisfactory answers.  Just as J. Ober describes in his latest book, 
the success of Athenian democracy is still a mystery: ‘how did the Athenians manage to 
go on together as an internally diverse and democratically governed community, one that 
sought (if never altogether successfully) to promote conditions of justice, in the face of so 
many circumstances that made going on so very difficult.’30  In 1994 R. Osborne urged 
scholars, instead of carrying on with the Thucydidean approach of leadership, to find out 
the answers to the political peace in fourth-century Athens by re-discovering the 
historical values of contemporary material such as Demosthenes’ speeches.31  P. 
Cartledge, observing the complex and dynamic character of the Athenian democracy, 
suggested that ‘the secret of Athens’ success lay in its multiple forums for , and 
determined practice of, creative political and social adaptation.’  He continued, ‘The 
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highly pressured tensions between conflicting and often contradictory social groups, 
forces and ideologies were thus channelled positively –again, for the most part—into 
progressive and above all solidary outlets, principally through the medium of civic 
ritual.’32 
As may have been revealed in the suggestions of J. Ober, R. Osborne and P. Cartledge, 
what is involved in the switch of attention from the Periclean to the post-Periclean age is 
more than simply adding a detailed account of fourth-century Athens according to the 
established model of the decline of Athens.  Instead, the criteria for the evaluation of 
Athenian democracy have changed from imperial power and wealth to domestic peace 
and harmony.  This change of attitudes has raised a different set of questions that demand 
different approaches and answers.  As Jennifer T. Roberts put it succinctly, ‘Prosperous, 
powerful, culturally rich—these things had often been said about Athens; but it was a 
new intellectual universe that credited the Athenians with internal peacefulness.’33 
In addition to the emphasis on the fourth-century democracy and its achievement of 
stability, the appreciation of its participatory way of life is another noteworthy 
development of historical research.  Compared with the fifth-century democracy which 
used to be shadowed by the reputations of Pericles and other powerful leaders, the fourth-
century democracy had no such powerful politicians and therefore appears to be a better 
case of autonomous popular government.  The citizens of fourth-century Athens are 
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thought more likely to have been active and independent participants rather than passive 
followers of great leaders or demagogues.   
This participatory aspect of fourth-century Athens stands out for two different reasons.  
The first and more historically relevant reason is that civic participation is now 
considered by a growing number of historians as one of the essential factors for the 
stability of the democracy.  Some scholars argue that active participation not only in the 
narrowly-defined political realm, but at all levels of public life, helped establish a trustful 
relationship among the Athenians, form a strong sense of community, and transform 
social and political tension into positive forces for the well-being of Athens.  For example, 
J. Ober argues that ‘Service to the polis in the capacity of councillor, magistrate, juror, or 
solider provided a chance to develop a sense of trust in a broad cross-section of fellow 
Athenians… That trust was developed both on the basis of personal knowledge of 
individual character, and on a recognition of a common loyalty, a shared commitment to 
advancing the common good of the entire organization.’34  The other consideration is the 
ideological agenda behind the research of ancient history.  Many scholars believe in the 
relevance of the ancient participatory way of civic life to the modern world,35 and some 
of them feel no need to disguise their intention of using the ancient democracy as a cure 
to the problems of apathy and elitism in modern liberal representative democracies that 
are framed within constitutional limits.36 
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It is one of the central arguments of this thesis that this trend of research discussed in this 
section draws our attention to the achievement of the fourth-century democracy in which 
its practice of popular participation played an indispensable part.37  However, the 
traditional theme of the decline of fourth-century Athens is still firmly held by many 
historians, and the positive function of intense participation in establishing and 
maintaining political order is far from widely accepted, despite Ober’s optimistic 
observation: 38 
The, by now, shopworn notions that a growth in democratic “radicalism” destabilized the 
democracy, that political leaders after Pericles abandoned concern for the public good and 
treated the public sphere as nothing more than a system of private spoils, and that class 
tensions and a growth in selfish individualism among the populace at large undermined 
civic solidarity, have been exposed as tendentious fictions by a spate of detailed work on 
the fourth- and third-century phases of the democracy.   
For example, this trend of favouring the democracy has been most recently criticized by 
Loren J. Samons’ What’s Wrong with Democracy? (2004) He complains that ‘Socrates’ 
death… has been relegated to the classroom of (one suspects increasingly few) 
philosophy departments, while Pericles’ ideals and “democratic theory” are discussed 
seriously by historians and political scientists.’39  In his opinion:  
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The actual history of Athens in the period of its democratic government is 
marked by numerous failures, mistakes, and misdeeds—most infamously, 
the execution of Socrates—that would seem to discredit the ubiquitous 
modern idea that democracy leads to good government… democratic 
Athens dominated and made war on the states most like itself, suffered 
two internal revolutions, exiled or executed many of its own leaders, 
squandered vast public resources, and preserved its autonomy for less 
than two centuries.40 
However, though the democracy was undeniably far from perfect, many of L. Samons’ 
accusations are highly contentious.  For example, he seems to suggest that the Athenian 
politicians should not be punished for whatever they did.  His condemnation of the 
Athenian slavery is particularly confusing when compared to his other opinion that 
Athens’ decision to help Sparta in suppressing the helot revolt was one of its few 
praiseworthy deeds.41  Finally, while the survival of the democracy for nearly two 
hundred years is considered generally as the hard evidence of its stability, he names it as 
a failure without explanation.  Though it is certainly not right to worship the democracy 
as an ideal regime, it is also wrong to go to the opposite extremity as Samons does. 
Besides, as shown by the literature review in later chapters on the law reform and the 
reconciliation, most historians are still inclined to consider the long-term stability of 
fourth-century Athens as nothing more than a fortunate but fragile incidence of power 
balance in the fierce struggles between the self-interested democrats and oligarchs.  Of 
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those who recognize the efforts in Athens to maintain the communal harmony, some 
scholars credit the moderation of politicians, some argue the achievement as a result of 
the institutionalization of the authority of the laws over the people’s Assembly, and yet 
others point to the financial arrangement that mitigated the tension between the rich and 
the poor by making the rich residents, in exchange for prestigious social status, obliged to 
help their poor fellows.42  These theories, maybe with the exception of the financial 
analysis, all revealed a strong belief that popular participation, instead of being an 
element of communal stability, should be constrained under strong leaders, the laws or 
other external forces.  However, as argued in those chapters on the democracy’s law 
reform and the reconciliation, in a democratic community such as Athens where most of 
the public offices were filled with ordinary citizens selected by lot and the few other 
elected positions were all under strict demotic supervision, civil participation takes the 
main responsibility for whatever the development of the community turns out to be.  
While the stability of Athens in the fourth century B.C. is now hardly deniable, the 
intense participation of the demos must play a central role in any explanation of the said 
period of stability. 
In summary, though it is still not accepted by all scholars of ancient history, the recent 
historical approach discussed in this section has produced some paradigm-shifting effects 
on our understanding of the Athenian democracy.  Firstly, there is a different criterion of 
good governments.  Instead of gauging the scale of its imperial power, this approach now 
judges the democracy according to its capability to maintain domestic peace.  Secondly, 
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there are also changes of research focus.  The democracy’s performance in the fourth 
century B.C. has now received much more attention than it used to.  The critical 
importance of popular participation is now acknowledged by many scholars, while in the 
past it was the quality of leadership that was considered the decisive factor for the 
performance of the democracy.  Finally, there is a re-evaluation of the democracy.  It is 
no more a noisy gathering of a large crowd who were ignorant and impulsive, but is 
believed by many historians to be a decent government committed to the principles of 
moderation and constitutionalism.  The research question regarding the Athenian 
democracy has changed.  Putting all these trends together, we have a completely different 
research question regarding the Athenian democracy.  It is no longer why the democracy 
fell from its golden age and lost its empire.  The question that should be asked is, as 
Josiah Ober said, why and how the Athenians combined the democratic rule with other 
important political values so effectively, despite many serious difficulties.43 
iii. Ancient Political Philosophy on Athenian Democracy44 
It is one of the central themes of this thesis that the achievements of fourth-century 
Athens as mentioned by certain historians since the mid-1980s should be taken on board 
in our discussion of the Athenian democracy.  Though there is still no agreement about 
the nature of the fourth-century democracy and the causes of its stability and harmony, 
the fact of its survival under extremely difficult conditions is beyond reasonable doubt 
and should not be neglected.  However, though the challenge posed by this recent trend 
of historical research has been noticed gradually by some scholars in the fields of ancient 
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political philosophy and democratic theories, its implication has not yet been fully 
appreciated.  The established negative view of the Athenian democracy remains strong. 
 As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the story of Athens for many people is still 
the terminal decline from its empire to the civil wars via a series of failure committed by 
its democracy.  According to this version of Athenian history, there seems nothing 
positive to learn from the presumably hopeless reality of Athenian democracy.  Scholars 
of ancient political philosophy therefore justify themselves in their search for political 
solutions mostly in the theoretical works of great writers such as Plato and Aristotle.  The 
framework of argument in the study of political thought, so to speak, is composed of 
Thucydidean problems of internal conflicts and Platonic and Aristotelian solutions.  
Following this pattern of explanation, the actual efforts of the democracy in restoring and 
maintaining political harmony and legal order in the post-war period is often ignored. 
For example, Author W. H. Adkins in his book on the Athenian cooperative virtues gives 
the pessimistic conclusion that ‘[a]fter the political upheavals at Athens in the closing 
years of the Peloponnesian War, no Greek could overlook the existence of the problem, 
even if he could neither formulate it clearly to himself nor suggest a solution.  A Plato or 
an Aristotle was needed.’45  David Cohen mentions the Thucydidean problem: ‘as 
Thucydides shows in his descriptions of stasis and the plague if conflict between groups 
in society becomes generalized enough, it can lead to the disintegration of the social 
order, not to its preservation.’46   He then switches to the work of Plato and Aristotle: 
‘like Thucydides, Aristotle and Plato viewed the problem of stasis as the fundamental 
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challenge to political theory.  Indeed, in a sense, the underlying goal of Aristotle’s and 
Plato’s political works is to analyze the causes of social disintegration so as to develop an 
institutional framework for social cohesion and hence, political stability.’47 
Scholars of ancient political philosophy might be said to fall into three groups for their 
responses to the changing image of Athenian democracy championed by a group of 
historians.  Some scholars did not think the trend a serious challenge to the established 
view against the democracy.  For example, The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman 
Political Thought, published in 2000, takes into account little of the recent research of 
ancient history.  Though the editors recognize the methodological differences between 
philosophers, political theorists and historians,48 and its contributors include historians 
such as J. Ober who is the champion of Athenian democracy, the chapters on Socrates, 
Plato and Aristotle are essentially theoretical without analysis of the historical context.49  
Besides, Richard Kraut, a leading scholar in the political philosophies of Plato and 
Aristotle, though vaguely recognizing in his review of J. Ober’s Political Dissent in 
Democratic Athens (1998) that the Athenian people ‘to some degree transform 
themselves into the just and educated citizenry’,50 still sticks to the traditional negative 
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image of the democracy and appears to think that there is hardly anything admirable in 
the practices of Athenian democracy.51 
Few scholars welcome the change.  Paul Woodruff’s First Democracy,52 a work 
dedicated to Isidor F. Stone,53 stands out as an exception among the works of classical 
philosophy for its enthusiastic defence of Athenian democracy against Plato and other 
elitist critics.  However, this is mainly a popular book rather than academic research. 
Malcolm Schofield, one of the editors of the Cambridge History of Greek and Roman 
Political Thought, is an example of the third group of scholars who vacillate between the 
new improved image of the democracy and its traditional view of being a corrupt regime.  
On the one hand, he appears to judge philosophy by the performance of the democracy.  
Following the theories of historians regarding the stability and civility of the fourth-
century democracy,54 he values the Aristotelian Eudemian Ethics over Nicomachean 
Ethics because the less moralistic attitude of the former provides a better explanation of 
the democratic achievements.55  He even suggests in his conclusion that the democracy 
deserves a more positive view than that of Eudemian Ethics.56  However, on the other 
hand, he still seems to judge the democracy from the traditional height of philosophy and 
considers Athens a city haunted by civil conflicts.  In his Saving the City: Philosopher-
King and Other Classical Paradigms (1999), though claiming that ‘fruitful work on the 
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political thinking of antiquity must be rooted in history and a proper appreciation of its 
historical context’, he says: ‘It is therefore no wonder that Greek and Roman political 
theory is above all else the search for a remedy for the malaise of stasis.  Like the great 
Athenian statesman Solon before them, the philosophers want to save the city from itself, 
and to create or identify a basis for harmony which will preserve it in unity.’57 
The tension between history and philosophy remains in M. Schofield’s latest book.58  He 
recognizes that the well-known Platonic criticism of the democracy in Plato’s Republic 
and other works does not square with the democracy’s actual performance.59  On the 
other hand, he still largely repeats the interpretive pattern of Thucydidean problems and 
philosophical solutions, saying that ‘the intensity of [Plato’s] obsession with political 
rhetoric as an inbred democratic disease is intelligible only against the background of an 
interpretation of fifth-century Athenian imperialism and its downfall in the Peloponnesian 
War that he probably borrowed (not without twist of his own) from the historian 
Thucydides.’60  Though Schofield is now more cautious about the validity of Plato’s 
judgement of the democracy, there is still no sufficient explanation as to why the proper 
historical context for our understanding of Plato should be the infamous failure of the 
Athenian democracy in the fifth century B.C. rather than its miraculous success in the 
fourth century B.C. which is exactly the period of time when Plato wrote his dialogues. 
In summary, to my knowledge, there is still no serious academic work by scholars of 
ancient political philosophy that has fully recognized the paradigm-shifting effects caused 
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by the switch of research focus from the fifth-century to the fourth-century democracy.  
Some have paid little more than lip service to the successful story of the democracy that 
disputes their traditional and sceptic view of the democracy.  As to those who are more 
willing to take on board the challenge from the field of ancient history, they have not yet 
provided satisfactory explanation about the gap between philosophical criticism and the 
reality of the democracy.  Did the ancient great writers understand the Athenian 
democracy properly or not?  Or, is it the later generations who distorted their views on 
the democracy?   These are questions worth asking.  In either case, there is now a need to 
reinvestigate the our traditional understandings of the Athenian democracy that are 
largely based on certain views of Thucydides, Plato, Xenophon and Aristotle, as well as 
other ancient writers.   
iv. Political Theory on Athenian Democracy61 
In the discussion of political theorists, Athenian democracy is mainly thought to be the 
extreme model of participatory democracy that inspires an alternative way of political life 
to the dominant form of liberal democracy.62  The latter, as John Dunn argues, is a 
mixture of representative institution, modern state and capitalist economy. The majority 
of its founding theorists, such as Benjamin Constant, James Madison, Jean Bodin and 
Adam Smith, sharing the traditional view of Athenian democracy, considered it as one of 
the wicked regimes that must be kept away.  Popular participation in their eyes, if ever 
acceptable to some extent, needed proper supervision for its imminent threat to individual 
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rights or constitutional order. 63  While democracy has become the predominant ideology 
in today’s world, it is mainly the triumph of representative government rather than the 
victory of popular participation.64  Therefore, Athenian democracy, though an inspiring 
idea for solving today’s problems in liberal democracies such as apathy and bureaucracy, 
is normally rejected as an unfeasible or undesirable substitute for representative 
democracy.  As we will find below, though some theorists praise the people as a needed 
revolutionary power to re-vitalize the community from various forms of ossified 
exploitation disguised as the conventions, the laws and the constitution, many scholars, 
following the main line of the history of political thought, still believe in modern 
constitutionalism.65 
Political theorists have already noticed the trend of re-evaluating Athenian democracy in 
the realm of ancient history,66 and one of them declared a decade ago that ‘the view of 
Athenian democracy offered by work building on this recent [historian] scholarship is 
sophisticated and nuanced.  It makes any portrait of Athens as anarchic or ill-governed 
appear simplistic and outmoded.’67  Though this political theorist has pointed out 
correctly that the evaluation provided a chance to re-examine and deepen our 
understanding of the democracy and human politics in general, this seems not a general 
approach adopted in the discussion of democratic theory.  Most political theorists, liberal 
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or radical democrats, still tend to overlook the changing image of the democracy by 
judging it with the traditional criticism or other preconceptions. 
John Wallach’s Platonic Political Art (2001) and Ricky K Green’s Democratic Virtue in 
the Trial and Death of Socrates (2001) are recent examples of researches that still 
presume the myth of the fall of fourth-century Athens.68   J. Wallach also appears to 
mistake the re-evaluation of the democracy as a cause for building a perfect model 
against all kinds of criticism.69   However, what is being challenged is the uncritical 
presumption of the fairness and plausibility of traditional criticism, a bias which is 
revealed fully in the following sentence: ‘Platonic philosophy would be radically critical 
of democracy but on behalf of justice and not necessarily on behalf of any other, extant 
political order.’70  
Arlene W. Saxonhouse, like L. Samons in the field of ancient history, wrote a monograph 
to criticize the trend of making Athenian democracy an admirable model by scholars such 
as Gorge Grote, John S. Mill, Hannah Arendt, Martin Ostwald and Isidor F. Stone whom 
she labels as mythmakers.71  She urges a return to the great Athenian writers for the 
genuine understanding of the democracy, for these writers, living in that democracy, had 
no partisan intention but aimed to achieve full understanding of its principles.  She claims 
that these writers ‘draw on democracy’s multifaceted nature and force us to explore the 
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underlying assumptions that characterize most regimes we might call democratic.’72  
However, her uncritical belief in the great writers has been challenged adeptly by J. T. 
Roberts.  By providing a detailed list of contrasts between Plato’s portrayal and the 
reality of the democracy, Roberts concludes that it is Plato who is the mythmaker for his 
invention of a problematic image of the Athenian democracy.73 
A. Saxonhouse’ latest work, Free Speech and Democracy in Ancient Athens (2006), 
presents a sophisticated and different story from her previous work of Athenian 
Democracy: Modern Mythmakers and Ancient Theorists (1996).  There is extensive 
consultation of the literature of ancient history and classics in her new book, and 
Saxonhouse now recognizes the admirable political success of the fourth-century 
democracy.  Yet, the core of her argument is still based on the traditional Platonic view 
that considers Athenian democracy a radical regime of extreme freedom and equality as 
described in the Republic Book VIII.74   Following such line of philosophical reasoning, 
democracy is by definition destructive because of its uncompromised defiance of all 
kinds of authority.  The Athenian democracy’s reconstruction of legal order under the 
conservative appeal of ‘the ancestral laws’, in her view, was an act against ‘democratic’ 
values.75  However, her view is not without serious problems.  Firstly, we see no 
sufficient reason to accept her definition of the democracy as the full realization of 
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excessive freedom and equality, a view that she admits is contrary to the actual 
development of the Athenian democracy.  Secondly, her explanation of the democracy’s 
constitutional stability in the fourth century B.C. actually follows the theories of M. 
Ostwald and R. Sealey, and therefore shares their problematic dichotomy between 
democracy and constitutionalism.76  In summary, despite her comprehensive use of the 
recent researches of ancient history, Saxonhouse’s latest work still misses the inspiration 
that Athenian democracy can make to improve our understanding of democratic politics.  
The extraordinary balance among freedom, equality and communal order that the 
democracy had achieved with its radical form of popular participation remains obscured 
within the established conceptual framework that Saxonhouse has followed.     
J. Dunn, J. Peter Euben and George Kateb, though having more appreciation of the re-
evaluation of the democracy, do not use it to test the established views of democracy.  
Dunn, though observing the stability and moderation of the democracy as well as its 
governing ability contrary to traditional criticism, agrees with B. Constant’s view that the 
age of ancient democracy has gone forever for the reason that in today’s world ‘nothing 
in principle can or could be done to enable modern citizens to know about, or choose 
coherently in relation to, the vast bulk of the factors which shape, constrain, or endanger 
their lives.’77  Nevertheless, another reason for his suspicion of Athenian democracy, 
probably more important than the vast size and complexity of modern state, is his 
continual acceptance of the negative image of the democracy described in Thucydides, 
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Plato and Aristotle.78  Even P. Euben, who is a political theorist and shares J. Ober’s 
democratic belief in participatory politics,79 still follows the traditional criticism.  Fully in 
agreement with J. Ober about the exceptional achievements of the fourth-century 
democracy, he questions its ability to resist the temptation of tyranny or the manipulation 
of demagogues.80  G. Kateb, on the other hand, paints the democracy with values of 
liberal constitutionalism.  While explaining the stability of the democracy, he downplays 
its practices of popular participation, describing them with terms such as consent, election 
and constitutional limits.81 
Benjamin Barber and Sheldon Wolin, though eminent and enthusiastic proponents of 
civil participation, do not use the constitutional stability of Athenian democracy as a main 
support of their theory.  B. Barber develops his theory of participation by using various 
sources in addition to the classical democracy.82    Though having used M.I. Finley’s 
Democracy Ancient and Modern to justify the trial of Socrates in his Strong Democracy 
(1984),83 he pays no particular attention to recent researches of ancient history.  The 
reason might be his belief that a genuine democracy has no need to obsess itself with the 
past.  With great boldness he says, ‘like every political system, democracy too has a birth 
mother, and thus rests on foundations.  Unlike every other political system, however, 
democracy is necessarily self-orphaned, the child who slays its parent so that it may grow 
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and flourish autonomously.’84  S. Wolin, on the other hand, insisting on preserving the 
revolutionary characteristic of democracy, does not care for the traditional accusations 
that the demos was liable to become a mob, and does not appreciate the efforts to 
promote the Athenian democracy as a stabilized constitutional government, a trend that 
he worries might tame the ideal of democracy and deprive it of its vivacity.85  
Finally, Blair Campbell and Susan Sara Monoson are among the few political theorists 
who establish their arguments through the recent research of ancient history.  As early as 
in 1989, Campbell’s ‘Paradigm Lost’ attempted to refute some dominant political myth 
by using a substantial amount of historical research produced in the mid-1980s.  Using 
the works of R. Sealey and M.H. Hansen, he argues that fourth-century Athens was in 
fact a model of the rule of law rather than that of public participation, as H. Arendt and 
other proponents of participation maintain.86  He also advised political theorists to root 
classical political concepts and theories in the historical context, an urge which seems to 
raise little resonance.87  Monoson’s Plato’s Democratic Entanglement: Athenian Politics 
and the Practice of Philosophy (2000), on the other hand, argues that Plato, borrowing 
various democratic practices in his philosophical writing, is a loyal critic of the 
democracy instead of a diehard anti-democratic.88  Though, as some reviewers comment, 
what her argument has established is similarities between some of the democratic 
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practices and the Platonic dialogues rather than Plato’s loyalty or sympathy to the 
democracy.89 
In summary, we have seen that in political theorists’ discussion of the Athenian 
democracy, there are concerns along with the development of modern democracies since 
the mid-nineteenth century, in addition to the Thucydidean/ Platonic view that we have 
discussed in the previous section.  However, both of the theoretic traditions are equally 
sceptical towards the participatory way of life exemplified in the Athenian democracy.  
Political theorists and philosophers who follow these traditional views are therefore 
unable to appreciate fully the achievements of the democracy, especially in the fourth 
century B.C., even though some of the scholars have already recognized the serious gap 
between the established theoretic evaluation and the reality of the democracy.  On the 
other hand, it is something of a surprise that proponents of participatory democracy, such 
as B. Barber and S. Wolin, do not welcome the recent revaluation of the democracy by J. 
Ober and some other historians, either.  Yet, whatever the theoretic or practical 
considerations Barber and Wolin might have, it seems that a closer examination of how 
the democracy managed the complex situations of the Athenian society would be a great 
help for their cause of civic participation. 
II. Law, Reconciliation and Philosophy at the End of the Fifth 
Century B.C. 
It has been shown that there is a need to readdress the important issue of the Athenian 
democracy in the realm of political philosophy and theory, following a groundbreaking 
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development in the field of ancient history since the mid-1980s.  Now, we have to justify 
the approaches used in this thesis.  There are two issues.  The first is why, out of the 
democracy’s history of nearly two hundred years, we investigate only three events in the 
years of 411-399: the law reform, the reconciliation and the trial of Socrates.  The other 
issue is why we look for Xenophon’s and Plato’s responses to these events in this thesis.  
We start with the first issue. 
Here is a brief account of the historical background.  The last decade of the fifth century 
B.C. is one of the most volatile periods in the classical history of Athens.  Within ten 
years, the democracy suffered two serious military defeats.  Its whole expeditionary force 
was wiped out in Sicily in 413, and then the city of Athens itself capitulated to Sparta in 
403.  The democracy was overthrown twice following each of the military defeats, and 
the ensuing partisan conflicts within Athens escalated rapidly into bloody civil wars.  As 
a consequence of these violent years, tens of thousands of Athenians died, in addition to 
the loss of the Athenian empire.  As mentioned in the previous discussion, this decade 
used to be considered the tragic ending of the Athenian golden age due to the folly of the 
democracy.   
However, along with all these well-known unfortunate incidents, there is another side of 
the story that is far less recognized.  When we examine the democracy’s performance 
during this period of time, we find that it actually managed many of its military and 
political crises competently. For example, the democracy responded swiftly to the 
disastrous consequence of the Sicilian expedition with effective measures of damage 
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limitation.90  Besides, it came back to power within a very short time after being 
overthrown by its powerful oligarchic enemies.  Even more surprisingly, the democracy 
was capable of restoring political order and of saving Athens from the chaos left by the 
short-lived oligarchic regimes, which had essentially done nothing but deepened the 
crises of Athens to the brink of complete destruction.91  After all, the democracy steered 
itself successfully through these difficult years.  After its second restoration in 403, while 
most Greek poleis still suffered from their problems of civil strife, the Athenian 
democracy enjoyed exceptional stability throughout the fourth century B.C. until 
conquered by Macedon in 323.  The author of Aristotelian Athenian Politeia concluded 
that the democracy in 403 finally reached its full development, having firmly established 
the sovereign status of the demos.92  Considering the level of difficulty that the 
democracy had faced during this period, the resilience it showed and the long-term 
stability it created are truly amazing deeds.  They in fact constitute some of the most 
persuasive reasons for the urge of some historians to re-evaluate the Athenian democracy 
since the mid-1980s. 
The three events, the law reform, the reconciliation and the trial of Socrates, stand out as 
illuminating examples of how the democracy governed Athens after their imperial age.  
Firstly, the law reform was launched in 411 and went through several regimes, but it is 
the democracy which was responsible for its completion in 399.93  Several constitutional 
principles were laid down in this reform.  Athens was to be governed under ‘the ancestral 
constitution’.  The laws in force were only those which had been written down and 
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collected in a central archive through due procedures of legislation.  The laws should be 
applied equally to all the citizens.  No decree should violate the laws, and the ruling 
power of all magistrates must be based on the laws.  It is generally agreed that the 
democracy largely followed these constitutional principles in the fourth century B.C. 
Furthermore, the reconciliation refers to the generous act of the democracy towards the 
oligarchic regime of the Thirty and their collaborators after the return of the victorious 
democrats to Athens in 403.94  Having won the civil war in 404/3, the democracy, instead 
of avenging the brutality of the oligarchs who had killed one thousand and five hundred 
citizens in a few months of their reign, granted amnesty for their past crimes.  Besides, 
the oligarchs were free to rejoin the Athenian community or to leave for another city 
prepared by the democracy.   While in many other cities the land of the oligarchic classes 
was confiscated and redistributed, the Athenian oligarchs were allowed to keep their 
property intact under the democracy, even though part of that had been taken by force 
from the victims of the oligarchic coup.  The democracy honoured the amnesty and other 
terms of reconciliation faithfully not only in the immediate aftermath of the civil war, but 
throughout the fourth century B.C.  The great efforts that the Athenian democrats made to 
keep their oligarchic compatriots within Athens are some of the most revealing deeds in 
the history of Athenian politics. 
Nevertheless, beside the two successful stories of law reform and reconciliation, there 
was the infamous trial of Socrates that occurred during the same period.  Socrates was 
prosecuted by private citizens in 399 with the accusation that he was a source of 
corruption to the traditional norm of Athenian religion and politics.  He was tried and 
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condemned to death by the majority of the jurors, who were a fair sample of the Athenian 
citizenry.  Because of the trial and the execution, the Athenian demos is said to have been 
ignorant for reaching the wrong verdict, feeble under the sway of demagogues, 
irresponsible in making an innocent man the scapegoat for its own mistakes, dangerous in 
its dogmatic intolerance, and, finally, irredeemable for killing the most benevolent citizen.  
However, the democracy did not regret its verdict on the philosopher, as indicated more 
than fifty years after the trial in the following sentence of a forensic speech that still 
claimed that the Athenians ‘put to death Socrates the sophist…because he was shown to 
have been the teacher of Critias, one of the Thirty who put down the democracy’.95 
The three events of law reform, reconciliation and the trial of Socrates are chosen for the 
following reasons.  It is more than likely that the law reform and the reconciliation laid 
down the foundation of domestic peace for fourth-century Athens.96  The laws had been a 
main cause of political disorder in the later part of the fifth century B.C., as shown clearly 
in the two oligarchic coups.97  After the comprehensive revision of the laws and their 
collection in the written form during the law reform, the contents of the laws were now 
much more clearly defined.  As a result of the law reform, the laws, rather than being a 
cause of political dispute, became the effective governing principle that regulated the 
decision-making processes of the administrative and judicial sectors.  On the other hand, 
through the reconciliation between the Athenian democrats and oligarchs, the democracy, 
breaking away from the vicious circle of civil violence and revenge that still plagued 
many Greek poleis, re-established Athens and consolidated its communal fabric with 
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sympathy, forgiveness and trust.  In summary, as the domestic peace of the fourth-
century democracy has received growing attention from the mid-1980s onwards, the 
answers to this surprising achievement lie largely in the democracy’s law reform and its 
reconciliation with the oligarchs. 
These two events present one of the most serious challenges to the traditional suspicion 
of Athenian democracy.  As discussed above, there is a tendency to consider the demos 
an imminent threat rather than a constructive element in politics.  Yet, the success of the 
law reform and the reconciliation is not what we normally expect following this suspicion.  
The gad between the actual performance and the negative view of Athenian democracy 
therefore needs an explanation. 
As to the trial of Socrates, the main function of this infamous incident here is to balance 
with the favourable account of the democracy that will surely emerge from the successful 
stories of law reform and reconciliation.  The democracy’s trial of Socrates has been the 
most influential reason for its negative image portrayed since ancient times.  Many vices 
of ochlocracy such as ignorance, impetuosity and the tendency to be manipulated are said 
to be presented most clearly in this trial.  Therefore, there is an apparent inconsistency 
that requires an explanation.  While the demos appeared to be sensible or even generous 
in the law reform and reconciliation, why were the same group of people at the same time 
so determined in condemning Socrates, a man whom his philosophical pupils claimed to 
be not only innocent but also the wisest and most righteous?  This is a question that must 
be addressed in our defence for Athenian democracy. 
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Last but not least, to my knowledge, no research has so far produced a systematic survey 
of the three events altogether.  There are already many discussions about the democracy’s 
law reform and the reconciliation, mainly by scholars of ancient history, and the trial of 
Socrates has been one of the major concerns of political philosophers since ancient times.  
However, their discussion often focused only on one of the three events with little 
attention paid to the other two events.  This thesis, by contrast, proposes a comparative 
approach, exploring the interconnection among the events.  This approach will improve 
our understandings of an important episode in the Athenian history. 
III. Xenophon and Plato 
The discussion of Xenophon and Plato in this thesis is not a systematic examination of 
their democratic theories, but to prove the misuse of their works in the established 
suspicion of Athenian democracy.   Plato is arguably the most important philosopher in 
the history of western civilization.  Xenophon’s works remain an indispensable source for 
our understanding of Athenian culture, though he is now considered a secondary writer 
far behind Plato and Thucydides.  Many scholars believe that they are the authoritative 
voices in the evaluation of Athenian democracy, since they were not only insightful but 
also had personal experience with the democracy.  Their works, especially those about 
the trial of Socrates, are cited as hard evidence for the failure of Athenian democracy. 
There are two problems in this customary use of Xenophon and Plato.  The possibility of 
distortion due to their oligarchic background is often neglected.  Many scholars tend to 
presume their impartiality without examination against the actual development of 
Athenian politics or other ancient sources.  Besides, it is problematic to read Xenophon 
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and Plato simply as critics of democracy.   As shown later in this thesis, there is also 
recognition of democratic achievements and sympathetic understandings of the trial of 
Socrates in their works.  Their views of Athenian democracy are mixed observation 
rather than outright denial. 
Another reason for the discussion of Xenophon is that his view of the democracy 
provides a valuable comparison to Plato’s.  The two writers were contemporaries from 
similar political backgrounds and were both Socrates’ pupils.  However, they chose 
different ways of life.  While Plato withdrew from the public sphere to his academy, 
Xenophon continued pursuing a political career in various regimes.  Though sharing 
Plato’s contempt for common people, Xenophon is often seen struggling for their 
approval, which was essential for a successful public career in a democratic community.  
Xenophon was at the same time a Socratic philosopher and a politician.  Through his 
works and life, we find another approach to the relationship between democracy and 
philosophy that is more practical than the Platonic theory of philosopher-king. 
Thucydides’ and Aristotle’s views of Athenian democracy are not discussed because their 
works hardly cover the three historical events.  The account of Thucydides’ History, 
which ends around 410, provides no information about the result of law reform and the 
reconciliation.  Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics did not seem to be concerned with 
Athenian politics as much as Xenophon and Plato did.  Besides, neither Thucydides nor 
Aristotle provides an account of the trial of Socrates. 
Xenophon’s and Plato’s recognition of Athenian democracy can be proved by situating 
their works in the historical context of the fourth century when democratic Athens 
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recovered from the destruction of the Peloponnesian war.  Scholars often interpret 
Xenophon and Plato against the background of Athens’ downfall in the war and the trial 
of Socrates, and conclude that their works were strict criticism of the democracy.  
However, as Josiah Ober argues, the immediate and more proper background should be 
the revival of democratic Athens in the fourth century B.C. during which their works 
were written.  He wrote: 
 If we abandon decline and fall [of Athens] as the historical frame, and 
focus on democratic Athens’ unexpected recovery during precisely the 
period in which Plato was writing, it becomes evident that Plato’s real 
problem is with Athenian democracy as such , not with some fallen “age of 
iron” version thereof.98 
However, my thesis differs from Ober’s research of Greek political thought on three main 
points.  Firstly, instead of providing a general discussion of Greek political thinkers 
against the overall historical context of fourth-century Athenian history, my thesis 
focuses on three important events in the last decade of the fifth century B.C.  It provides 
detailed discussion of the debates surrounding the three historical events, on the one hand, 
and searches for Xenophon’s and Plato’s responses to them, on the other.  Secondly, 
Ober did not consider Xenophon as this thesis does.  Thirdly, Ober considers Plato a 
diehard antidemocrat who denied all the merits of the democracy decisively because of 
its execution of Socrates.99  By contrast, I argue that Plato (and Xenophon) did show 
noticeable appreciation of the democracy’s achievements in constitutionalism and 
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political harmony, despite their fundamental oligarchic position and the democracy’s 
execution of Socrates.  Their responses to the democratic projects of law reform and 
reconciliation will be discussed further in chapters five and six. 
IV. Primary Sources 
The content of this thesis is divided into two parts; the first is a historical survey of the 
three events conducted by the Athenian democracy at the end of the fifth century B.C., 
and the second part is philosophical discussion of Xenophon’s and Plato’s response to 
these events.  The sources and principles of interpretation for the two parts are different 
according to their different concerns. 
In the first part, we will re-evaluate the Athenian democracy from historical perspectives.  
It examines the democracy’s actual performance in three important historical events 
during a critical period of time: its law reform, the reconciliation and the trial of Socrates.  
Its discussion is mainly based on researches by historians rather than by political 
philosophers and theorists.  The primary texts used in this part are as follows.  
Thucydides’ History, Xenophon’s Hellenica and the Aristotelian Athenian Politeia 
provide a general framework for our understanding of the three events.  The speeches by 
Athenian orators such as Andocides, Lysias, Isocrates and Demosthenes, provide useful 
information about Athenian political life and institutions.  The laws and decrees recorded 
in orator’s speeches and inscriptions are important particularly for the reason that they 
represent the collective will of the Athenian demos. 
Besides, the works by the Sicilian historian Diodorus Siculus and the Roman historian 
Justin provide alternative accounts of the Athenian reconciliation.  As to the trial of 
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Socrates, Xenophon and Plato are our main sources.  Aristophanes’ Clouds presents a 
comical portrayal of Socrates.  Aristotle indicates some important aspects of Socrates’ 
philosophical pursuit.  Diogenes Laertius provides a biography of Socrates. 
In the second part of this thesis, we explore Xenophon’s and Plato’s philosophical 
reflections on the three events through a systematic survey of their works.  Their views 
on other political issues will be discussed only when they are relevant to the three events.  
In the case of Xenophon, his responses to the democracy’s constitutional achievement are 
largely revealed in some Socratic dialogues in his Memorabilia.  We find his praise of the 
democracy and its reconciliation in his Hellenica.  His view of Socrates and his trial is 
recorded in his Socratic Memorabilia and Apology.  His other works such as Anabasis, 
Cyropaedia, On the Cavalry Commander also provide important information about his 
political thinking. 
Plato’s views of the democracy also spread throughout his whole oeuvre.  However, his 
Laws and Statesman are the main dialogues for his response to the democracy’s 
constitutional achievements.  The Menexenus is the main source of his attitude towards 
the reconciliation.  While his Apology provides the fullest account of his view on the 
democracy’s trial of Socrates, there are second thoughts on this issue in his Statesman, 
Crito, Protagoras and the Republic.
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Chapter Two 
Athenian Democracy and the Law reform, 411/10-399 
We examine in this chapter the relationship between Athenian democracy and the law 
reform1 that was introduced in Athens about two years after its defeat in Sicily and fully 
implemented in 399, the year when Socrates was tried.  This reform was largely 
successful, in that it produced a legal framework that was stable until the democracy 
came to an end in 322.2  Of the five regimes in those 12 years the Four Hundred, the Five 
Thousand and the Thirty survived only a few months, and it was under the two restored 
democracies that most work of the reform was done.  Though it was the Four Hundred 
who first proposed to reform the constitution, scholars generally agree that there was no 
constitution in force or constitutional government in their temporary reign of terror.  
There is very little information about the government of the Five Thousand, while the 
government of the Thirty were notorious for their lawlessness.  By contrast, the first 
restored democracy launched a systematic survey of legal documents in 410, and the 
reform was accomplished in 399 under the second restored democracy with all the laws 
and practices examined and archived in written form.  Thereafter, the democracy 
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observed this constitution and its constraints on the popular government until its end in 
322.  In a word, the Athenian direct democracy in the fourth century B.C., through 
founding and maintaining its legal order in a chaotic age, appears to be a model of 
constitutionalism. 
The law reform is important in the discussion of ancient political thought for the reason 
that its success takes into question the traditional presumption of inherent tension 
between direct democracy and lawful order.  This event has been discussed by scholars of 
ancient history, especially since the mid-1980s.  There are mainly two issues in their 
discussion.  Firstly, though it is generally agreed that the democracy conducted a 
comprehensive revision of law in this reform, some scholars argue that it was limited in 
its scale and influence.  Secondly and perhaps more importantly, there is the issue of the 
relationship between the democracy and the laws.  Were the laws independent guiding 
principles that maintained the stability of Athens by putting the democracy under control?  
Did the democracy use the laws to reinforce its partisan control of Athens?  Or, is it 
something more complicated than these two views?  These two issues will be discussed 
below. 
 This chapter also provide a historical account of the law reform.  It starts with the 
Athenian disaster in Sicily in 413, continues with two oligarchic coups and subsequent 
restoration of the democracy after each coup, and ends with the completion of the reform 
in 399.  This account will provide the necessary historical context for our understanding 
of the relationship between the democracy and the laws. 
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I. The Scale of Reform 
Different views on the scale of the reform mainly result from different interpretations of 
the main sources:  Lysias’ Against Nicomachus and Andocides’ On the Mysteries.  While 
accepting the accounts of Lysias and Andocides, most scholars tend to believe that there 
was a thorough investigation and revision by certain professional magistrates, whose 
work resulted in a general codification and publication of the laws.  However, there are 
some problems with this interpretation.  First, Lysias and Andocides were not committing 
themselves to disinterested description; they were litigants ready to use deceptive words 
in the law courts.3 Therefore, their testimonies need very careful examination.  A further 
serious difficulty is that through the fourth century B.C. the extant public speeches only 
mentioned individual laws; no title of an Athenian law code was mentioned.  In other 
words, beyond Lysias’ and Andocides’ suspicious testimonies, there seems no other 
evidence supporting the existence of general codification of laws at the end of the fifth 
century B.C.4 Some scholars have consequently argued that there was no such project of 
general law revision, or, indeed, even if there was such a project, it did not produce a 
substantial outcome and therefore did not amount to a ‘constitutional’ event.5 
 Noel Robertson’s ‘The Laws of Athens, 410-399 B.C.’ may be one of the most 
comprehensive studies of this issue following this sceptic view in recent years.  He 
rejects Andocides’ own words and examines the scale of the reform with the cited 
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decrees alone.6  He concludes that there is no evidence for the existence of law reform or 
systematic review of all laws at that period, but only systematic collections of laws, 
selective reviews of laws, and temporary displays of new laws.7 
However, what Robertson has successfully questioned are only the publication or 
inscription of the law code and the legislative power of a)nagrafei=j, the law scribes in 
410-404.8  First, his article does not disprove the existence of a comprehensive project of 
law reform.  It has been widely recognized that there is little evidence that Athens 
displayed all of its laws permanently and systematically in a public place.  The difference 
is that Robertson claims there was no project of law publication at the outset, while most 
scholars believe that there was such a project, though it failed before long.9  Secondly, 
regarding the power of the a0nagrafei=j, Robertson’s view might be right when he 
suggests that the main task of these law scribes was to collect legal documents, not to 
revise and make laws; otherwise, Lysias could not have accused Nicomachus, an 
a0nagrafeu/j, of inserting new laws.10  Nevertheless, the point is that there must have 
been disorder found among the collected legal documents and, therefore, a requirement to 
make them more coherent.  Even though the job of law revision did not fall to the 
a0nagrafei=j, it was undertaken through other institutions.  Robertson himself also 
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admits that ‘the [legal] record thus compiled sometimes brought to light contradictions 
and uncertainties in the existing laws, which were then resolved by the bodies competent 
to do so, the Council and the Assembly.’11  Finally, Robertson claims that the scale of 
reform revealed by Teisamenus’ decree and the new laws enacted at about the same 
period was ‘very modest’.  However, he should consider the content of these new laws; 
only written laws had force, the laws applied to all citizens alike, no decree shall override 
a law, etc.12  It is hard to believe that the scale of the reform was modest from the 
evidence.13  The importance of the reform is also attested from another perspective.  Its 
systematic collection and inscription of legal documents, which was for the first time in 
Athenian history, helped make the laws public property rather than private possessions of 
experts.   The consistency of the laws should have also improved, since many 
contradictions among them would have been exposed and fixed in the process of 
collection and public display.  Contrary to Robertson’s view, both the developments were 
important steps towards the rule by the laws.14 
II. Democracy and Law in the Reform 
In Regard to the relationship between the Athenian democracy and the laws as revealed 
in the law reform, the theories proposed by scholars can be summarized as the rule of law 
against a power struggle. 15  The theory of the rule of law is that the law reform 
represented a triumph for the principle of the rule of law over the arbitrary nature of the 
democracy.  Quoting Martin Ostwald’s book title, the reform transformed Athenian 
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politics from ‘popular sovereignty’ to ‘the sovereignty of law’.16  This theory argues that 
the reform set up new institutions of legislation and judiciary which successfully 
contained the supposedly rash tendency of the democracy.  By contrast, the theory of 
power struggle argues that the demos, based on its partisan calculation, exploited the law 
reform as a political weapon to protect its democracy against oligarchic citizens.17 
i. The Rule of Law 
Mogens H. Hansen, Martin Ostwald and Raphael Sealey are the main proponents of the 
argument that the law reform was a triumph of constitutionalism.18   Hansen argues that 
the reform successfully put the democracy under the control of law by creating new 
judicial and legislative institutions that were independent of the assembly.   He points out 
that the investigation and revision of the laws were conducted by a group of legislators 
rather than by the assembly: ‘The Assembly had absolutely no role in the work of 
legislation.’ 19  The result of the law reform is a revolutionary constitutional framework: 
‘The Athenians acquired for themselves a new definition of a “law”, a new organ of 
legislation, a new legislative procedure, and a new procedure for the scrutiny of the 
laws.’20  These new arrangements served as ‘the organ of control for keeping the 
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Assembly and the political leaders in their place and for re-establishing respect for the 
laws.’21 
M. Ostwald argues that certain Athenian magistrates were responsible for the 
investigation of all the old and new laws, ‘in an attempt to coordinate scattered legislation 
into a coherent whole and to prepare and publish authoritative texts of the pa/trioi no/moi, 
especially those of Solon’.22  He also notices that the nomoqe/tai who completed this 
reform in 399 were independent of the Assembly; ‘no part of the new code could be 
proposed from the floor of the Assembly’.23  In his view, the outcome of the reform was a 
complete change in the nature of Athenian democracy; ‘law was to be supreme in the 
new democracy and that the demos could no longer regard whatever it pleased as valid 
and binding.’24  He considers this development the transference of sovereignty from the 
demos to the laws, which made Athens an almost ideal political community.  He praises 
that ‘thus the democracy achieved stability, consistency, and continuity when the higher 
sovereignty of nomos limited the sovereignty of the people.’25 
Sealey argues that the law reform fulfilled the tradition of the rule of law that was another 
important Athenian tradition in addition to its democracy.  He traces the tradition of law 
to the age of Solon, even earlier than the birth of democracy, arguing that ‘if the laws of 
Solon derived their authority from an oath sworn by all Athenians, they did not derive 
their authority from the vote of a majority in the Assembly.’ 26  This earlier tradition 
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existed independently and was neither a product nor a servant of the democracy.  R. 
Sealey argues: 
On the one hand, the Athenians had a concept of law as a set of permanent 
rules capable of serving as a framework within which resolutions could be 
passed by a majority in the assembly; so much is implied by the existence of 
the graphe paranomon.  On the other hand, the assembly was in the habit of 
passing resolutions without regard to any supposed limitations.27   
Sealey maintains that the law reform was meant to be a reinforcement of this legal 
tradition against the democratic tendency of abusing it, for the laws had been written 
down and more resistant to political manipulation.28 
 The theory of the rule of law has the advantage of drawing attention to the legal stability 
of fourth-century Athens that used to be neglected by scholars.  It also points out the 
complexity of the Athenian legal system and its dramatic change after the law reform. 
However, its claim that the laws were independent and superior to the democracy is 
problematic, particularly in the case of democratic Athens where the legislative and 
judicial functions were fulfilled almost always by common citizens in person rather than 
through independent experts.29   
One of the proponents of the rule of law theory, M.H. Hansen, tries to meet the objection 
to the distinction between law and democracy.  He argues that institutional designs made 
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a difference.  For example, The legislative power was transferred from the assembly to 
the law court in fourth-century Athens.  Though both institutions consisted of common 
citizens, Hansen argues that this institutional change has its advantages: the law court 
gave equal time to both the defenders and the prosecutors; the jurors swore to vote 
according to the laws and the principle of justice; they were better informed, since many 
of them had already heard the case in the Assembly; they also had more time of 
deliberation about law revision in the court than in the Assembly; the lottery of jurors and 
secret voting prevent faction, bribery and many other kinds of corruption.  Hansen argues 
that institutional arrangements such as these prevented the laws from being abused as 
they more likely were in the Assembly.30 
However, even if certain institutional innovation in the legislative and judicial sectors 
helped establish the authority of law in Athens, there remains the question why the 
democracy tolerated this constitutional development in the law reform that was supposed 
to restrain its lawless tendency.  As we will see later in this chapter, there was eventually 
no political group who could stand up to the demos.  The democracy was the 
predominant power that was actually responsible for the law reform and the subsequent 
lawful stability.  Hansen says vaguely that it was the Athenians who decided to ‘place 
some controls on the unlimited power of the people.’31  Sealey refers to the Athenian 
tradition of constitutionalism in the Athenian society.  Their views appear to say that the 
constitutional achievement relies on the demos’ wisdom and self-control.  Ostwald, on 
the other hand, credits the government of the Five Thousand with the success of the law 
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reform.32  However, his view is equally questionable, since the government of the Five 
Thousand is merely a short-lived transitional regime in the chaotic period at the end of 
the fifth century B.C.33 
The unsuccessful search for lawful authority independent from the interference of the 
people is arguably a reflection of the traditional negative view of Athenian democracy as 
a regime with an embedded tendency of lawlessness.  To explain the lawful stability in 
line with the traditional distinction between the rule of law and the rule of people, 
scholars tend to argue that fourth-century Athens was no more a radical democracy, but 
instead a republic under the sovereignty of law.34  However, this conclusion is hardly 
compatible with the political reality in Athens at the same period of time.  The laws could 
have little support from political groups other than the demos who remained the 
predominant power in fourth-century Athens. 
ii. Political Struggle 
The theory of political struggle, on the other hand, provides better understandings of the 
Athenian law reform, for it explains why the demos decided to revise the laws as it did.  
The main purpose of the law reform was to consolidate the democracy that had been 
overthrown twice in less than ten years by its oligarchic enemies.  Though there had 
already been some legal restrictions as a safeguard for the democracy, such as ostracism 
and paranomos, the two oligarchic coups in 411 and 404/3 proved their inadequacy.  The 
demos, therefore, launched a new constitutional project with the aim to consolidate the 
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democracy with a more powerful legal mechanism.  It deprived the Assembly of the 
legislative power, in case that this institution would vote the democracy out of existence, 
as it had done twice in the past.  Yet, the power to make law was still in the demos’ hand.  
It decided that the laws should have higher authority than decree, because the laws 
protected its interests.  By this view, Athenian government in the fourth century B.C. 
remained a partisan regime rather than a constitutional government. 
This is a widely accepted view among scholars.35  Alick R. W. Harrison pointed out over 
50 years ago that the democracy ‘deliberately invented a perfectly democratic brake’ to 
prevent the possible disastrous consequences of snap vote in the Assembly.36  Josiah 
Ober observes that ‘the Athenian masses were perfectly capable of maintaining two 
philosophically contradictory concepts [democracy and the rule of law] when they felt 
that each was valid and useful.’37  David Cohen argues that the laws ‘provided a very 
powerful “democratic” mechanism for social control and for the regulation of 
competition among those vying for power, wealth, and influence.’38  Mathew Christ says 
that ‘these reforms are best viewed as practical measures designed to ensure that the laws 
serve the interests of the demos more effectively rather than to redefine the relationship 
between the demos and the laws.’39 
At first glance, the theory of power struggle seems to echo the traditional negative view 
of Athenian democracy, since both of them consider the democracy a partisan regime 
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rather than government for the common good.  Yet, there is a fine line between these two 
views.  The traditional view tends to believe that the democracy, in its pursuit of egoistic 
interests, would sooner or later destroy itself and the whole community because of its 
excess or political incompetence.  The other view, by contrast, recognizes the 
democracy’s exceptional success in maintaining its ruling position.  What is suggested in 
the scholars’ quotations above is a highly competent popular government that learned 
from its mistakes, foresaw potential political problems, and pre-empted them with 
sophisticated political manipulation.  The fourth-century democracy may remain a 
partisan regime, but it was a very successful one in terms of its effectiveness and stability. 
However, the theory of power struggle tends to neglect two important aspects of the law 
reform.  First, its instrumentalist way of thinking may overlook the possibility that the 
demos did not only use the laws as a means to certain ends, but also believed in their 
intrinsic values.  The outcome of the law reform arguably reflects core democratic ideas 
such as equality and participation.   Second, it is simplistic to claim that the democracy 
used the laws for the consolidation of its government or for other partisan interests, 
without further examining how these political goals were understood by the democracy.  
This is a complex issue involving the democracy’s understanding of the relationship 
among the demos, the oligarchs and the Athenian community as a whole.  As we will see 
in the historical account of the law reform, during the ten years’ time the democracy 
developed different views of its political interests and strategy in relation to the wider 
society.  There will be further discussion on these issues in the concluding part of this 
chapter.  
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III. The Source Question 
i. Thucydides’ History vs. Athenian Politeia 
Thucydides’ History and the Aristotelian Athenian Politeia are two main sources for our 
understanding of the law reform.  Though it is generally agreed that they are compatible 
and even complementary to each other, their reports are contradictory at two points: one 
is about the sequence of two oligarchic regimes, the Four Hundred and the Five 
Thousand, and the other relevant issue is their views of the Athenian politician 
Theramenes and the so-called ‘moderate oligarchs’ who are responsible for the overthrow 
of the democracy and the establishment of the Four Hundred in the year of 411.40 
Firstly, regarding the sequence of the two oligarchic regimes, Thucydides reports that the 
Four Hundred existed before the Five Thousand, the former taking control of Athens 
from the democracy while claiming to set up a government of the Five Thousand in an 
appropriate time.41  However, the Four Hundred tried their best to put off the transfer of 
power to the government of the Five Thousand.  By contrast, Athenian Politeia reports 
that it is the Five Thousand that replaced the democracy and then granted all its 
responsibilities to the Four Hundred.42  Their accounts are plainly incompatible at this 
point. 
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This difference is relevant to their another disagreement over the evaluation of the Four 
Hundred.43  Athenian Politeia is more sympathetic to the Four Hundred than Thucydides.  
According to the latter, the Four Hundred used the constitution of the Five Thousand only 
as a cover for their autocratic ambition, holding political power in their own hands after 
the overthrow of the democracy, rather than transferring it to the government of the Five 
Thousand as they had promised they would.  By contrast, the version of Athenian Politeia 
suggests that at least some of the Four Hundred, that is, Theramenes and his followers, 
were sincere supporters for the constitution of the Five Thousand, since they put it into 
practice immediately after they overthrew the democracy.  Besides, the two-stage 
procedure via the democracy and the Five Thousand by which the Four Hundred was 
established enhanced the legitimate appearance of the Four Hundred, for the regime 
seems in this light more like a result of thorough and peaceful discussion. 
All in all, the images of the Four Hundred by Thucydides and Athenian Politeia are much 
different from each other.  According to the latter, the Four Hundred replaced the 
democratic government with theirs through a largely lawful procedure.  The demos 
abdicated mainly because they believed in the oligarchs’ ability to secure the alliance of 
Persia against Sparta.  The democracy passed Pythodorus’ proposal of setting up a 
constitutional commission, allowed any discussion against the established laws, and 
finally agreed to be replaced by the government of Five Thousand for the duration of the 
war against Sparta and Persia.  The Five Thousand, in turn, handed over the government 
to the Four Hundred with the task of tackling the immediate military crisis.  Thus, the 
Four Hundred was granted with autocratic power not because of their conspiracy and 
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violence, but due to the serious crisis by the folly of the democracy.  The sympathy of 
Athenian Politeia with the Four Hundred is revealed clearly in its conclusion that the 
Four Hundred was distinguished in their rule of Athens, though they soon stepped down 
for their military and diplomatic failure.44 
Thucydides, on the other hand, shows no such sympathy, reporting that the Four Hundred 
overthrew the democracy and acquired the autocratic power through crafty conspiracy of 
murder and terror.  The demos submitted to the Four Hundred not because of its trust in 
the Four Hundred, but due to fear and suspicion among the people spread by the Four 
Hundred.  Though there were formal consent of the assembly and the promise to set up 
the government of the Five Thousand in the future, these could not conceal the fact that 
the Four Hundred pursued their political ambition by killing their fellow Athenians, 
overthrowing the democracy, and finally betraying their fatherland to its Spartan enemy.  
Besides, the short-lived rule of the Four Hundred was a complete failure in all other 
aspects except their subversion of the democracy.  In their diplomacy and warfare, they 
did not succeed in securing the alliance of Persia or the peace treaty with Sparta.  
Defeated by Sparta off Eretria, they lost Euboea, a subject ally more useful to Athens 
than Attica.  Domestically, the Athenian navy at Samos was in revolt.  The city of Athens 
was also divided, many citizens finally marching in arms from Piraeus to the city, 
demanding the government of the Five Thousand.  It is because of the hesitant nature of 
Sparta, Thucydides observes, that the Athenian empire barely escaped the fate of 
destruction that it was led into under the Four Hundred.45 
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ii. The interpretative view presented in this thesis 
In Regard to the temporal sequence of the Four Hundred and the Five Thousand, it is 
better to follow most scholars’ view that Thucydides is more authoritative than Athenian 
Politeia.  The latter was written almost a century after the event, hence its narrative is 
more likely to have been distorted through time than the account of Thucydides, who 
lived at the end of the fifth century B.C.  Historians also doubt the authenticity of the 
constitutional documents quoted in Athenian Politeia, arguing that they were not likely 
official documents preserved in the state archive, but unofficial drafts, abridged private 
notes or, more probably, faked testimonies for the integrity of some conspirators, the so-
called ‘moderate oligarchs’ among the Four Hundred.46  Thucydides, by contrast, though 
relying mainly on his informants’ report while he was in exile at that time, still should not 
have mistaken obvious facts such as the succession of governments.47       
As to the evaluation of the Four Hundred, however, the implication behind Thucydides’ 
account that there was nothing but personal interests and ambition in the Four Hundred’s 
coming to power seems too radical to many historians.  The ideal of moderate leadership 
embodied in the portraits of Theramenes and some other oligarchs by Athenian Politeia 
seems to be a proper explanation of the law reform and other praiseworthy achievements 
at this period.  While Thucydides claims that there was absolutely no sincere proponent 
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of law reform among the leaders of the Four Hundred, most historians still tend to accept 
the defence provided by Athenian Politeia for the so-called moderate politicians such as 
Theramenes and his followers.  According to Athenian Politeia, this group of politicians 
went beyond the partisan struggle of democrats and oligarchs and were true supporters of 
the constitutional idea they proclaimed.  For example, it is said in A Historical 
Commentary on Thucydides that ‘we should accept Thucydides’ view, with the 
consequences that flow from it’.  One of the consequences should be the conclusion that 
there was no moderate leader at all among the Four Hundred.48  However, the 
Commentary also questions Thucydides’ view that the proposal of law reform was mere 
propaganda, arguing that ‘it is unlikely in fact that the original conspirators included no 
“moderates”’.49  The Commentary concludes that these faults of Thucydides might be 
attributed to the incompleteness of his book and the distortion of his informants.50  
Hignett, on the other hand, was more consistent on this issue.  He argues that, once 
accepting Thucydides’ version, we should abandon the myth of Theramenes that the 
politician ‘was the recognized leader of the moderates before the revolution of 411, 
entered into a coalition with the extremists and was then tricked by them.’51  Yet, what he 
rejects is only Theramenes’ own integrity rather than the existence of other moderate 
politicians.  He still relies on a list of Theramenean politicians provided by Athenian 
Politeia in explaining the success of the law reform and the reconciliation.52  The 
attraction of Athenian Politeia may lie in its tendency to explain the reconstruction of the 
Athenian legal order with a theory of moderate leadership without referring to the efforts 
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by the democracy.  On the other hand, though most historians prefer Thucydides, his 
narratives, based on realist approaches and ending up in a chaotic Athens, leaves 
historians at a loss for an explanation about the resilience of the democracy and its 
aftermath long-term stability in the fourth century B.C.53 
However, the tendency to consider the moderate leadership of Theramenean politicians as 
the dominant factor for the law reform and other political achievements after 411 should 
be avoided, for it may oversimplify the tension and complexity of Athenian politics.  
Firstly, the integrity of Theramenes and his group had been questioned as early as in their 
days.  It is risky to put much weight on a contention of such a long history of controversy.  
Secondly, most of the politicians were major collaborators of the oligarchies in 411/10 
and 404/3.  It is unlikely that the restored democracy ever believed in their innocence of 
the atrocities by the two oligarchies and trusted them with tasks as serious as the 
constitutional project.  Finally, as revealed in the development of the law reform, though 
its final outcome wins the universal praise of being a product of moderation, the several 
regimes that the reform had gone through adapted different constitutional measures, most 
of them contradicted one another because of their partisan nature.  There was hardly a 
persistent element of moderation that could be considered as evidence of the dominance 
of moderate leadership throughout the whole process of law reform. On the contrary, it is 
more likely that the success of the law reform relies mainly on the demos and the 
democracy. 
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IV. The Law reform, 411-399 
i. The Oligarchy of the Four Hundred 
When the news of defeat at Sicily arrived in Athens in 413, all Athenians realized that 
they were now facing a crisis of life and death.  It was expected that Sicily and Sparta 
would soon launch a further invasion into Athens and that the allies of Athens would 
revolt.54  At this moment, the Athenian people showed great determination and resilience 
in dealing with the crisis.  The democracy remained stable for two years.  However, the 
difficult situation of fighting the alliance of two powerful enemies, Sparta and Persia, 
finally robbed the Athenians of their confidence.  The Athenian demos, at first, was 
tempted to exchange its democracy for support from Persia.55  Later on, the oligarchs, by 
murder and terror, forced the demos to give up the democratic government.  An 
oligarchic government of the Four Hundred was finally established in 411. 
It was through legal procedure with the pretext of law reform that the oligarchs overthrew 
the democracy.  They proposed to replace the democracy with the government of the Five 
Thousand whose membership qualification was to ‘serve the State either in their own 
proper persons or financially’.56 The proposal to replace the democracy with the Five 
Thousand was acceptable among many Athenians at least for the period of crisis.  Some 
oligarchs might be sincere supporters of the proposal, but the leading oligarchs’ real 
purpose seemed to create a much narrower oligarchy for themselves.  The democracy was 
terminated through a legal procedure of constitutional amendment.  The oligarchs called 
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for the Assembly and set up a plenipotentiary committee (suggrafei/v) with the task of 
preparing a draft of ‘the best possible government’.  When the committee only advised at 
a later Assembly that the law of para/nomov be suspended and ‘any Athenian should be 
allowed to make whatever suggestions he liked with impunity’, the oligarchs proposed 
that the democracy be replaced with a government of the Four Hundred, which they 
claimed was a preparation for the government of the Five Thousand. 
A rider proposed by one called Cleitophon reveals an important aspect of the Athenian 
concept of law.  He suggested that the constitutional committee should also investigate 
and consider ‘the ancestral laws’ while preparing its draft of a new constitution.57 It 
cannot be sure whether he was trying to promote or to block the oligarchic cause, since a 
wide range of political agendas could claim support from the ideal of ‘the ancestral 
constitution’.58 
What was the effect of the Four Hundred on the Athenian law reform of 411 to 399?  The 
conclusion that the constitutional proposal of the Four Hundred was merely a false 
propaganda for their political ambition does not mean that their coup brought no 
consequence on the Athenian laws.  Though it would be unlikely that the successive 
regimes followed their project, the Four Hundred might have produced some knock-on 
effects on the subsequent law reform.  Firstly, as the theory of power struggle indicates, it 
is reasonable for the democrats to protect the democracy with more rigorous legal 
arrangements after their suffering of the abuses of the laws first by the Four Hundred and, 
seven years later, by the Thirty.   The decree of Demophantus and the deprivation of the 
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legislative function of the Assembly would be two examples of such consideration.  The 
decree, granting honour and impunity to murderers if they had killed in the name of 
democracy, could have the effect of eradicating any anti-democratic proposal and 
discussion.  The institution of Assembly, deprived of the legislative power, could not vote 
out the democracy again.  Secondly, the idea of ‘the ancestral laws’ became an important 
political issue after the Four Hundred.  The Four Hundred used the slogan of the ancestral 
constitution to defend their autocratic rule,59 claiming they were following the traditional 
laws rather than altered them or enacted new ones.60  Their version of the ancestral laws, 
obviously, was not compatible with the democrats’ understanding.61  Given the 
importance of law in the Athenian society, these disputes over the contents of law needed 
to be solved.  This purpose was arguably one of the main motives behind the law 
collection and investigation project from 410 to 399.   
ii. The Five Thousand and the First Restored Democracy 
The oligarchic regime of the Four Hundred collapsed a few months later, leaving Athens 
in chaos.  Thucydides gave us a list of the crises facing Athens.  Euboea had been lost to 
Sparta, a blow which was more deadly than the disaster in Sicily.  The city itself was on 
the brink of civil war; its navy either defeated or in revolt abroad.  Furthermore, the great 
fleet of Sparta was approaching the harbour of Athens.  It was in such a dire situation that 
the Athenian people assembled, overthrew the oligarchy of the Four Hundred, and set up 
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the government of the Five Thousand.  The new government later launched its law 
project.62 
Though few things are known about the law project of the Five Thousand, M. Ostwald 
claims that the Five Thousand ‘ushered in a period of law reform that had no precedent in 
Athenian history’ with the purpose of constraining the popular sovereignty by the written 
laws.63  He also presumes that the constitutional project of the Five Thousand was 
continued by the restored democracy.  However, there is no reason to believe that the 
democracy followed the direction of the Five Thousand in such a critical matter.  Two 
things are sufficient to illustrate the radical difference between the two regimes.  First, 
Theramenes, supposedly the major proponent of the government of the Five Thousand, 
lost the people’s support after the restoration of the democracy.64  More decisively, the 
decree of Demophantus, as mentioned below,  revealed most clearly the radical character 
of the restored democracy that was the opposite of the constitutionalist principle that 
Ostwald claims to be laid down by the Five Thousand.65 
The democracy, restored ‘in the summer of 410’,66 assigned the job of law collection to a 
group of magistrates called syngrapheis.67  Though these magistrates were not guaranteed 
the mandate to revise the laws, it is generally believed that their work is preparation for a 
general law revision, about which there is scant information.    
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The performance of the democracy at this period seems to match up the typical image of 
the tyranny of the majority.  It showed no respect for the laws as an independent authority, 
but made them subject to the demos’ partisan interests or passion, abusing them to punish 
their enemies.  There seemed a series of prosecutions; many suspected supporters of the 
Four Hundred were partially deprived of civil rights.68 There was the infamous trial in 
which the generals of the naval battle off Arginusae were put to death in 406 through 
unlawful procedure by the demos who was overwhelmed by anger or politicians’ 
instigation.69 
Yet, these examples above have not fully described the demos’ ruthless use of the laws, 
compared with Demophantus’ law against subverting the democracy in 410/09, one of 
the earliest pieces of legislation by the first restored democracy.  This law demanded that 
any one who plotted to overthrow the democracy was an enemy of Athens whom all 
citizens were required under oath to kill.  The reward of murder was tempting.  The 
murderer in such cases would be rewarded with half of the property of the murdered, and 
the state promised to care for his descendents if he was killed in his action.  The law even 
overrode religious taboo, claiming that the murderer caused no religious contamination, 
since the murdered was by definition an enemy of the state and that all oaths were 
deemed annulled if sworn to overthrown the democracy.70 
The demos at this period of time, as Aristotle criticised, identified itself with the 
community of Athens and mistook the interests of the democracy for the interests of all 
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citizens.71  As Plato criticized, it tried to pre-empt all possible threats to their partisan 
regime by violent means.72  Therefore, citizens who attempted to overthrow the 
democracy were considered enemies of Athens and were no longer fellow citizens. All 
Athenian citizens were imposed with the same obligation to protect the democracy by all 
means, regardless of their political inclinations.  The identification of the demos with the 
Athenian community became the supreme principle over the whole society, the laws and 
other social regulation being modified utterly to fit the needs of the democracy.  
Demophantus’ law overrode Draco’s law on homicide that was republished at about the 
same time.  The obligation for all Athenians to kill the conspirators and collaborators 
meant that all social connections, such as family and friendship, could be cut off for 
political reasons.  Even religious conviction was compromised; the oaths sworn in the 
name of the gods could be annulled, and the action of murder, by defining the murdered 
as an enemy of Athens, was a deed of purification rather than pollution. 
iii. From the Naval Battle of Aegospotami to the Coup of the Thirty   
Popular opinion started to change after the rout of the Athenian fleet in the naval battle of 
Aegospotami in 405, as Patrocleides’ decree suggested.73   The decree decided that, with 
the exclusion of certain fugitives, the oligarchs of the Four Hundred and other citizens 
who had been deprived of civil rights, due to economic or other reasons, should have 
their full civic rights back.  Now they could speak and make propositions freely to the 
demos.  This measure, as expected at that time, was proposed in the name of the ancestral 
laws.   The contemporary orator, Andocides, rightly observed that their restoration of 
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citizenship indicated a radical change from civil division to unification. (o(mo/noia)74  This 
decree concluded with the hope that ‘the Athenians may live in all security (or with all 
trust, pisto/tata) both now and hereafter.’75   
However, Athens finally surrendered to Sparta, and the oligarchy of the Thirty was set up 
in 404/3.  Once again the Assembly was forced to terminate the democracy, and the law 
investigation stopped.76  Though extremely notorious for their lawless behaviour, the 
Thirty claimed at the very beginning of their rule to investigate the ancestral constitution, 
which they promised would be the principle for their rule and revision of the laws.77  
However, several laws were nullified or amended; the laws of Ephialtes were nullified 
and the sovereign power of the jury men abolished, and the Thirty also revised the 
Solonian laws, claiming to stop sycophancy.78  One interesting thing is that the Thirty 
seemed to be the only politicians that publicly criticized the Solonian or ancestral laws in 
this period. 
iv. The Second Restored Democracy 
The oligarchy of the Thirty survived only a few months before the democracy was 
restored again.  An agreement of reconciliation was achieved between the democrats and 
the oligarchs, including the freedom for all the Athenians to live in either the city of 
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Athens or the self-governing Eleusis, a general amnesty for the past misconduct, and a 
government according to the ancestral constitution.79 
Under the atmosphere of reconciliation the project of law reform, resumed soon after the 
restoration of democracy, was unlikely to make extremely partisan laws against the 
oligarchs.  On the contrary, the demos tried hard to keep its former enemies within the 
Athenian community.  The severe law of Demophantus against subversion of the 
democracy was either suspended or abrogated.80  The amnesty covered most of the 
oligarchic supporters for all their misconduct in the days of the Thirty, except for the 
leaders and those who had committed murder with their own hand.81  Someone who tried 
to instigate popular hatred toward the oligarchs was put to death without trial.  Finally, 
Pericles’ law of citizenship confirmed again that only children of Athenian astoi could be 
Athenian citizens.  The decree of Thrasybulus that granted Athenian citizenship to the 
democrats’ non-Athenian comrades was annulled.   Accepting their oligarchic enemies 
with abundant generosity, but rejecting the foreign comrades with little gratitude, the 
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democracy seemed determined to reconstruct not just a democracy, but a democracy 
based on a strict principle of ethnicity. 
The law reform was finished at 399.  The democracy confirmed again the ancestral laws 
as the principle and substantial content of its constitution.82  The ancestral constitution 
was no longer elusive ideas or empty words from politicians, but what Nicomachus and 
his colleagues had collected and written down since 410.83 The authority of the laws was 
well maintained by the following innovative procedural regulations: under no 
circumstances all magistrates should thereafter enforce an unwritten law, no decree 
should override a law, and no laws should be applied to individual citizens if not applied 
to all citizens.84  Besides, any decree that violated the laws would be annulled through the 
prosecution of grafai\\ parano/mwn and grafai\ no/mon mh\ e0pith/deion qei=nai.85  
In addition to the collection of the ancestral laws, there was a new legislative procedure 
in Teisamenus’ decree for new laws if necessary.86  The procedure was divided into two 
stages and through several institutions.  At the first stage, the Council elected a group of 
legislators to prepare a draft of the new law.  The draft was then displayed to the public 
and then handed over to the responsible officers. At the second stage, the Council and a 
new group of five hundred legislators elected by the demes examined the draft.  All 
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citizens could also provide their respective advice.  If the draft was ratified, the 
magistrates should apply the new law under the guardianship of the Areopagus council.87 
In summary, only three types of law were in force after 403; the first was ‘the laws that 
were enacted under democratic government before the archonship of Eucleides’, the 
second was ‘the laws that were enacted during the archonship of Eucleides and are on 
record’, and the last type of law was those ‘enacted after the archonship of Eucleides or 
laws that shall hereafter be enacted’. 88  All the laws that were in force since 403 were to 
be written down and registered in a newly built official archive called Metroon.89   
The development of Athenian legal system is now completed.  According to Athenian 
Politeia, the law reform from 403 to 399 was the final constitutional change in the history 
of Athens.90  From here until its end in 322, the restored democracy maintained the 
stability of both its government and the laws. 
V. Conclusion 
i 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, there are mainly two theories about the 
achievement of the law reform.  One believes that the reform was a triumph of the rule of 
law over populism, while the other explains it from the perspective of political struggle, 
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considering the reform a successful manipulation of the laws by the democracy to its own 
advantage.  It is noteworthy that, though having different views on the law reform, both 
the theories challenge the traditional negative view of Athenian politics in some ways.  
The Athenian constitutional government as argued in the explanation of the rule of law 
differs from the tradition view of Athens as a disordered society.  The theory of political 
struggle suggests that Athenian democracy was a cunning master of political manoeuvre 
rather than a mob of common people as it used to be labelled. 
 The theory of the rule of law argues that the law reform created a legal system 
independent to some extent of the Athenian partisan politics.  The theory gains strong 
support from both the Athenian legal texts and the stability of Athenian legal order after 
the reform.  The laws quoted in Andocides’ speech attest the independence of law from 
the demos or the assembly.91  All the laws had authority over the decrees of the Assembly 
and the council, and the authority of law came not from the Assembly or the demos, but 
from the fact that it had been a law in the past or because of the legislation of the council 
and the elected legislators.  The laws had to be written down, so the possibility of the 
laws being distorted or abused has lessened.  It was now more difficult to use the laws 
against particular political enemies due to their equal appliance to all citizens.  Perhaps 
most importantly, the designs mentioned above for constitutional independence were not 
only a temporary arrangement; they were observed throughout the fourth century B.C. 
The theory of the rule of law gives an explanation for the constitutional stability of 
Athens since 403, but has problems in its tendency to play down the role of the 
democracy.  The theory tends to emphasise that the function of the rule of law was to 
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constrain the ruthlessness of the democracy, ignoring the fact that the rule of law was 
fulfilled and maintained under the direct democracy.  Considering the extent of civil 
participation in Athenian politics, it is hard to believe that the democracy or the demos 
had nothing positive to do with the establishment of the lawful order. 
The theory of political struggle, on the other hand, believes that the democracy 
successfully exploited the laws to justify its political authority and to control its 
oligarchic citizens.  The theory has the advantage of taking into account the reality of 
Athenian politics.  It correctly pointed out that the Athenian laws were part of democratic 
politics rather than an independent authority.  As we have seen, the democracy was the 
architect of the law reform, and in most cases the demos participated intensively in the 
legislative and judicial activities of the laws.  Besides, the law reform was, in a sense, 
competition for the legitimacy of political power.  The democracy was overthrown twice 
by the oligarchs with the pretext of law revision in the reform.  There is good reason to 
believe that the demos, having learnt from its experience, would take particular care of 
the laws after its hard-won victory in the competition, to make sure that the laws would 
not contradict again what it thought were its essential interests. 
ii 
However, the theory of political struggle may miss some important aspects of the law 
reform.  Its instrumental way of thinking that the democracy used the laws mainly as a 
partisan means tends to deny the intrinsic connection between the democracy and the 
laws.  In fact, there is a possibility that the demos made the laws following its political 
belief rather than cost-benefit analysis.  There should be a conceptual distinction about 
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the relationship between Athenian democracy and its laws.  The laws were democratic in 
two senses; they promoted demotic interests, or they reflected democratic values.  It is the 
second function of the laws that we might overlook when seeing the law reform from the 
perspective of political struggle. 
Some intrinsic connections between democratic values and the laws may be argued as 
follows.  The democratic belief that all citizens were equal members of the community 
can be found in one of the important results of the law reform that all laws should be 
applied to all citizens equally.92  It is also reflected in the principle that all magistrates 
ruled only by the laws, which means that no citizen should have arbitrary power over 
others even when he was in charge of the government.  There is more evidence for 
another democratic value of participation.  As the democracy restored in 403, Athens 
went back to the participatory way of life.  Ruling officials did not have arbitrary power, 
but were demanded to rule by the laws.  Citizens discussed and decided lawful issues as 
well as other public affairs.  The collection of laws in the state archive and display of 
legal drafts in public places improved public access to the laws to an unprecedented level.  
In a sense, the outcome of the law reform embodied the important democratic value that 
to be a citizen of Athens was to participate in its public affairs.93 
iii. 
Another important aspect of the law reform that is often neglected by scholars is the 
demos’ ability to learn and adapt their view of politics.  Both the perspective of the rule 
of law and that of power struggle tend to presume that the Athenian demos was a pursuer 
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of self-interests even at the expense of common interest or the interest of others.  
However, the distinction between demotic and other interests are dynamic rather than 
static.  As shown in the history of Athens at the end of the fifth century B.C., the policies 
of the second restored democracy regarding the laws and other political issues in 403 was 
much more generous than the first restored democracy in 410, a difference that suggests a 
dramatic change in the Athenian demos’ understanding of self-interest in relation to other 
political groups and the whole community. 
The last stage of law reform was obviously dominated by the concern of rebuilding the 
Athenian community in terms of ethnicity.  Athens was defined principally as the 
exclusive community of Athenians and their offspring.  The laws in force were claimed 
to be the laws of Athenian common ancestors.  Athenian oligarchs were not expelled 
from the community because of their plot against the democracy or other serious crimes 
while the foreigners could not join the community even when they had sacrificed their 
lives for the cause of democracy. 
This is a great change.  Compared with previous stages of law reform, we found that the 
democracy after 403 continued with the reconciliatory spirit of Patrodeides’ decree in 405 
rather than returned to the tyrannical mode of Demophantus’ law in 410.  It is of course 
an exaggeration to claim that the democracy after 403 transformed itself from a partisan 
regime to an ideal constitutional government, whose only concern was the common good 
of the whole community.  However, we can at least argue that the democracy had learnt 
to put its partisan interests into the broader context of the whole community.  The demos 
and the democrats, though the predominant part of the Athenian community, were still 
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less than the whole community which also contained many oligarchic citizens.  A 
flourishing Athens relied on the cooperation of both the democrats and the non-democrats.  
The democracy would have realized this lesson to its own cost.  As we have seen, after 
all its military and political disasters in the past years, the democracy tried hard to strike a 
balance between democratic interests and communal harmony, taking into account the 
non-democratic elements of the community. 
In other words, we may say that the democracy after 403 learned the political art of 
compromise.  Some results of the law reform could be interpreted from this perspective.  
As we have seen in this chapter, ‘the ancestral laws’ were the dominant principle of 
Athenian political order.  To alleviate suspicion on all sides, the ancestral laws which 
would be valid thereafter should be clear and certain.  Therefore, the Athenians 
announced that only the laws enacted in specific times would be valid and that all the 
valid laws must be written down.  A state Archive at Metroon collected all the valid laws 
and other documents for public reference.  The predictability of the future to all citizens 
was further strengthened by the magistrates’ duty to apply only the written laws, the 
general appliance of the laws, and the laws’ superiority over the decrees of the Assembly 
and the council.  Furthermore, the legislative procedure in the Teisamenus’ decree could 
be considered a compromise of the democrats and the oligarchs.  Since the superiority of 
law to decree had been established, the legislative power would be the most fiercely 
competed target.  Monopoly of the legislative power by any particular political group 
would not be an likely solution.  This decree provided an acceptable arrangement by 
dividing the legislative process into two stages and distributing the legislative power 
among three institutions.  The assembly now lost all its legislative power.  Of the three 
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legislative institutions, only the council was appointed by the democratic method of 
lottery, the other two groups of legislators being elected either by the council or by the 
demes.  The election of legislators did resemble the procedure of oligarchic coups in 
411/10 and 404/3.  However, while the Four Hundred and the Thirty had become 
tyrannical by grasping the complete executive and legislative powers at the same time, 
the two legislative groups elected by the Teisamenus’ decree had only part of the 
legislative power respectively, and held no executive power at all. Their power was 
further limited because they were ad hoc rather than standing committees. 
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Chapter Three 
The Reconciliation of Athens in 403 B.C. 
The democracy decided to reconcile with the oligarchs after its miraculous victory over 
the Thirty in 403.  Among other issues, it was agreed that there would be no prosecution 
of collaborators of the Thirty in most cases, that oligarchs were free to leave Athens, and 
that Athens should be ruled by the ancestral laws.  The democracy observed these 
reconciliatory terms faithfully, and civil strife ceased to be a serious problem in Athenian 
politics in the fourth century B.C.   
Given the ferocity of the Athenian civil war, it is surprising that the war finished in a 
relatively peaceful way, an achievement that was even praised by its contemporary 
critics.1  Xenophon described the democrats as pious and generous people in contrast to 
the ruthless Thirty.2  Athenian Politeia observed that the people ‘appear both in private 
and public to have behaved towards the past disasters in the most completely honourable 
and statesmanlike manner of any people in history’.3  Even Plato wrote that ‘so readily 
and naturally—so much contrary to the expectations of the other Greeks—did the citizens 
from the Piraeus [i.e. the democrats in exile] and those from the city [i.e. the oligarchs] 
deal with each other!’4 
However, this achievement of Athenian democracy has been largely dismissed in the 
study of ancient political history and philosophy.  Even though the Athenian 
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reconciliation is recently getting more attention,5 most scholars still tend to downplay its 
significance or to dispute the demos’ contribution to its achievement. 
With knowledge of the law reform in the previous chapter, this chapter will provide a 
balanced account of the reconciliation.  It will also prove that Athenian democracy 
deserves a better image than it has received from traditional views.  It concludes that 
what the democracy did in the reconciliation is to strike a balance between the goals of 
democratic consolidation and communal harmony by putting its partisan interests in the 
broader context of the community.  It is not, as suggested by most scholars, that the 
democracy made an either-or choice between partisan interests and the common good.  
Before reaching this conclusion, a historical account will be provided to clarify some 
important issues about the reconciliation, including its goals, terms and the degree of its 
success, as well as the role of the democracy in this great event. 
I. Literature review 
The reconciliation of Athens constitutes a difficult case for scholars of ancient history, for 
the restoration of domestic peace under Athenian democracy appears to be at odd with 
the traditional and pessimistic view that Athens was in a process of decline since the 
death of Pericles.  Historians’ vacillation on their assessment of the demos in 403 is 
clearly demonstrated in Claude Mossé’s Athens in Decline, 404- 386 (1973).  Mossé 
differs from most historians in his insistence that the democrats returned to Athens as the 
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victors.6  Therefore, in his opinion, pressure from Sparta and the Athenian oligarchs does 
not account for the moderation of the demos.  However, he still hesitates to credit the 
demos with its achievement.  Instead, he promises that ‘an analysis of the material 
situation of Athens’ could provide the answer.7 His promise failed; her material analysis 
leads to the conclusion that the economic conditions, impoverished by the war, do 
nothing positive but intensified conflicts among the Athenians.  While the poor and the 
city people longed for another war for the opportunities of jobs, booty and imperial glory, 
the rich and country people disliked sharing the cost and the destructive consequence of 
war.8  Therefore, the question of ‘the stability of Athens…which forms so remarkable a 
contrast with the disturbed state of other parts of the Greek world’ turns out to be 
unanswered.  He finally provides a list of possible causes which are in fact largely 
irrelevant.9 His pessimistic view on fourth-century Greece might be the cause of his 
problem.  He argues that ‘the moral confusion, the disloyalty towards the gods of the 
polis was to increase during the fourth century B.C., in association with that decline of 
the civic consciousness which reveals the slow break-up of the civic community and 
heralds the end of the city-state.’ 10  His observation of the long term tendency of Greece 
might be right, but he has difficulty in explaining the reconciliation. 
In any case, there are two main theories about the Athenian reconciliation: realism and 
Loraux’s ‘anthropological’ perspective.  A common view of the reconciliation is that the 
demos was simply forced into reconciliation with the oligarchs because of the pressure of 
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Sparta.  The vivid reports of Thucydides and Xenophon on the Athenian people’s 
behaviour in the plague, their invasion of Melos, and the trial of the ten generals in 406 
has created the notorious image that the demos was naturally liable to manipulation by 
passion and partisan interests, having little forethought for the consequences to itself as 
well as to others.11  It is generally believed that the democrats would have exacted their 
revenge on the defeated oligarchs had they been confident in their power over outside 
constraints.  There could be no reconciliation at all without the intervention of Sparta.   
The political order was restored not because of the Athenian virtue of dealing with 
conflict in non-violent ways, but because of an incidental balance of forces among the 
democrats, the oligarchs, and, most important of all, Sparta.  In this chapter, I am going to 
refer to this line of interpretation as realism.12 
Another approach that might be called ‘anthropological’ perspective refers to the strong 
sense of community among Athenians.  It argues that this communal feeling constitutes 
one of the main reasons that the democrats gave up their right of revenge on the defeated 
oligarchs.  It also points out the tension between democratic interests and communal 
unity, arguing that the demos actually sacrificed its democracy for the sake of community.  
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In contrast to its egoistic image in the view of realism, Athenian democracy has been 
portrayed as an altruistic government from this communitarian perspective.  
As discussed below, the communitarian approach has an advantage over the realist 
approach because of its proper recognition of the reconciliatory achievement and the 
contribution of the democracy in this project.  However, neither of the two approaches 
provides satisfactory explanation of this important event. 
i. Realism 
1. Traditional view 
As mentioned above, realism has been the dominant explanation of the reconciliation.  It 
is often argued from this perspective that the democracy did not choose but was forced 
into reconciliation by certain external factors, especially the attitude of Sparta which was 
supposedly the guardian of Athenian oligarchs.  It is said that, had it been possible, the 
demos would not have voluntarily given up its revenge on the oligarchs.  For example, 
Stephen Todd concedes that the reconciliation was successful to a certain extent, but he 
also stress that ‘the reason for this was not democratic magnanimity, or the existence of 
an all-powerful ‘moderates’ faction, but the threat of Sparta.’13  
 Thomas C. Loening’s The Reconciliation Agreement of 403/ 402 B.C. in Athens (1987) 
is an important work on this issue.  Though pointing out that the peaceful outcome of the 
Athenian civil war was extraordinary, Loening does not argue that the Athenian way of 
thinking and behaviour were anything different from the way they had been in wartime.  
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The reconciliation was mainly achieved by the political and military conditions at that 
moment.  All the three parties involved in the negotiation, the democrats, the oligarchs, 
and the Spartans, made their decisions according to nothing other than their partisan 
interests.14  Besides, he concludes that ‘[t]he triumph of the reconciliation treaty must be 
credited in large part to the leaders of the restored democracy, especially Archinos and 
Thrasyboulos, who were far-sighted enough to recognize that the renaissance of Athens 
depended upon peace and harmony among all its citizens.’ 15 
Another recent example is Cynthia Schwenk.  Though appreciating the stability and other 
achievements of the fourth-century Athens, she still argues that Sparta has the credit for 
the political achievement of Athens, not only because Sparta decided not to destroy 
Athens and tolerated the restoration of the democracy, but also because it acted as a 
powerful constraint on ‘the strongest passions and hatreds created [among Athenians] 
during the rule of the Thirty’.16 
Barry Strauss summarizes the external factors that are said to force the democrats to 
reconcile with the oligarchs.  He argues that the remaining strength of the oligarchs and 
the Spartan army were the true foundation for the moderation of the democrats.  Another 
important reason is the decreased population of the demos which was outnumbered by 
the richer citizens by at least 20 percent because of their greater casualties in the war.17  B. 
Strauss also seems to credit the ‘Theramenean’ or moderate oligarchs with the 
reconciliation.  He concludes:  
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The ranks of the men of the City were not small, for Archinus had limited 
the number who could emigrate to Eleusis.  They included a general and 
secretary of the Council for 403/ 402.  Three leaders of Phyle and Piraeus 
were former Theramenists: Anytus, Archinus and Phormisius.  Add to this 
the population problems of the thetes and the watchful eyes of Sparta, and 
it is no surprise that the restored democracy avoided radicalism.18 
This line of interpretation reflects the strong influence of the traditional suspicion of 
Athenian democracy.  It tends to dismiss the achievement of reconciliation, considering it 
merely an accidental event based on precarious checks and balances of power.  The 
Athenian demos, supposedly still keen on revenge, was seen as a potential threat to the 
fragile peace agreement, and many policies and decisions by the democracy actually 
violated the spirit of reconciliation, if not its terms.  As to the limited success of the 
reconciliation, it is often credited to factors other than the demos and its government. 
This dominant view of the reconciliation is not without its problems.  Firstly, as discussed 
later in this chapter, the reconciliation is highly successful in terms of the enforcement of 
reconciliatory regulations and the consequent Athenian internal peace.  It is unfair to 
deny the success of reconciliation, as some scholars did, by applying strict criterions such 
as complete oblivion and unconditional forgiveness of the past crimes committed by the 
Athenian oligarchs.  It is equally problematic to describe the exceptional long-term 
domestic peace of Athens after the civil war as nothing but a precarious balance of power.  
Secondly, most factors used in realist explanations are far from being decisive as they 
appear to be.  The role of ‘Theramenist’ or moderate politicians has been highly 
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controversial since ancient times.  Neither their morality nor their political leadership at 
the end of the fifth century B.C. should be taken for granted.19  The influence of Sparta, 
though important at the beginning of the reconciliation, soon faded out a few years later.  
Besides, it is likely that Athens was allowed to have complete freedom in the domestic 
affairs as long as it followed Sparta in its foreign policies.20  The only remaining factor 
left in B. Strauss’ list is then the post-war structure of Athenian population, whose 
diversity arguably prevented the demos from taking revenge on the oligarchs.  However, 
even this is questionable, since the political diversity of Athenian population is more like 
a result of the reconciliation rather than its condition, as discussed below. 
2. Recent discussions 
The recent articles in Transactions of the American Philological Association, 2002, show 
further developments of the realist tradition.  These articles were also suspicious of 
ancient writers’ praise of the demos for the reconciliation, arguing that the demos’ moral 
character may not constitute an adequate explanation for the achievement of the 
reconciliation.21  A realist concept of self-interested human nature is presumed: people 
‘make choices in such a way as to optimize the outcome or outcomes that he most desires, 
given his beliefs.’22  Following this assumption, Athens was portrayed as a city of 
suspicion and fragmentation by which revenge on the oligarchs was suspended.  James M. 
Quillin argues that the Athenians refused to approve prosecutions of the oligarchs 
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because they were afraid that the prosecutors ‘would use the power afforded to them by a 
conviction not to attack the enemies of the demos, but to destroy any who opposed them 
and to keep everyone else quiet through fear of prosecution.’23  On the other hand, 
Andrew Wolpert concludes that ‘perhaps the Athenian people were so divided after the 
civil war that it was impossible for them to revert to a state of civil unrest with the 
community divided into two (and only two) warring factions.’24   
The realist theories of J. Quillin and A. Wolpert show some progress compared to their 
predecessors.  The traditional view tends to differentiate the demos from other political 
groups for the demos’ supposedly vulnerability to egoism and impetuosity.  Quillin and 
Wolpert do not seem to share such elitist values.  Their understanding of the demos as 
rational pursuer of maximum self-interest seems to be based on a common understanding 
of human nature that is prevalent in modern social sciences.  They are also right in 
putting aside the doubtful influence of Sparta and the Athenian ‘moderate’ politicians.25  
As a result of their new realist approaches, Athenian democracy receives a more positive 
image, since the demos is now at least considered to be a group of sensible people 
following rational calculation. 
However, the explanations of Quillin and Wolpert also have their problems.  Quillin’s 
conclusion is highly unlikely.  As it was, the Athenian juridical system still relied on 
voluntary prosecutors in the fourth century B.C.  It is hard to believe that an Athenian 
prosecutor would ever acquire tyrannical power by accumulating a few victories in 
criminal trials.  More importantly, it would be hard to imagine how the institutions of 
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direct democracy could have been maintained if there had been such deep suspicion 
against voluntary prosecutors. 
Wolpert’s theory is more plausible, but is too simplistic.  He is right in pointing out that 
the heterogeneous composition of citizen population might have created disagreement on 
punishment of oligarchic citizens.  However, it should be pointed out that the diversity of 
Athenian civic population in terms of their political spectrum is more like a result of 
reconciliation rather than its condition.  The democracy was the victor in the civil war.  It 
could have axed the number of oligarchic citizens to triviality if it had chosen to do so.26 
In summary, there is nothing elementarily wrong with the realist presumption that the 
democracy pursued its self-interests even in the laudable project of reconciliation, but it is 
problematic to conclude that its self-interests necessarily conflicted with the common 
good.  Most realist explanations of the reconciliation so far reflect strong influence of the 
traditional suspicion of direct democracy.  They doubt that the restored democracy had 
the wisdom or capability to conduct the reconciliatory project, and tend to play down the 
reconciliation as something built on insecure foundations.  Their view neglects the 
exceptional achievement of Athenian domestic peace after the civil war, on the one hand, 
and the central role of the democracy in Athenian politics, on the other.  Recently, some 
scholars are able to reject this elitist suspicion of the demos’ intelligence, but they have 
not yet developed satisfactory explanations for the reconciliation. 
One problem with these realist explanations may be their failure to notice the dynamic 
relationship between democratic and communal interests.  As argued in the previous 
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chapter, there were changes in the democracy’s perception of self-interests from narrow-
minded partisan positions to broader nationalistic perspectives after its military crisis in 
405.  The unity of Athenian community became an essential part in the democracy’s 
understanding of self-interest.  Without this knowledge of historical development, it is 
hard to understand why the democracy chose to reconcile with the oligarchs rather than 
taking revenge. 
ii.The ‘Anthropological’ Approach 
Over 60 years ago, Alfred P. Dorjahn noticed that the sense of community was an 
important cause of the reconciliation.27  In recent years some historians, presuming that 
the restoration resulted from genuine virtues on the part of the demos, questioned the 
validity of realist explanations.  Andrew Wolpert’ Remembering Defeat and Nicole 
Loraux’s Divided City are the major works of this new approach.   
Andrew Wolpert emphasises that nothing except the demos itself could really have 
prevented their indulgence in revenge.   He says:  
The Athenians could have simply dismissed pragmatic considerations in 
order to obtain private satisfaction for past grievances.  Causal 
explanations present the reconciliation as a fait accompli, as if there were 
only one possible outcome to the civil war.  But as Corcyra shows, 
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pragmatic considerations do not always lead  a people to chose the 
course of action that best serves its interests. 28 
Nicole Loraux’s Divided City is a more profound analysis.  She criticizes historian 
approaches, saying that they concentrate only on the aspect of conflict without 
considering the other aspect of cooperation.29  Another approach that she calls the 
‘anthropological approach’ is better equipped for explanation of formation and 
maintenance of community, though its explanation of conflict is less satisfactory.30  
While historians focus on events of military and political conflicts, anthropologists search 
for what binds the city as a whole through all of these conflicts.  The Athens of the 
historical descriptions was a city of male adults institutionalized with a democratic or 
oligarchic constitution.  It was in fact an organization for war and politics.  Its male 
citizens were obliged to invade and defend against enemies.  They lived a political life, 
i.e., they joined in the assembly and made ‘decisions based on a majority vote.’31    Other 
social aspects like family, economy, and religion are largely dismissed or subordinated 
behind this image. Anthropologists, on the other hand, in trying to answer how Athens 
maintains the community as a whole and its cultural identity through the repetitive rituals 
of family, religion, etc., provide a non-antagonistic static portrait.  She argues that this 
anthropological approach is essential for a proper understanding of Athenian politics after 
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403, for the issue in question is not only the cause of civil war and its brutality, but also 
restoration of order and harmony after the ruins of civil war.32 She concludes: 
Because one feature of the Greek city is that it maintained, simultaneously, two competing 
and complementary representations of itself—one that “accepts history” and one that “is 
loath to do so and prefers not to know it”—we must strive to bring these two figures 
together in order to connect them: to think the city of anthropologists historically, but 
especially to think the city of historians anthropologically. 33 
Approaching from a different angle, Loraux and Wolpert point out correctly that there are 
in fact two contradictory tasks for the restored democracy: consolidation of democratic 
sovereignty and concord of city.34  Scholars usually make no distinction between the two 
tasks, but use them as basically interchangeable goals.35  Yet, they are not entirely 
compatible.  Given the existence of substantial numbers of non-democratic citizens in the 
city, an unlimited reinforcement of democratic sovereignty is itself an obstacle of 
reconciliation.  The democrats’ decision to live with their former enemies means that they 
had to play down their victory and compromise their sovereignty to a great extent. 
The image of Athenian democracy receives great improvement from the 
‘anthropological’ perspective.  The democracy saved Athens from the tyranny of the 
Thirty and then gave up its just share of political interest for the sake of communal 
harmony.  In contrast to the traditional image of being a rash and egoistic regime, it now 
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becomes an altruistic government that was willing to go to any length to improve the 
common good. 
This perspective is correct in pointing out the central role of the democracy in the 
reconciliation.  It also highlights the scale of difficulty facing the democracy by pointing 
out the tension between democratic consolidation and communal harmony.  The 
achievement of Athenian reconciliation and the efforts by the democracy is therefore 
better recognized from this perspective than in the realist view.  However, this approach 
also has its shortcomings.  Stressing on the binding elements of a society, this approach 
may be more convincing in explaining continuity and stability, but it also tends to neglect 
phenomena of change and conflict.36  For example, it goes too far in suggesting that the 
demos sacrificed its democracy in exchange of domestic harmony.37  If that had been the 
case, the demos would not have revolted against the Thirty at the beginning.  In other 
words, this approach might provide a better explanation for the stability of fourth-century 
Athens, but not for the collapse of the fifth-century Athenian empire and the following 
civil wars. 
II. The Source question 
i. Xenophon’s Hellenica vs. Athenian Politeia 
There are mainly four extant ancient sources: Xenophon’s Hellenika, the Aristotelian 
Athenian Politeia, Diodorus’ Bibliotheke, Book 14, and Justin’s Epitome of the Philippic 
                                                 
36
 Ober (2002: 134): ‘If social rules, substantial enough to ensure that action is coextensive with 
negotiations within the frame they define, are “always and already” pre-existing, then the space left for 
meaningful social change shrinks to zero.’ 
37
 For further discussion, see section 3.2 of this chapter. 
 88 
History of Pompeius Trogus.38  The first two are more important than the others.  
Athenian Politeia is also the main source for the content of agreement between the 
democrats and oligarchs, though its chronology is judged by most historians as unreliable 
when different from others.39  The following is a comparison of the four texts.   
 Xen. Hell. 2.4 Ath. Pol. 37-39 Diod. Sic. 14.32-33. Just. 5.9-10 
The democrats 
started to fight 
back 
Thrasybulus occupied 
Phyle. 
 
Thrasybulus occupied 
Phyle. 
 
Thrasybulus occupied 
Phyle. 
 
Thrasybulus occupied 
Phyle. 
 
The battle outside Phyle. The battle outside Phyle. 
 
The siege of Phyle 
failed. 
 
The democrats 
defeated the Thirty. 
Effects of defeat on 
the oligarchs 
The Thirty killed 
Eleusians. 
 
The Thirty killed 
Theramenes. 
Spartan garrison arrived 
at Athens. 
The Thirty drove 
citizens to Piraeus.  
They killed the 
Eleusians and 
Salaminians. 
The Thirty asked for 
more Spartan troops. 
The Thirty drove 
citizens out of the city. 
More Spartan troops 
came to help the 
Thirty. 
 
 
  The battle at Acharnae. 
 
 
The democrats 
marched toward 
Athens 
The democrats marched 
into Piraeus 
 
 The democrats marched 
in Piraeus and 
Munychia. 
 
 
The decisive battle 
at Munychia 
 
The battle at Munychia 
 
The battle at Munychia 
 
The battle at Munychia 
 
The battle at Munychia 
 
Effect of defeat on 
the oligarchs 
The Thirty was deposed 
and retired to Eleusis.  
Election of the Ten, who 
decided to fight.  Extreme 
disorder and confusion in 
the city. 
 
The Thirty deposed.  
Election of the Ten as 
plenipotentiaries of 
negotiation. 
 
The democrats laid siege 
to the city. 
The Thirty deposed.  
Election of the Ten as 
plenipotentiaries of 
negotiation. 
The Thirty were 
deposed and retired to 
Eleusis.  Election of 
the Ten. 
The mandate and 
actual behaviours 
of the Ten. 
Skirmishes continued 
between the democrats and 
oligarchs. 
The Thirty and the Three 
Thousand asked help from 
Sparta. 
The Ten decided to 
fight.  Dictatorship of 
the Ten.   
The Ten deposed.  The 
second election of the 
Ten, who looked for 
peace. 
The Ten decided to 
fight.  Dictatorship of 
the Ten.  Ask for 
Sparta’s help. 
 
The Ten ruled Athens 
like the Thirty. 
Pausanias defeated 
the democrats 
 
Pausanias defeated the 
democrats outside Piraeus. 
   
Negotiation of 
Pausanias 
Pausanias arranged the 
treaty of reconciliation. 
He then disbanded his 
army. 
Pausanias arranged the 
treaty of reconciliation 
that included the 
amnesty. 
Pausanias arranged the 
reconciliation.  Athens 
to be governed with its 
own laws.   
Pausanias arranged the 
reconciliation.  The 
Ten withdrew to 
Eleusis. 
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Reunification of 
Athens and Eleusis 
in 401 
The first post-war 
assembly.  The decision 
that Athens was ruled by 
ancient laws. 
Athens attacked Eleusis.  
Announcement of 
amnesty. 
  Eleusis attacked 
Athens.  The oligarchic 
leaders were killed 
when going for a 
parley. 
Unification of Athens 
and Eleusis.  
Announcement of 
amnesty. 
Adapted from Rhodes 1981: 416-419; Krentz 1982: 1982: 132-3; Wolpert 2002: 17, 22. 
ii. The interpretative view presented in this thesis 
Differences between the two main sources, Athenian Politeia and Xenophon’s Hellenica, 
may give rise to some discussion.  The first is about the nature of the Thirty.  Is their 
excessive brutality an inherent characteristic?  Or is it an unfortunate reaction to outside 
pressures?  Following the narrative of Xenophon that the Thirty had asked for a Spartan 
garrison and committed many atrocities before the democrats’ revolts, it might appear 
that the Thirty had been a truly evil regime from its very beginning, though its level of 
brutality escalated as the democrats approached.  Yet, following the version of Athenian 
Politeia that the Spartan garrison and all the most brutal crimes of the Thirty happened 
after the democrats’ revolts, some scholars form the impression that the Thirty might 
have been less harsh if the democrats had not revolted. 
Regarding this issue, Xenophon is more authoritative, as most scholars agree.40  Martin 
Ostwald and Peter Krentz are among the scholars who prefer Athenian Politeia for the 
reason that it provides the democrats’ revolt as a reason for the brutality of the Thirty.41  
Krentz even blames the democrats for the cruelty of the Thirty, arguing: ‘the 
democrats…did not have entirely clean hands… Thrasybulus and other democratic exiles 
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began the civil war and precipitated a harsher policy within the city.  If Thrasybulus had 
not acted, one suspected that far, far fewer than 1,500 would have died.’42  However, 
there are absolutely no circumstances that could prove the innocence of the Thirty.  
Wolpert does not think that the narratives of Athenian Politeia partially vindicate the 
Thirty, pointing to the fact that all sources share the common view that ‘violence and 
opposition were inextricably linked to the regime.’43  
The other debate which is more relevant to our discussion is about the outcome of civil 
war.  Did the outcome turn out to be a victory for the democrats or the result of a 
compromise among the democrats, the oligarchs, and Sparta?44  If the democrats were the 
victors in the civil war, the reconciliation was undertaken freely by them.  If, in contrast, 
the restoration was decided through compromise, the democrats cannot really take the 
credit.  Athenian Politeia puts much more weight on the contribution of the three 
thousand in negotiation of peace.  According to its narrative, they deposed the Thirty and 
elected the Ten with a clear mandate of negotiation.45  When the Ten insisted on fighting, 
the Three Thousand re-elected the Second Ten who made concerted efforts for the 
termination of civil war.46   Therefore, we have the impression that the restoration of 
democracy was not due to military victories of the democrats, but rather to negotiation by 
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the oligarchs and Sparta.  Athenian Politeia praises the democrats for their observance, 
not their initiation of the reconciliation agreement.   
In contrast, Xenophon mentions almost no contribution of the Three Thousand.  In his 
report the reconciliation and restoration of democracy derived from the efforts of the 
democrats in addition to that of the Spartan king Pausanias.  Furthermore, despite his 
report of the essential role of Pausanias in terminating the civil war, Xenophon seems to 
accord most of the credit to the democrats.  According to Xenophon, Pausanias disbanded 
his army and left Athens right after the treaty of reconciliation. The democrats then 
marched into the city of Athens as the victors of civil war.  Thrasybulus the leader of 
democrats addressed the oligarchs at the assembly in a truly contemptuous tone.  The 
oligarchs, he said, just like dogs tied and abandoned, were now at the mercy of the 
democrats.47  Therefore, it is all due to the democrats’ own generosity and moderation 
that the previous supporters of the Thirty, unpunished, remained living in Athens as 
citizens.48 
Regarding this issue, the version of Xenophon is again preferred.   Xenophon himself was 
a contemporary and is therefore more reliable in most scholars’ view, while the other 
writers might have been influenced by propaganda that attributed all the responsibility for 
civil war to the Thirty and the Ten rather than to general oligarchic citizens.  Besides, 
given that Xenophon is the only one who mentioned the democrats’ defeat by Sparta 
outside Piraeus, his report does not seem biased towards the democrats. 
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However, these are only minor differences.  All the sources actually give similar 
descriptions.   Firstly, though not reporting the mandate of negotiation as the act of 
oligarchic citizens, Xenophon mentioned deep dissent and distrust among them, 
suggesting that at least many of them, if not the majority, were looking for peace after 
their defeat at Munychia.49  Secondly, Xenophon does not mention the oligarchs’ efforts 
on negotiation probably because these were unimportant.  If the oligarchic citizens 
decided to pursue peace, all the sources agree that it only happened after their decisive 
defeat at Munychia.  A proposition of peace at such moments does not refute the 
democrats’ military superiority.  In any case, the oligarchs were defeated and 
marginalized. 
III. Restoration of Democracy and the Reconciliation Agreement  
This section provides a general historical account of how Athens was transformed from 
the chaos of civil war to order and harmony.  Instead of providing a story from the reign 
of the Thirty to the restored democracy, this section focuses on the process leading to the 
agreements of reconciliation.  This story starts with the revolt of the democrats in exile, 
the oligarchic defeat at Phyle and Munychia, and the intervention of the Spartan King 
Pausanias, as a result of whose arrangements the reconciliation agreement was achieved.  
After explaining the main contents of this agreement, we will argue for its success 
according to the fulfilment of its goals, as well as the respect it received from the 
Athenians.  Also included is their reconfirmation of Pericles’ law of citizenship, which, 
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though not an initial provision in the agreements, is essential to an understanding of the 
meaning of the amnesty and reconciliation and Athenian politics in general. 
i. Democratic Revolt and Restoration  
As argued above, the sources are largely in agreement.  They all indicate that, while the 
Thirty and the three thousands occupied the city of Athens, the democrats in exile fought 
back from Phyle via Piraeus under the leadership of Thrasybulus and Anytus.50  
According to Xenophon, there were only about seventy of them at the beginning, but the 
number grew rapidly to well over a thousand, including foreigners and slaves, in their 
march towards Athens. The democrats won two decisive battles at Phyle and Munychia.  
After their defeat at Phyle the Thirty tried to maintain their power with more murders and 
terrors inside the city.  The result was that more Athenians left the city and joined the 
opposition.  After the battle of Munychia the oligarchy was obviously on the brink of 
collapse.  The Thirty were deposed and many citizens in the city preferred negotiation 
with the democrats. However, the new elected leaders, with the support of extreme 
oligarchs and the Spartan General Lysander, continued fighting.51  Finally, the Spartan 
King Pausanias intervened and defeated the democrats outside Piraeus. He was said by 
Xenophon to be a political enemy of Lysander and well disposed toward the democrats.  
In any case, it is because of his efforts that an agreement of reconciliation between the 
democrats and oligarchs was achieved.52 Accordingly, all Athenians returned to Athens, 
an amnesty was announced, and Eleusis was separated from Athens as an independent 
city for those oligarchs who did not want to live with the democrats.  The democrats took 
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it back two years later through force as well as persuasion and the amnesty.  The 
democracy also accomplished many important domestic reforms after its restoration.  In 
its foreign policy it followed Sparta until the two poleis broke off in 395.53    
ii. The Goals of Reconciliation 
It is necessary to discuss the goals and terms of reconciliation by which the Athenians’ 
achievement of reconciliation can be assessed.  It is a plausible assumption that the goal 
of the reconciliation was restoration of harmony in Athens as well as consolidation of the 
democracy.  This does not mean that these aims were sincerely supported by every 
individual Athenian and remained so.  What is intended here is to understand the 
reconciliation and assess its success from a teleological perspective.54  
However, democratic consolidation and political concord are two conflicting tasks.   
Consolidation of popular sovereignty could be itself a source of domestic division and 
bitterness, since there remained many non-democratic or even antidemocratic citizens in 
post-war Athens.  This question has aired recently by two scholars.  N. Louraux argues 
that the two tasks could not coexist, as one would have to be sacrificed for the other.  In 
fact, she argues, the democrats gave up all their rights as the triumphant party.  Since the 
democrats chose to live with their former enemies, they must nullify their victory and 
give up their sovereign power.  She says: 
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Shall we say that once the people have shown themselves to be the city, 
they must espouse the communal life?  I would answer that an appeal to 
the polis, however, justified it may have been in its time, later became very 
effective in neutralizing democratia.  Or more precisely: in neutralizing 
kratos as an integral part of the word.  From then on, Athenian orators, like 
Isocrates in the Areopagitiucus, praised the democracy for its ‘mildness’.55 
Wolpert argues that the democracy has to transform from a partisan regime of the poor 
people to an impartial government shared by all citizens, including the rich and the 
oligarchs.  He borrows a sociological concept called the process of ‘departicularization’, 
through which ‘historical discourses and practices were emptied of local and concrete 
meaning to become “the property of all and no one”’.56  Through this kind of process, the 
demos was no more the aggregate of only poor citizens, but the abstract image of the 
citizenry as a whole.  Both the scholars argue that, either giving up its power or 
transforming the meaning of demos, the democracy was sacrificed for the unity of Athens. 
Interestingly, the priority of political concord is attested in ancient sources of both public 
speeches and private teachings.  Almost all ancient writers, when referring to the goal of 
reconciliation, claim that its aim was to achieve political concord, the task of democratic 
consolidation fading into the background.57  This phenomenon can be seen in public 
speeches. For example, Andocides wrote, ‘you [the Athenians] have shown the greatest 
generosity and wisdom in devoting yourselves, not to revenge, but to the preservation of 
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your city and the reuniting of its citizens. 58 (o9mo&noian tw~n politw~n)  Lysias wrote in 
his funeral speech that the democrats ‘revived … the harmony that had been shattered by 
faction.’59 (o(monoou~san de\ a)nti\ stasiazou/shv a0pe/fhnan)  Isocrates said that the 
determination shown in the people’s payment of the oligarch’s war debt brought Athens 
into concord.60 (o9mo&noian)  The same emphasis is also found in the writings that did not 
appeal to the public.  Xenophon writes that ‘oaths were sworn that there should be an 
amnesty for all that had happened in the past, and to this day both parties live together as 
fellow citizens.’61 (o9mou~ te politeu&ontai) The author of Athenian Politeia described 
the payment of the oligarchs’ war debt ‘as the first step to concord’. 62 (o9mo&noia)  Finally, 
in a Platonic work of funeral speech, all that is concerned is healing of harm and 
divisions.  ‘The sole cause for all that [reconciliation] was their genuine kinship, which 
provides them, not in word but in fact, with a firm friendship based on ties of blood.  We 
must also remember those who die at each other’s hands in that war and try to reconcile 
them in ceremonies such as today’s by what means we have—prayers and sacrifices—
praying to the gods below who have power over them, since we ourselves are reconciled 
as well.’63  
With these ancient one-sided testimonies, one might think that there was actually only 
one true aim of reconciliation, this being the unity of Athens.64  Yet, if this had been the 
case, the demos would have not fought the civil war in the first place.  It is more 
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reasonable to believe that the democrats struggled to find some balance between the two 
tasks rather than sacrificed one for the other.  After all, the democracy revived and 
remained dominant over other internal political groups for eighty years.  The author of 
Athenian Politeia might exaggerate in saying that the demos returned Athens by its own 
efforts alone, but with Sparta away and the oligarchs defeated it was, as he said, truly fair 
for the demos to take the government.65   
iii. The Terms of Reconciliation66 
The following table is a comparison of sources regarding the terms of reconciliation.  
Xen. Hell. 2.4.38 Ath. Pol. 39 Diod. Sic. 
14.33.6 
Just. 5.10.7 
Peace between the 
democrats and oligarchs 
Return of all citizens 
Extreme oligarchs 
withdrew to Eleusis. 
Right to migrate in  
Eleusis 
[the amnesty announced 
two years later] 
Right to  migrate 
in Eleusis 
The amnesty 
Return of debts 
separately 
 
Return of 
citizens 
Right to migrate 
in Eleusis  
Autonomy of 
Athens 
 
Return of citizens  
The Ten withdrew to 
Eleusis 
[The amnesty 
announced two years 
later] 
There is a difference in the date of the amnesty.  According to Xenophon and Justin, the 
amnesty was announced on the reunification of Athens and Eleusis in about 401.67  That 
is, there is a gap of two years between the treaty of reconciliation and the amnesty.  
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Athenian Politeia, on the other hand, included the amnesty in the treaty of reconciliation 
in 403.  It had support from Andocides, 68 and almost all scholars prefer its version to 
Xenophon’s, believing that the Amnesty was one of the initial terms of reconciliation in 
403. 69  
However, no ancient writer gave a complete account of the terms of reconciliation.70  
Among them Athenian Politeia provides the fullest account, though its account is not 
without question in its authority and coverage.  Peter J. Rhodes suspects that its author 
consulted only certain political pamphlets instead of original official documents.71  The 
source has no report on certain important issues such as the post-war relationship with 
Sparta, the constitutional arrangement of Athens, and the solution of controversies over 
property confiscated by the Thirty.72  
Through examination of the extant sources and related discussion of historians, the terms 
are reconstructed here around five essential issues: the relationship with Sparta, 
oligarchs’ migration to Eleusis, the amnesty, the problem of confiscated property, and the 
constitutional order after the civil war. 
The Relationship of Sparta and Athens: Both the restored democracy at Athens and the 
oligarchs in Eleusis remained subject allies of Sparta.73  Athens’ capitulation terms of 404 
presumably remained valid, meaning that, amongst other terms, the Athenians were 
obliged to have ‘the same enemies and the same friends as Sparta had’ and followed 
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‘Spartan leadership in any expedition Sparta might make either by land or sea.’74  In 403 
Pausanias was said to instruct the Athenians to negotiate with Sparta on one of the terms 
that the democrats and oligarchs remained its allies.75  Both the democrats and oligarchs 
had financial and military obligations for Sparta’s military activities76  Regarding its 
internal affairs, Diodorus reports that Athens ruled by its own laws.77  It is not very clear 
as to what degree of autonomy Athens was granted by Sparta.  Charles Hignett believes 
that Sparta should have learned from the failure of the Thirty that it was better not to 
intervene in the internal affairs of Athens.78  Ostwald argues that the Athenians had 
complete freedom in internal affairs.79  Stephen Todd, in contrast, believes that its 
internal autonomy was very limited.80  However, considering that the Athenians were 
capable of accomplishing so many fundamental political and military projects, such as 
law reform, military actions against the oligarchic city of Eleusis, and rejection of a law 
draft of limited citizenship that had alleged support of Sparta, Athens seemed to enjoy a 
very high degree of autonomy as long as it followed Sparta in its foreign policy.  In any 
case, it should be noted that Sparta’s dominance over Athens lasted only a few years.   
Athens plotted unsuccessfully for an alliance with Persia in 397.  Two years later it 
officially broke away from Sparta.  In other words, Sparta was not a decisive factor in the 
long-term development of Athenian politics. 
 The Migration of the Oligarchs to Eleusis:  While all Athenians were returning to Athens, 
the oligarchs who feared the revenge of the democrats or who had other considerations in 
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mind were free to migrate to Eleusis.81  They actually built their own city there, ‘retaining 
their full rights, and having sovereignty and self-government, and enjoying their own 
revenues.’82 These migrants had the power to decide who amongst the inhabitants of 
Eleusis could live with them, not the other way around.  Besides, the oligarchic Eleusis 
and democratic Athens regarded each other as hostile cities.  The citizens were not 
allowed to visit the other city, let alone hold official positions.  The celebration of the 
Mysteries was the only exception to this rule.83  However, the separation of Athens and 
Eleusis was, according to Athenian Politeia, obstructed by Archinus and then ceased to 
be in 401when Eleusis went back to Athens.   
The Amnesty: This is the most famous term that is often used as an alternative term to the 
reconciliation.84  According to Athenian Politeia, the amnesty was expressed in an 
unequivocal tongue, no one being ever allowed to revenge (mnhsikakei=n) on any one for 
the past events. There were, however, two exceptions.  The first concerned the cases of 
murder.85  Though people who had collaborated with the Thirty in arresting citizens were 
pardoned, those who had committed assault or murder with their own hand should be put 
on trial according to traditional laws.  Second, certain core oligarchic officers like the 
Thirty, the Eleven, and the Ten enjoyed the protection of amnesty only after their account 
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of their past behaviour had been submitted to and accepted by the courts.86 This most 
important term should be quoted in full: 
[T]hat trials for homicide be in accordance with the ancestral ordinances, if 
a man has killed or wounded another with his own hand.  And that there 
be a universal amnesty for past events, covering everybody except the 
Thirty, the Ten, the Eleven, and those that have been governors of 
Piraeus, and that these also be covered by the amnesty if they render 
account.  And that those who had been governors in Piraeus render 
account before the courts held in Piraeus, but those in the city before a 
court of persons that can produce ratable property;  or that those who will 
not render account on these terms do migrate.87 
Solution of Confiscated Property: Many citizens and foreigners living in Athens were 
deprived of their property by the Thirty, and much of this was then sold or redistributed.  
This problem obviously constituted one of the most contentious issues besides the cases 
of homicide.  The situation was much more complex when the property in question 
turned up in the hands of a seemingly innocent buyer.  However, there are only a few 
existing sentences that inform us of its solution.  The principle, scholars agree, is that the 
original owners had the right to reclaim his immovable property, such as land and 
buildings, even when it had been sold; while they could only get back the movable 
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property when it remained unsold.88  A special office was set up to deal with this issue.  
A fair amount of confiscated property, obviously, did not go back to the original owners 
under this regulation.  Many democrats, even powerful generals like Thrasybulus and 
Anytus, had to accept permanent loss of their property.89 
The Restored Constitutional Order: Almost all sources agree that the ancestral laws were 
the principle of post-war constitution, though their meanings needed further investigation 
even to contemporary Athenians.90  However, it is unclear whether there was any 
provision about the form of restored government in the reconciliation agreement.  In fact, 
though it might seem strange, there is nothing about this important issue in reports of the 
agreement. Athenian Politeia says nothing on this issue in its account of the 
reconciliation agreement.91  According to Xenophon and Justin, there was only the return 
of all the Athenians and their obligation to maintain peace among them.  Diodorus reports 
that Athens was to be governed by its own laws (toi=v idi/oiv no/moiv), which suggests 
that Sparta granted Athens autonomy in internal affairs.   
According to Xenophon and Justin, it was only later at the first Assembly of the restored 
democracy that Thrasybulus declared that Athens was to be governed under the ancestral 
laws.92  Diodorus reports that Thrasybulus, when contacted by the Thirty earlier, also 
demanded that all citizens should go back to Athens and the ancestral constitutions be 
restored.  There was no discussion as to whether the government should be democratic or 
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otherwise.  Maybe it was taken for granted by these ancient writers that with the return of 
all the triumphant democrats the Athenian government could be nothing less than 
democratic.  The oligarchy, defeated by the democrats and abandoned by Sparta, had no 
chance of survival. 
On the other hand, though there should be no doubt that democracy be an essential part of 
the post-war constitutional order in Athens, there would still be controversies over other 
constitutional issues.  Therefore, there is a possibility that, to solve these disputes, the 
democrats and the oligarchs agreed upon a procedure to decide the content of the 
ancestral laws, and this might be one of the reasons why another stage of law reform 
coincided with the reconciliation.  This constitutional procedure, if existed, should be a 
product of compromise like Teisamenus’ decree of law investigation and revision, which, 
as argued in the previous chapter, took into account not only the demos’ interests, but 
also oligarchic citizens’ concerns. 
iv.The Success of the Reconciliation 
There are two criteria to evaluate the success of the reconciliation.  One is the realization 
of its goals: communal harmony and democratic consolidation, the other is the 
Athenians’ observance of the reconciliation terms.  Generally speaking, the reconciliation 
was a success according to both criteria.  Assessed by the realization of its goals, the 
success is obvious, given the stability of Athens and its democracy in the fourth century 
B.C.  While considering the Athenians’ observance of the reconciliation, there are some 
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reservations and disputes.  However, most scholars agree that the terms of reconciliation 
were largely respected.93 
The Athenians’ respect for the terms of reconciliation is attested by the following reports 
of ancient sources.  Several former oligarchs held government positions or appeared in 
the law courts as prosecutors under the democracy.94 Democratic leaders as powerful as 
Thrasybulus and Anytus had to bear their loss of property under the constraint of 
reconciliation.  Besides, the democracy did even more than what the terms required.  The 
authority of the amnesty was secured by making an example of a democrat executed 
without trial for his open instigation against the oligarchs.  According to Isocrates, a legal 
apparatus called paragrafh/ was passed by which oligarchs could suspend prosecutions 
by claiming violation of the amnesty. Prosecutors, if found violating the amnesty, were 
punished with heavy fines.95  While it had been decided that the oligarchs should pay 
their own debt of war to Sparta, the democracy paid it through a public fund.96  Though it 
cannot be denied that there were many prosecutions in reference to the past misconducts 
of the oligarchs, there was (as far as we know) at most only one conviction that violated 
the amnesty.97  Furthermore, the democracy sent three hundred oligarchic cavalry for the 
Spartan expedition in 400/399.  Xenophon claimed that the purpose was to get rid of 
these former enemies of the demos.  However, Xenophon’s report is biased and this 
dispatch, strictly speaking, did not violate the terms of reconciliation.98  The Athenians’ 
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attack on Eleusis in 401/400 may be the most serious attack on the oligarchs, but even 
this might not be a violation, since all sources report that it was an act of defence.99  In 
summary, the terms of reconciliation were largely respected.100   
However, there are doubts about its success due to alleged cases of violation, especially 
cases against the amnesty, as well as political conflict after the civil war.101  These 
disputes are in fact more about the adoption of criteria than identification of historical 
facts.  Scholars, such as Thomas C. Loening, who consider the reconciliation a success do 
not deny the existence of conflicts and persecutions after the civil wars, but argue that 
these problems, strictly speaking, did not violate the terms of reconciliation.  The others, 
such as B. Strauss and S. Todd, deny its success with widely extended explanations of the 
terms, arguing that the existence of conflicts and persecutions violated the spirit of 
reconciliation.  The latter criterion of success presumes a total disappearance of 
resentments and conflicts, which is neither necessary nor practical. 
For example, though analyzing Athenian politics with a typically realist approach, B. 
Strauss seems to presume a standard of perfect harmony as his political criterion, arguing 
that the success of reconciliation was limited for the reason that political conflicts did not 
completely disappear.102   Having pointed out conflicts of classes, personal interests, 
political principles, etc. in post-war Athens, he concludes: ‘Athenian political unity 
between 403-386 was fragile, at times tenuous.  This stands counter to the prominent 
thesis that once the storm of the Thirty was weathered, only superficial and relatively 
                                                 
99
 Loening 198763-4. 
100
 Contra. Todd 1985; Wolpert 2002a: 48ff. 
101
 Scholars who question the testimonies of ancient writers: Todd 1986: 29. B. Strauss 1986: 171; Wolpert 
2002a:52, 71. 
102
 B. Strauss 1986: 114. 
 106 
unimportant political divisions existed in Athens.’103  However, it is inadequate to deny 
the success of reconciliation with the existence of conflicts.  All the kinds of conflict 
which he has listed in fact happen in both times of war and peace.   No society in the 
world could get rid of them completely.  The achievement of Athens is that it dealt with 
them not with violence, but in much more civilized ways. 
Todd is one of the most radical critics of the success of reconciliation.   He insists that the 
application of the amnesty should not be limited to only certain kinds of persecution, but 
extended to all kinds of trials, public policies, official audits, and military actions.104  In 
his opinion, there should be no persecutions in any way connected with the oligarchic 
past.  ‘The magistrates at the anakrisis had the right, indeed the duty, to reject an illegal 
prosecution; but once it came to court it could not simply be quashed on technical 
grounds.  Consequently, a breach of the Amnesty had occurred the moment an illicit 
prosecution reached the court, whatever the result of the trial.’105  This standard is so high 
that Todd himself admits it is impossible under the democracy.  ‘The only way for the 
Athenians to have ensured that the Amnesty was kept would have been to force the 
magistrate to dismiss the case unheard: this however would have reduced unacceptably 
the democratic sovereignty of the court.’106 
Loening’s position is the polar opposite of Todd’s.  Adopting a literal explanation of the 
terms of reconciliation, he finds no violation of reconciliation in the events which Todd 
believes were plain breaches.  For example, Athens’ taking back of Eleusis is not a 
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violation, for the oligarchs in Eleusis broke the peace first.   He says, ‘one must assume 
that once the agreement had been violated by the oligarchs, the Athenians were no longer 
obliged to respect Eleusinian autonomy and were free to act as if a state of war 
existed.’107  Furthermore, one of the traits of the Athenian legal system is its flexible 
nature by which many strategic options were available for prosecution of the same crime.  
In the cases of homicide, a charge called a0pagwgh/ against a murderer’s presence in 
sanctuaries and public spaces could be used in circumvention of the amnesty.  Since this 
behaviour of oligarchic killers and collaborators, if they were the perpetrators, happened 
after the reconciliation, they were not protected by the amnesty.108  Therefore, the 
oligarchs were prosecuted without violation of the reconciliation.  Similar arguments 
apply to the dispatch of oligarchic cavalry for a Spartan expedition in 400/ 399, the 
purpose of which Xenophon believed was to get rid of these ardent supporters of 
oligarchy.109  However, Loening argues, ‘there is nothing in the reconciliation agreement 
of the amnesty provision in particular which forbids dispatching cavalry abroad.’110 
The criterion of Loening, I believe, is more reasonable than Todd’s.  The latter seems to 
presume nearly unconditional forgiveness and complete obliteration of the oligarchic past 
as the standard of successful reconciliation, which is unrealistic and undesirable. It is 
better to understand mhde/na mnhsikakei=n  as a struggle for the reconciliation through re-
interpretation of the past, rather than complete obliteration and unconditional forgiveness 
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of the oligarchic past.111  Many scholars have pointed out the importance of character 
evidence in Athenian politics, and the litigants’ past behaviour must be brought forward 
because these were an essential part of their characters.112  In a direct democracy like 
Athens, judicial verdicts in the law courts and political decisions in the assembly were 
made by the citizenry according to their own understanding of the cases in question. 
Speakers’ personalities or what they did in the past were essential for the credibility of 
their apology.  It would have been almost impossible for the Athenian audience to make a 
sensible decision if the knowledge of a speaker’s past had been forbidden.  It might be 
proposed that this dilemma could be solved by setting up an independent professional 
institution to expel illegal testimonies from public spheres.  This suggestion, however, is 
plainly anachronistic. 
To conclude, a reasonable assessment of the success of reconciliation, therefore, should 
consist of two parts.  The first is to examine the Athenians’ observance of the terms of 
reconciliation according to a strict explanation such as the one Loening adopts.  This 
criterion allows necessary flexibility for everyday political activities.  No doubt, there 
were a number of alleged violations not of the words, but of the spirit of reconciliation.  
This problem could be solved by the second criterion of teleological assessments.  If the 
Athenians achieved both of its goals, political harmony and democratic consolidation, we 
might be confident in saying that there was no serious violation of the reconciliatory 
spirit.  In fact, according to the standard of Athenian society, political unity alone was 
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sufficient evidence for the success of reconciliation.  Ancient writers praised the 
reconciliation for its contribution of civil concord.113  No one considered persecutions in 
some private cases as serious faults, perhaps with the exception of Plato and his bitter 
memory of the trial of Socrates.114 
IV Conclusion 
i 
The historical survey above, I hope, has proved some important features of the 
reconciliation against some inadequate understandings of this important event.  The 
democracy was largely responsible for the achievement of reconciliation, since it had 
decisively defeated the oligarchs in the civil war, and Sparta did not seem to interfere in 
the domestic politics of Athens as long as Athens followed it in foreign affairs.  There 
were two main goals that the democracy tried to fulfil in the reconciliation: democratic 
consolidation and the unity of Athenian community.  There was tension between these 
two goals, since there were many non-democratic or antidemocratic citizens remaining in 
Athens.  As to the terms of reconciliation, what the democracy did was much more than 
forgiving the past crimes of Athenian oligarchs.  According to the terms of reconciliation, 
another city was arranged for the oligarchs who did not want to live in Athens under the 
democracy.  The democracy also made concession regarding the property confiscated 
during the reign of The Thirty.  Not all the property returned to its original owner, and 
even some powerful democratic leaders had to accept their loss.  The guideline for the 
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reconstruction of political order after the civil war was not the strictly defined democratic 
values but the more ambiguous ancestral constitution by which the concerns of oligarchic 
citizens were taken into account, as revealed in Teisamenus’ decree of law investigation 
and revision.  Last but not least, the reconciliation was successful in terms of the 
observance of reconciliatory terms and the achievement of the intended goals.  It is 
generally agreed that the democracy respected the amnesty and other agreements of 
reconciliation.  The demos actually did more than that.  It paid the Athenian oligarchs’ 
war loan to Sparta even though it was not required by the reconciliatory agreement.  The 
reconciliation was also successful judged by the consequent democratic stability and 
domestic harmony in fourth-century Athens.  In a word, the reconciliation constitutes one 
of the most powerful cases against the established negative image of Athenian democracy. 
As we have argued above, the reconciliation was successful.  Even critics like Barry 
Strauss and Stephen Todd do not deny its success.115  The important disagreement among 
scholars centre around the causes of success.  Examining scholars’ explanations on this 
issue, we find two main types of theory.  Realism is the traditional and dominant view, 
emphasising the role of external pressures in constraining human passion and self 
interests.  The other ‘anthropological’ view argues that a sense of community which 
acquired much strength from the myth of common ancestors, racial prejudices, and daily 
interaction held the unity of Athens despite constant political storms of competition and 
conflicts. 
There is certain improvement of the image of Athenian democracy in recent scholarly 
studies of the reconciliation, a trend similar to what we have found in the researches of 
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the Athenian law reform in the previous chapter.  Realist explanations used to reflect 
traditional suspicion of the demos, disregarding the possibility that the common people 
by themselves could be responsible for great achievements such as the restoration of 
political harmony from the ruin of civil war.  Recent researches, by contrast, are able to 
resist this elitist presumption and recognize the demos’ rationality.  The ‘anthropological’ 
approach goes much further than that.  In its version, the democracy becomes an almost 
altruistic government, sparing no effort in promoting the common good over its own 
partisan interests. 
ii 
The realist explanation is that the morality crisis, caused by the war with Sparta, the 
plague, the success of Athenian democracy and its empire, and other factors, was beyond 
repair.  Passion and egoism, aggravating each other in turn, drove the Athenians against 
each other.  Without external constraints, Athens was doomed to fall into a vicious circle 
of suspicion and vengeance as the civil war of Corcyra was in Thucydides’ description.  
The cause for the success of reconciliation is, therefore, not anyone or anything virtuous, 
but a coincidental balance of forces amongst the Athenian democrats, oligarchs, and 
Sparta.  All of them followed their realist considerations.116 
There is nothing categorically wrong with their presumption of self-interested human 
nature, but the realist theories that we have seen so far fail to provide a satisfactory 
explanation of the reconciliation.  As mentioned in the literature review, there are mainly 
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three factors in the realist model of explanation: moderate politicians, Sparta and the 
diversity of political groups in Athens. 
Firstly, the moderate leadership at the end of the fifth century B.C., as discussed in the 
previous chapter, is a myth based on the suspicious report of Athenian Politeia.  The 
moral implication of the term ‘moderate’ also seems to be odd with the realist principle 
of self-interest.  Why did a group of politicians stand out for their moderation as opposed 
to all other egoistic counterparts?117  Besides, this theory seems to exaggerate the 
influence of the moderate politicians by neglecting their conflict with other political 
leaders.  For example, Thrasybulus was one of the few, if not the sole, politicians who 
maintained his leadership position throughout this chaotic period of time.  He is therefore 
the most likely candidate for the credit of reconciliation.  However, he was actually a 
rival of the Theramenean or ‘moderate’ politicians.  His proposal of rewarding foreign 
comrades of the democracy with Athenian citizenship was denounced by a Theramenean 
politician Archinus, for it was contrary to the Theramenean idea of limiting citizenship to 
oligarchic Athenians. 
Secondly, Sparta’s influence in the domestic politics of Athens might not be decisive.  It 
did play a key role at the very beginning, but Athens seemed to enjoy autonomy in its 
internal affairs afterwards.  The determination of Sparta to protect the Athenian oligarchs 
is questionable as proved by the Athenian military action on Eleusis.  The brutality of the 
Thirty inflicted great damage on the reputation of Sparta.  Furthermore, Xenophon tells 
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us that there was a conflict in its leadership.  Pausanias was not as enthusiastic as 
Lysander in supporting the Athenian oligarchs.  It might be in the best interests of Sparta 
that it tolerated the complete autonomy of Athens in its internal affairs, as long as it 
followed Sparta’s foreign policy.  More importantly, the reconciliation in fact greatly 
outlasted the Spartan influence.  The hegemony of Sparta was hit with a heavy blow just 
six years later when Persia appointed the Athenian general Conon as its admiral in 397.  
Two years later, Athens officially revolted from Sparta.118  However, even at that 
moment the demos did not break its promise of reconciliation and indulged itself in 
revenge because of this diplomatic change.  Scholars adopting the realist approach are 
compelled to provide another explanation for the unity of Athens.119   
Thirdly, the heterogeneity of Athenian citizenry in terms of their partisan spectrum is an 
outcome of reconciliation rather than one of its causes.  The reign of the Thirty already 
polarized the whole population into two hostile groups of oligarchs and democrats.  The 
first group stayed inside the city of Athens, supported the Thirty, and deeply implicated 
in their crimes during the civil war, while the latter group were killed or exiled by them.  
When the democrats and their foreign comrades defeated the oligarchs and returned to 
Athens as the victor of the civil war, they had the opportunity to increase their share of 
the civic population by granting citizenship to their foreign soldiers or by simply not 
interfering in the emigration of Athenian oligarchs.120  However, the democrats rejected 
their foreign comrades and chose the Athenian oligarchs as their fellow citizens.  This 
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decision of the democracy is the main reason why the oligarchs remained an important 
voice in Athenian politics.  Another problem with the theory of diverse population is that 
the democracy did not seem to be paralysed because of partisan diversity among citizens.  
On the contrary, it successfully conducted many profound political projects such as the 
law reform, the military action against the oligarchs in Eleusis, and the Athenian alliance 
with Persia against Sparta.  These deeds by the democracy prove that it had the capability 
to persecute the supporters of the Thirty if it had chosen to do so. 
iii. 
Another important theory of the reconciliation is the ‘anthropological’ approach proposed 
recently by Loraux and Wolpert.  As they have argued, it is more than likely that a strong 
sense of community was the constant support for the success of the reconciliation project 
and long-term stability of Athens.121  There was much evidence for the strength of this 
nationalistic sentiment.  The demos agreed that the ideal constitution was the one created 
by its ancestors.   It confirmed that only children of Athenians could be the fellow 
citizens, merit or damage to the democracy notwithstanding.  These principles stood 
unchanged until the end of democracy and were obviously not expedient measures.  
Besides, the demos gave up the right of revenge, bore the loss of property, and even paid 
the war debt of their oligarchic enemy.  The sentiment of community appears to be the 
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key for more consistent understandings for all the decisions and actions that the Athenian 
people took through the most conflict-laden decade of its democratic history. 
Besides, there are persuasive testimonies from two great critics of Athenian democracy, 
Xenophon and Plato.  Xenophon reported a speech by a democratic soldier in the civil 
war that most vividly expresses the social bonds among the citizens based on nationalistic 
myth and communal life in various social and political spheres.122  It is said clearly in 
Plato’s Menenxeus that ‘the sole cause for all that [reconciliation and amnesty] was their 
genuine kinship, which provided them, not in word but in fact, with a firm friendship 
based on ties of blood.’123  Though these two passages do not necessarily reflect the 
writers’ true opinions towards the democracy, they are at least reflections of Athenian 
public sentiments.  These passages have proved that the motivation for many citizens to 
support the reconciliation was their sense of community. 
However, this perspective goes too far in suggesting that democratic values were largely 
sacrificed for domestic harmony during the reconciliation.  The demos did not actually go 
that far as to please the oligarchs by giving up the democratic form of government.  
Phormisius’ proposal to limit Athenian citizenship to landowners was rejected.124  
Payment was introduced at about the same time to encourage public participation in the 
assembly.125  These developments mean that direct democracy was firmly re-established 
alongside the reconciliatory project.  It should be more reasonable to include both 
democratic consolidation and communal harmony as goals of the reconciliatory project.  
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iv 
The truth of reconciliation might be somewhere between the realist and the 
anthropological explanations that we have discussed so far.  As argued in the previous 
chapter, there seems to be a communitarian turn in Athenian politics around 405 after the 
naval battle off Aegospotami.  Before that time, Athenian democracy was much like an 
intolerant regime eager for revenge, as predicted in most realist theories.  There was no 
forgiveness and reconciliation, but persecution and discrimination in its first restoration 
between 410 and 405.  Supporters of the first oligarch coup had been executed, exiled, or 
deprived of civil rights.  However, the demos changed its way of politics after their defeat 
in the naval battle off Aegospotami.  It found its mistake of identifying partisan interests 
with the common good.  With the recognition that oligarchic Athenians were essential for 
the flourishing of the whole community and the survival of the democracy, the demos 
started to bring them back by restoring their civil rights and recalling those in exile.  The 
development of Athenian democratic politics then switched to a different direction closer 
to Loraux’s ‘anthropological’ version, though the demos did not go that far as to sacrifice 
the democracy for communal harmony, but tried to strike a balance between the two 
different goals. 
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Appendix: Athenian Citizenship at the End of the Fifth Century 
B.C 
The development of citizenship in the early years of the restored democracy is a difficult 
question due to the fragmentary condition of the extant sources, but also because of its 
complexity.126  Though, as mentioned above, it was taken for granted among the 
Athenians that the democracy was to be restored, and all the democratic exiles were to 
return to Athens as its citizens, disputes around citizenship had not settled down within 
this general understanding.  Politicians were still struggling to extend or limit citizenship 
to his respectively preferred group. Besides, the Athenian legislative procedure was 
changing at those years.  Therefore, it is usually unclear by whom and through which 
procedure propositions of citizenship were made.  The discussion of this section will help 
us to clarify this important issue. 
I. The status of foreign soldiers 
The first question is the status of those foreigners who supported the return of the 
democrats.  Their contribution seems to be barely recognized with proper reward by the 
democracy.  Thrasybulus proposed to grant them citizenship and the Assembly approved 
it as a decree.  However, Archinus, another democratic leader, abolished this generous act 
through grafh\ parano/mwn, accusing it of lacking the approval of the council.127  These 
foreigners, because they were not citizens, were not even on the list of the Athenian 
recipients who were honoured for their fight against the Thirty at Phyle with merely 
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symbolic gifts: a crown of olive and a few drachmas for sacrifices and dedicatory 
offerings.128 Furthermore, the sons of foreigners could not expect support from the 
democracy even if their parents died fighting for its restoration, because a decree 
proposed by Theozotides in the Assembly had made it clear that only legitimate sons of 
Athenians had this privilege.129  According to this decree, illegitimate and adopted sons 
of Athens did not have a share, let alone those of foreigners.  Those foreign soldiers who 
died fighting for the democracy at Piraeus did receive public funeral from the Athenians 
and enjoyed ‘for all time…the same honours as citizens’.130  Nevertheless, they were 
always aliens to Athens, having only ‘bravery as their fatherland’.131     
Few of these foreigners were finally granted the Athenian citizenship two years later.  In 
a decree of 401/0 they were rewarded according to the timing they joined the democratic 
revolt.132  It is generally agreed that those who joined the democrats at Phyle received full 
citizenship, others who joined at a latter time at Munychia and Piraeus were granted 
i0sote/leia or other less privileged prizes.  The first group of new citizens was less than a 
hundred, while the other groups amounted to about nine hundred. 
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II. Phormisius’ proposition 
Not only were foreigners excluded from the democracy, even the citizenship of poor 
Athenians was challenged.  Phormisius, a man who returned to Athens with the 
democrats, made the proposition that the full citizenship be limited to those Athenians 
who owned land.  He also proposed the return of the oligarchs in exile.  It is not clear to 
which procedure of enactment his proposition was put.  In any case, his proposition failed, 
though it was said to have the support of Sparta.133  
 Phormisius’ motion might look improbable when the Thirty was overthrown not long 
ago and the democracy restored.134  However, there must be some reasons for his 
confidence in his chance of success.  First, the propertied class and other people who 
considered property as an essential condition of political rights were not necessarily in 
alliance with the Thirty, since many of them were robbed of their property by the Thirty 
and had gone into exile.  Instead of being labelled as enemies of the democracy, they 
might claim contribution for its victory over the Thirty.  Besides, the propertied class was 
not necessarily a small group in the democracy.  It is not clear as to the level of property 
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qualification proposed in Phormisius’ motion.135  However, there is a possibility that the 
citizens who reached his qualification of property might be a substantial part, or even the 
majority of the audience whom he addressed to. 
There are three possibilities about whom and what procedure Phormisius’ proposition 
was put to.  First, it could be put to the Assembly by the typical procedure of the fifth-
century democracy.  In that case, Phormisius addressed directly to the demos.  However, 
not all of the demos would fail the property qualification required in the proposal.   
Dionysisus of Halicarnassus says that about five thousand Athenians would have been 
deprived of their citizenship if the proposal had passed.136  That is, less than a fourth of 
the citizenry, given the estimated citizen population ranging from twenty thousand to 
thirty thousand.137   If Dionysisus of Halicarnassus is correct, the status of the most 
citizens would remain intact.  In fact, it was even tempting for the majority to get rid of 
the burden of financing the poor minority by expelling them out of the democracy.  
Furthermore, the multitude of the propertied group is attested in Lysias speech.  The 
addressees of the extant part of his speech titled Preserving the Ancestral Constitution 
were actually the propertied class.  His rhetoric strategy would have been pointless if 
their number had not been decisive.  For example, Lysias wrote, ‘It was the demos that 
brought these men [those propertied citizens in exile], and gave you back what you have, 
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but did not itself have the boldness to share in it’,138 and ‘those who fought for oligarchy, 
who are nominally making war on the demos but in reality are coveting your property, 
and they will get possession of this, once they catch you without allies.’139  In contrast, 
the poor citizens seemed to be a minority.  To justify their share of the democracy, the 
speaker was forced to stress their past services for the propertied class, just like an 
oligarchic politician would do in his public speech.   
The second possibility is that Phormisius’ proposition was made as part of law 
investigation ordered in Teisamenus’ decree in 403.  In that case, the audience would not 
be the demos, but the five hundred councillors and the five hundred nomoqe/tai elected 
by the demes.140  The propertied class would be much better represented in the elected 
nomoqe/tai beyond their proportion of citizenry.  Accordingly, Phormisius’ proposition 
had a better chance of success.  Finally, Phormisius might put his proposition to the new 
procedure of legislation.  In that case, his motion had to go through both the Assembly 
and the nomothetai who were selected by lot and, therefore, a fair sample of the civic 
population.141  Though, compared with the first situation above, the audience was largely 
the same, his chance of success would decrease due to this two-stage procedure of 
enactment. 
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III. Re-confirmation of Pericles’ Law of Citizenship 
As mentioned above, Pericles’ law of citizenship finally turned out to be the principle of 
citizenship after the end of fifth-century Athens, though a few foreigners were awarded 
later with citizenship for their contribution for the democracy.142   This Pericles’ law was 
confirmed in a law of Aristophon around 403 by ordering that ‘anyone not born of an 
Athenian mother’ was ‘illegitimate’.143  Sometime later, another law or decree of 
Nicomenes was passed, approving the same principle, but also naturalizing its retroactive 
force.   This law declared that ‘no one of those[coming of age] after the archonship of 
Eulkeides, who can not show that both his parents are a0stoi/ should have a share in the 
city; but those before Eulkeides should be left unexamined.’ 144  From then until the end 
of the democracy,145 the Athenian parentage of both the maternal and paternal sides 
became a necessary, if not the sufficient, requirement for one to be an Athenian citizen, 
his merits to the democracy or ownership of property notwithstanding.146 
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Chapter Four   
The Athenian Democracy and its Trial of Socrates 
The trial of Socrates is discussed in this thesis because it presents one of the most 
difficult cases against the competence of Athenian democracy that has been argued in the 
previous chapters.  While the democracy appears to have governed strictly by the written 
laws following its law reform, the trial of Socrates suggests that the demos still showed 
no respect for the order of law, and was instead susceptible to demagogic manipulation 
and ready to commit the killing of innocent people and other outlawed behaviour on a 
whim.  Besides, the trial is often seen as one of the best examples exposing the reality of 
intolerance in post-war Athens under the surface of reconciliation.  The demos’ desire for 
revenge is said to be so strong that, despite its agreement on the amnesty, it turned on 
Socrates, a harmless aged philosopher, with barely disguised excuses and made him a 
scapegoat for its past sufferings. 
The date of the trial creates another difficulty for the defence of Athenian democracy.  
Socrates was tried and executed four years after the second democratic restoration.  
Therefore, it could not be explained away with the theory, as argued in the previous 
chapters, that persecution like the trial of Socrates could have happened only before the 
demos learnt from its mistakes in the naval battle of Aegospotami in 405.  In fact, there is 
no evidence that the Athenian demos ever regretted its execution of the philosopher. 
This chapter starts with a discussion of the source issue and then reconstructs the 
historical procedure of the trial, including its indictment and the verdicts.  This chapter 
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then proceeds with a discussion of the central issue: the historical causes for the 
intolerance of Socrates from the democracy in 399.  The accusations against Socrates, 
divided into six sub-categories of politics and religion, will be evaluated respectively for 
their possible effects on the jurors. 
I. The Socratic Question 
Xenophon and Plato, undeniably, provide the fullest, though not necessarily the most 
consistent, accounts of Socrates’ life and thought among the extant sources.  While the 
former was celebrated as a more truthful writer in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, the latter has been preferred by most scholars because of, inter alia, his literary 
and philosophical talent.1  Nevertheless, two important caveats should be added.  First, 
scholars who prefer Plato to other Socratic sources do not argue that all of the Platonic 
dialogues represent the thoughts of Socrates, but only the early dialogues or the so-called 
‘Socratic dialogues’, excluding the ‘later’ ones. 2  Second and more importantly, the 
Socratic dialogues are considered reliable by the scholars in the sense of being faithful 
accounts of Socrates’ philosophy, rather than being the exact records of his actual words 
and deeds.  The literary form of dialogue and the dramatic scenes, at many of which Plato 
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was obviously absent, are sometimes considered as a convenient tool for exploring the 
true meanings of the Socratic philosophy.  Gregory Vlastos makes it clear that Plato’s 
‘overriding concern is always the philosophy’ rather than historical facts.3  Plato is said to 
make the Socrates in his Socratic dialogues ‘say whatever he — Plato—thinks at the time 
of writing would be the most reasonable thing for Socrates to be saying just then in 
expounding and defending his own philosophy.’4           
In addition to the philosophical quality, there are many other reasons proposed by 
scholars for the historical reliability of Plato’s Socratic dialogues.  Plato is said, 
compared with Aristophanes and Xenophon, to be an inner member of the Socratic 
circle.5  Besides, to be successful in defending Socrates, he is supposed to provide a 
faithful report.6  His Socratic Apology and other Socratic dialogues would have passed 
the scrutiny of, and been chosen from many competing versions by, his contemporaries 
who were familiar with Socrates and his thought.7 Most important of all, Aristotle’s 
fragmentary but illuminating testimony that Socrates was not a natural scientist and was 
not the inventor of theories such as the immortal soul and the ideal of Forms attest the 
version of Socrates in Plato’s Socratic dialogues, in contrast to the descriptions in 
Aristophanes’ Clouds and Plato’s other dialogues.8  
                                                 
3
 Vlastos 1991: 51. 
4
 Vlastos 1991: 52.  His own emphasis. 
5
 See, for example, Ross 1933: 28-9; Chroust 1945: 43; Vlastos 1988: 138. 
6
 See, for example, Graham 1992: 181; Vlastos 1991: 51. 
7
 See, for, example, Brickhouse & Smith 1989: 5-6; 1994: viii.  
8
 Arist. Met. 987b1; 1078b17-32.  Besides, Aristotle also attributes a number of other doctrines to Socrates, 
such as the impossibility of a)krasi/a, the identification of virtue with knowledge and his profession of 
ignorance. All of them, Vlastos argues, testify to the reliability of Plato’s early dialogue.  See Vlastos 1988: 
145-7.  For scholars who prefer the account of Plato’s Socratic dialogues, Aristotle’s testimony is the 
decisive evidence.  See Ross 1933: 32; Vlastos 1988: 149.  
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 However, none of the reasons mentioned above provide hard evidence for the historical 
truthfulness of the Socratic dialogues.  First, Plato’s dialogues, though great philosophical 
works, are not necessarily historically accurate.  Second, neither Plato’s friendship with 
Socrates nor his motive of vindication would bring about a faithful account of the 
historical Socrates in front of the public; on the contrary, a very likely outcome of these 
incentives is a deceptive portrait of the person in question, as we would expect in most 
forensic speeches, ancient and modern.  Furthermore, having reputation of being the 
orthodox account of Socrates among the Socratic circle does not necessarily excuse 
Plato’s partisan colour, as the recognition came mainly from a fairly like-minded, and 
therefore uncritical, audience.  This is especially true in the discussion of the trial of 
Socrates.   Most of the audience of Plato’s account were not commoners, but the leisured 
class in his academia who tended to assume Socrates’ innocence and the incompetence of 
the democracy.  Therefore, the prejudice or errors in Plato’s account had less chance of 
being rectified through this academic process.  As to Aristotle’s testimony, it might very 
well indicate certain important differences between the Socratic and Platonic 
philosophies; however, his brief philosophical remarks provide little information about 
the tension between Athens and the philosopher. 
In light of the above discussion, an attitude of reservation about the historical reliability 
of Plato is more advisable.9  It is sometimes described as an agnosticism for its 
                                                 
9
 Recent articles of this view, Montuorri 1988: 57; Kahn 1992: 159-160; Beversluis 1993: 212, 218; M.H. 
Hansen 1995: 4; Millett 2005: 26; esp. Prior (2001: 46) that ‘Nor do I wish to deny that some of the views 
and arguments put forward by the Socrates of the Apology may very well correspond to those of the 
historical Socrates;   I only wish to argue that we are not in a position to claim that all of them do, or to say 
with certainty which of them do, or to specify the exactness of the correspondence.’ (His emphasis)  
However, a slightly different and more sensible position is the one he proposes elsewhere in the same 
article (Prior 2001: 44): ‘I cannot bring myself to doubt that there was an historical Socrates, that he was a 
philosopher, that he had many of the physical and psychological characteristics Plato attributes to him, that 
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recognition of the impossibility of separating the factual accounts of Socrates from the 
fanciful stories in the delicate mixture of the Platonic dialogues, though admittedly Plato 
might have provided overall a faithful account of Socrates, or even have captured his 
charisma and philosophy in a way much more illuminating than an exact report could 
ever do. Nevertheless, the core of this approach is not to accept uncritically Plato’s 
Socratic dialogues as factual evidence, insisting that their authority be established by the 
norms of historical scholarship, as is the case with other historical sources.  In other 
words, a single piece of testimony from either Xenophon or Plato will not be accepted in 
this thesis; it should be at least in agreement with the testimony from the other writer, or 
even better supported by other historical evidence.10 
This more sceptical approach has now even won the reluctant consent of Thomas 
Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith, two leading proponents for the Socratic study via Plato’s 
Socratic dialogues.  They concede that, unless examined and accepted by the norms of 
historiography,11 they ‘cannot be sure whether the philosophical views [they] expose and 
explicate really do belong to the historical Socrates, which is the only concession the 
anti-historicists [those who doubt the historical accuracy of Plato’s works] can claim their 
                                                                                                                                                 
he was the inspiration for Plato’s portrait of him, that he exposed Plato to the possibility of living a 
philosophical life and served as Plato’s model for that life.  About these matters our sources agree, and 
where there is agreement among the ancient sources we lack the evidence needed to raise serious doubt.’  
(Emphasis added.) 
10
 It is presumed that at least some of the sources of Plato are different from those of Xenophon.  Therefore, 
the points of agreement in their reports have a better chance of being historically correct.  See Hansen 1995: 
6-7.   
11
 Their concession comes with some reluctance.  Brickhouse & Smith (2003: 120): ‘The claims of 
historicist Socratic scholars [those who believe the historical accuracy of Plato’s works], we believe, need 
to satisfy no more stringent standards of evidence that do other historical claims—standards that must rely 
substantially on admittedly speculative judgements about what makes the best sense of ‘slim and 
fragmentary’ evidence.’    
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own arguments merit.’12  Their latest position makes a clear-cut distinction between 
philosophy and history as summarized in their so-called ‘Philosophical Identity Thesis’.  
The Philosophical Identity Thesis, which claims only that ‘the philosophy of 
Socrates’ or ‘Socratic philosophy’ is identical to the philosophy given to the 
character named ‘Socrates’ in the relevant group of Platonic dialogues… 
The Philosophical Identity Thesis makes no commitments of any kind 
about the historical accuracy of the Platonic portrait of Socrates or 
Socratic philosophy.13 
An important implication following this concession is that Plato’s Socratic dialogues 
should no longer be used as the only evidence in judging the democracy and its trial of 
Socrates, since both are historical events rather than philosophical assumptions.  Events 
such as the dialogue between Socrates and Euthyphro and the famous conversation in 
Plato’s Crito, which are described only by Plato, are not beyond reasonable doubt and 
therefore should not be used as hard evidence for the innocence, the philanthropy and the 
Athenian allegiance of the historical Socrates.14  This principle is plain and obvious, but 
might be difficult to adhere to.  Though Brickhouse and Smith claim that most scholars 
who are interested in the Socratic philosophy have been well aware of the essential 
difference between philosophy and historical judgement,15 many of them are in fact 
tempted to judge the democracy and the trial with the Platonic material unexamined.   For 
example, Vlastos was not hesitant in arguing for the political attitude of the historical 
                                                 
12
 Brickhouse & Smith 2003: 125-6. 
13
 Brickhouse & Smith 2003: 111.     
14
 Even the famous story of the Delphic oracle might not be entirely immune from doubt; see Montuori 
1988: 52-6.  For the credibility of the conversation in Crito, contra. Vlastos 1991: 51.   
15
 Brickhouse & Smith 2003: 125. 
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Socrates being the same as in Plato’s Socratic dialogues, especially in his Crito, believing 
that the dialogue is what the historical Socrates ‘tells his friend in the privacy of his 
prison cell, where he could have no motive for dissembling’.16  Even Brickhouse and 
Smith themselves adopt a similar methodological presumption to disprove the oligarchic 
tendency of the historical Socrates, claiming that ‘when other ancient sources conflict 
with views attributed to Socrates in Plato’s dialogues, we shall accept the version found 
in the early [Socratic] dialogues.’ 17 
In any case, an important methodological agreement has been emerging among Socratic 
scholars that literary elegance, philosophical insight or personal association do not 
exempt Plato or Xenophon from scrutiny by the norms of historical research when the 
issue in question is the historical events of the democracy and its trial of Socrates.  This 
principle, insisting on a distinction between historical narrative and philosophical 
discourse, would help us to view the elitist theory and the democratic practice of the 
Athenian politics from a new perspective.   
The demos and its government were an easy target for philosophical criticism from 
ancient times when they were blamed for their unjust treatment of Socrates.  However, 
the democracy would be put in a more positive light through this critical approach toward 
                                                 
16
 Vlastos 1983: 90, 107.  For a convincing refutation of Vlastos’ view in his article, see Wood & Wood 
1986. 
17
 Brickhouse & Smith 1994: 157-173.  Though they (1994: 157) claim most clearly at the beginning that 
their concern is only the Platonic attitude toward democracy in the early dialogues, it is so obvious in their 
argument and conclusion that the Socrates they mention is presumably the historical one, and the one to 
blame is of course the Athenian democracy.  For example, their aim (1994: 157) is to refute the claim that 
‘Socrates must be counted among those loyal to the oligarch faction.’ They conclude (1994: 173) that ‘we 
have shown that neither Socrates’ own views nor his associations support the view that he was a political 
threat to Athens.  This is, however, unfortunately quite compatible with his having been seen as such a 
threat.’  It is unlikely that ‘the oligarchic faction’, the ‘Athens’ and the ‘Socrates’ in the quotation refer to 
anything else but the historical ones.  One reader, J. Wallach (2002: 94n135), has the impression that their 
aim is ‘to establish the historical validity of the [Plato’s] Apology.’ 
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the works of Plato and Xenophon, as well as by more emphasis on its much-admired 
success in law reform and reconciliation.  Suppose that the democracy has proved itself 
to be a successful and virtuous regime without Socrates or even partly for that very 
reason: it should then be the turn of Plato, Xenophon and other Socratics, retracting their 
accusations toward the demos, to answer why the philosopher should have been tolerated, 
or even honoured, in the democracy in the face of all the allegations against him. This 
might not be an easy task. 
II. The Trial Process 
This section provides a summary of the trial with an account of the indictment, the statute 
adopted by the accusers, the selection of the jury and the trial procedure.  It will be shown 
that, compared with what is expected in a negative view of the direct democracy that is 
still prevalent today,18 there was likely to have been a higher degree of deliberation and 
legality in the trial because of the law adopted, the preventive designs against abuses of 
public prosecution, the impartial selection of the jury and one accuser’s reputation of 
moderation.19 
                                                 
18
 See the discussion of the modern image of Athenian democracy in section 1 of chapter 1. 
19
 Millett (2005: 41-5) defends the Athenian legal system as a design for the welfare of the community and 
the democracy, not as a mechanism for abstract principles of justice.  He argues that one of the main 
considerations in the Athenian legal system, though maybe not appearing relevant to the case in question 
from the views of modern jurisprudence, was the litigants’ contribution or damage to the community and 
the democracy that they had made or might have made in the future.  His argument is based on the 
following reasons: the openness and nearness of the law courts to the Agora, the institute of supportive 
speakers who were supposed to hold good public reputation, litigants’ emphasis on their records of public 
services, and those jurors who voted for Socrates’ acquittal in the first round, but condemned him then to 
death probably because of his continual rebellion. 
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i. The affidavit and the law applied 
At the age of seventy20 Socrates was charged with impiety and corruption of the young 
by three Athenians named Meletus, Lycon, and Anytus21 in 399,22 four years after the 
initiation of the Reconciliation and the year that the law reform was completed.  The 
affidavit is recorded by Diogenes Laertius as the following:  
Under oath Meletos the son of Sophronicskos has brought a public action 
(e0gra/yato) against Sockrates the son of Sophronisko of Alopeke and 
charges him with the following offences: Sokrates is guilty of not 
acknowledging the gods acknowledged by the state and of introducing 
other new divinities.  Furthermore, he is guilty of corrupting the young.  
Penalty proposed: capital punishment.23 
Regarding the question of legality, it is often believed that Socrates was accused and tried 
by the decree of Diopeithes that Plutarch says was enacted in the 430s and used to 
sanction public denunciation (ei0saggeli/a) of sophists such as Anaxagoras who did not 
‘accept what has to do with the gods or teach theories about what is up in the sky’.24 One 
implication of this belief is that the Athenian hostility to philosophers or sophists was so 
profound that a special enactment had been passed to deal with them long before the trial 
of Socrates.  However, this might be unlikely for the following reasons:.25  Firstly, the 
                                                 
20
 Pl. Ap. 17d; Cri. 52e; Diog. Laert. 2.44. 
21
 The names of the accusers are mentioned in several sources, for example, Pl. Ap. 23e; Xen. Ap. 29; Diog. 
Laert. 2.39. See Hansen 1995: 7-8, 16, 33-4. 
22
 The precise time of the trial is the winter of 399 in the archonship of Laches.  Hansen 1995: 16. 
23
 Diog. Laert 2.40, trans. Hansen 1995: 16.  The affidavit is also mentioned by Xenophon and Plato at 
several occasions. See Hansen 1995: 16n61. 
24
 Plut. Per. 32.2. trans. Dover 1976: 136. 
25
 See MacDowell 1962: 201; Dover 1976: 146-7; R. W. Wallace 1994: 137-8; Hansen 1995: 25.  
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existence of the decree is problematic, as it is mentioned by Plutarch alone in his own 
paraphrase without support from other ancient writers who were concerned with similar 
religious cases and therefore should have referred to the same decree in some way.  
Secondly, it is uncertain whether the decree, if it ever existed, was collected and 
remained as a valid statute after the law reform.  Finally and more decisively, it is clear 
from the accusers’ indictment that instead of following the judicial procedure of 
ei0saggeli/a demanded by the decree, they adopted a different procedure of grafh/.  The 
contention that the trial of Socrates was not sanctioned by the decree of Diopeithes, of 
course, does not disprove the Athenian demos’ suspicion of sophists and philosophers, 
but at least suggests that that emotion was never strong enough for a systematic 
prosecution sanctioned by an ad hoc enactment and lasting for generations. 
ii. The accusers 
Among the three accusers, the identities of Meletus and Lycon are uncertain.  There were 
many Athenians at that time named Meletus; some of them were blasphemous themselves, 
the others were a collaborator of the Thirty, a politician, a tragic poet, etc.  However, 
none of them can be definitely identified with the accuser Meletus who, according to 
Plato, was young and unknown to Socrates.26  Similar is the case of Lycon.  According to 
a scholium on Plato’s Apology 23e, he was the father of Autolykos and therefore the 
Lycon in Xenophon’s Symposium who was on friendly terms with Socrates.27  M. H. 
Hansen considers this association unlikely, for had it been true, Xenophon, not renowned 
for the ironic style, should have mentioned immediately that this Lycon was also an 
                                                 
26
 Pl. Euthph. 2b. MacDowell 1962: 208-9. 
27
 Xen. Symp. 9.1; Hansen 1995: 33-4. 
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accuser of Socrates.28  Regarding Anytus, by contrast, there is more information about his 
public life29:  he was elected a general, and in 409 put to trial for his responsibility for an 
unsuccessful naval campaign.  He was said to have been acquitted by bribing the jury.30  
In the restored democracy after 403 he was an influential politician due to his leadership 
during the democratic revolt against the Thirty.31  His defence of the orator Andocides 
who was also charged with impiety suggests that he was not intractable on religious 
grounds.32  Most important of all, though having suffered serious personal loss under the 
Thirty, he was well known for his adamant respect for the Amnesty of 403, despite his 
capability for vengeance as an influential politician.33 
It is noteworthy that the accusers themselves, though accusing rather than being accused, 
were not free from risk.  While voluntary private prosecutors were an essential part of the 
Athenian judicial system, there were also mechanisms for preventing abuse of this open 
access to lawsuits, or merely for controlling the number of trials at a reasonable level. For 
example, in the case of public prosecution,34 the accusers would lose part of their civil 
rights and be liable for a fine of one thousand drachmas -- a huge sum equal nearly to 
three years’ income of a skilled worker -- if they failed to acquire more than a fifth of the 
                                                 
28
 Hansen 1995: 33-4. 
29
 For the life of Anytus and the relevant sources, see MacDowell 1962: 166; Rhodes 1981: 343-4, 431-2; 
Hansen 1995: 7-8. 
30
 Ath. Pol. 27.5; Diod. Sic. 13.64.6. 
31
 Xen. Hell. 2.3.42 - 44; Lys. 13. 78, Isoc. 18.23. 
32
 Andoc.1.150; cf. Hansen 1995: 9-10. 
33
 Isoc. 18.23. 
34
 The lawsuits in Athens could be divided into public and private ones.  Roughly speaking, the public 
prosecution concerned the public interests and could be initiated by any free adult male, including non-
citizens in many cases; while the private suits were filed only by those who claimed to be wronged by the 
defendants.  The litigious procedure and penalty varied accordingly.   However, this distinction was vague 
and flexible.  For a further discussion of this complex issue, see Hansen: 1991:191 ff; Todd 1993: 98 ff. 
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votes or dropped their lawsuits unexpectedly, a tactic often used by blackmailers to 
acquire bribes from the defendants in the name of justice.35 
iii. Selection of the jury 
As to the composition of the jury, it is generally agreed that it was a representative 
sample of the whole citizenry, though there are still minor uncertainties about the 
procedure for the juror selection, especially in 399.  First, only an Athenian male over the 
age of thirty with full citizenship could seek to be one of the six thousand jurors selected 
at the beginning of a year.  It is unclear how the jurors were selected when the number of 
applicants was more than six thousand; however, considering the general practice of the 
democracy in its distribution of government offices, sortition was a likely solution.36  
Besides, it is also uncertain how the five hundred or five hundred and one37 jurors in the 
trial of Socrates were selected from the six thousand.  While the jurors in the fifth century 
B.C. seemed to be allocated to specific courts in advance for the whole year, a further 
daily selection by lot before the opening of courts was introduced as early as 392.  By this 
institutional change, bribing of the jury and other kinds of corruption would be much less 
possible, since it was unlikely for a juror to know in advance the court and the cases that 
he was going to consider, nor would the litigants know the exact composition of the jury 
before the court opened.38  This new method of selection might have been introduced as 
                                                 
35
 Pl. Ap. 36b; Harrison 1971: 83; MacDowell 1978: 64 
36
 MacDowell (1978: 34) and Hansen (1991: 181) believe that sortition was used in such cases, while 
Harrison (1971: 239) and Todd (1993: 83) are more hesitant. 
37
 Some scholars such as Hansen (1995: 16) and Gregory (983: 106) believe the number of the jury was 501, 
while others such as Brickhouse & Smith (2002: 2) and Todd (1993: 202) argue for the number of 500.  See 
also MacDowell 1978: 202. 
38
 Ar. Wasps 1206-7, Eccl. 681-90. Harrison 1971: 239-241; MacDowell 1978: 36-37; Hansen 1991: 181 ff; 
Todd 1993: 84-85.  The selection of jurors was becoming even more sophisticated in the days of Aristotle, 
see Ath. Pol. 63-70. 
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early as in 403 as part of the law reform39 and therefore was used in the trial of Socrates.  
This might be a reason that the Platonic Socrates in his defence did not complain about 
the partisan character of the jury.  He, like all orators, addressed the jury as if they were 
general Athenian citizens; it was only after his conviction that he ambiguously suggested 
the accusers’ embracery of the jury.40 
iv. The procedure  
The procedure of the trial, according to the general Athenian juridical procedure, was as 
follows:41 indicted for committing impiety and corruption of the young, Socrates was 
summoned by Meletus42 or the other accusers in person to appear at the office of the King 
Archon at a fixed time.43  On that day, the official in charge, maybe after a preliminary 
and general examination of the legality of the case, ordered them to attend a preliminary 
hearing at another time.44  The trial started some time after the hearing.  After the jury 
was selected and the court opened, the accusers first made their prosecuting speeches, 
followed by the defences of Socrates or his co-speakers.45  In the process they were 
allowed to attack each other by interrogation.  It is unknown how persuasive the 
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 Harrison 1971: 240; Hansen 1991: 183. 
40
 Pl. Ap. 36b: ‘if Anytus and Lycon had not joined him [Meletus] in accusing me, he would have been 
fined a thousand drachmas for not receiving a fifth of the votes.’  Yet, even this sentence does not 
necessarily refer to the accusers’ embracery and manipulation of jury selection; it might have as well 
suggested their oratorical ability or other kind of influence on the jury. 
41
 See Harrison 1971: 85ff; MacDowell 1978:57ff, 200-202; Todd 1993: 128ff; Hansen 1991: 196 ff; 1995: 
16-18. 
42
 Pl. Euthphr. 2b. 
43
 Pl. Tht. 210d; Ath. Pol. 57.3; Harrison 1971: 9. 
44
 However, the function of this hearing is unclear.  MacDowell (1978: 241-2) suggests that it helped to 
clarify the cases in question through interrogation by the relevant magistrates and among the litigants 
themselves.  Hansen (1991: 197) believes that its main priority is to reach an agreement among the litigants 
instead of going to court.  This might be true in most private cases, but is questionable in the cases of public 
accusation.  As Harrison (1971: 83, 103-5) argues, accusers in public cases would be fined a huge amount 
of money or be deprived of part of their civil rights if they withdrew their cases.  A possibility is that the 
accusers were not allowed to evade the liability by dropping the case after the preliminary hearing.  
45
 Xen. Ap. 22; Hansen 1995: 13-14. 
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prosecuting speeches were, since they are lost to us, while Socrates appeared to irritate 
the jury several times with his ‘big talk’.46 The jury, having listened to the cases of both 
sides, found Socrates guilty with a vote of 280 to 221.  While the accusers proposed the 
penalty to be death, Socrates either refused to propose his own punishment47 or did so 
with even greater loftiness and irony.48 The jury, accordingly, approved the accusers’ 
proposition by a much larger majority.49  The trial was then over, but Socrates, though 
not required by the judicial procedure, launched his third and last speech, insisting on his 
innocence, the injustice of the verdict and his total disregard for the whole process.50  
However, many of the jurors, as Hansen and Millett suggest, were probably hurrying out 
to somewhere else and did not pay much attention to it.51 
III. Causes of the Trial and the Conviction 
Socrates’ long-term public image presumably played a decisive role in the trial and its 
outcome, since it would have aroused further suspicion at the end of the fifth century B.C.  
Though other factors such as the arrogance of Socrates’ court speeches or the superior 
rhetoric of the accusers might well have contributed to his conviction and execution, it is 
almost impossible to know exactly the effects of their court performance on the jury, 
since the speeches of the accusers are lost, while the substantial part of Socrates apology 
cannot be reconstructed beyond reasonable doubt from the writings of Xenophon and 
Plato. Furthermore, we simply cannot measure precisely in what direction and to what 
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 Xen. Ap. 1-2, 14, 31-2; Pl. Ap. 21a, 30c. 
47
 Xen. Ap. 23. 
48Pl. Ap. 35eff, 38c. 
49
 Diog. Laert. 2.42. 
50
 Pl. Ap. 38c ff; Xen. Ap. 24. 
51
 Hansen 1995: 18; Millett 2005: 26. 
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extent the individual opinions of the jurors changed because of the speeches.  By contrast, 
there are more sources for a sufficient understanding of the political development of 
Athens at the end of fifth century B.C., during which public opinion of Socrates was 
shaped , eventually becoming a decisive element of his fate.   Besides, Socrates, rather 
than being an ordinary private citizen, was a public figure so well known that he was 
made into a major figure for comedy long before his trial.52  His name was also often 
associated with some of the wicked oligarchs.  Therefore, it is most likely that, before 
entering the court, the jurors knew of him and had formed certain judgements from his 
eccentricity and alleged involvement in the destructive political struggle of the past 
decade.  The public image thus formed, probably too fixed already to be altered by a few 
speeches in the court, must have played a major part in the jurors’ condemnation, 
especially in an Athenian court where a litigant’s character was important evidence.  
i. The Classification of Religious and Political Causes 
The causes for the trial and conviction of Socrates discussed by most scholars fall into the 
two categories of religion and politics: Socrates was condemned because he was 
considered a religious danger or a political threat.53  There are two problems with this 
classification.  First, what is meant by “political and religious causes” in the discussions 
of scholars’ is not always clear and consistent.  There are in fact three different references 
for the religious accusation and another three for the political one.   The three specific 
religious charges are (1) Socrates’ denial of Athenian religious beliefs, (2) his 
introduction of new divinity and (3) atheism. Political reasons are meanwhile (1) partisan 
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 For Aristophane’s Clouds as a demonstration of Socrates’ public reputation, see Millett 2005: 28. 
53
 For Scholars adopting this distinction, e.g. Hackforth 1933: 12-13; Finley 1985: 129; Stone 1988: 138-9; 
esp. Brickhouse & Smith 1994: 173. 
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enmity, (2) his criticism of democracy and (3) his threat to the general established orders.  
It is better to be more specific in the discussion of these issues as to which of the six 
causes are mentioned, rather than referring to them generally as the religious and political 
causes. 
The second and more serious problem is the false separation of Athenian politics and 
religion that seems to be presumed in the classification of the religious and political 
causes.  This is not a proper presumption for understanding the trial.   First, there were 
five hundred and one jurors whose considerations were very likely different from one to 
another.  Some may have made their decisions according to certain political reasons, 
others may have been persuaded by the religious arguments, and many more may have 
cast their votes following various combinations of different motives. It is unlikely that the 
majority of them voted for the same reason, no matter whether religious or political.54  
Second, many scholars have pointed out that, to the Athenians, politics and religion, 
rather than being separated, were interpenetrated to an indistinguishable level.  The state 
assumed its imperative responsibility to maintain the religious rituals and belief, while 
religion was considered an essential element for the flourishing or decline of the political 
community.  A religious enemy was, therefore, a political threat, and vice versa.55  
Finally, the accusation of corrupting the young, as we can see in Aristophanes’ Clouds, 
referred not only specifically to Socrates’ religious or political crimes, but also to their 
destructive effects on all the basic established orders -- that is, the Athenian norms in the 
realms of religion, politics, morality, etc. 
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 Parker 1996: 151.  Burnyeat 1995: 135; McPherran 1996: 165. 
55
 Finley 1985: 115; Montuori 1988: 82; Parker 1996: 155-6; Wallach 2002: 96; Parker 2005: 89-90; esp. 
Todd 1993: 307-15. 
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However, as long as we do not make an either-or choice between them, the classification 
of the six causes is useful for exploring the jurors’ opinions of Socrates. 
ii. The Religious Causes 
The Religious motive is the more obvious reason, since the religious accusation of 
impiety is the focus of both the accusers’ formal indictment and the defences of Plato and 
Xenophon.  There were three religious charges against Socrates: the denial of the 
Athenian gods, the introduction of new gods and his atheist belief. 
The denial of the Athenian gods: This charge might mean specifically Socrates’ lack of 
respect for the rituals and beliefs of the established religion.56  The accusation of 
neglecting the rituals can be surmised from Xenophon’s defence that Socrates offered 
sacrifices regularly to the gods both at home and at the public altar.57 Ritual misconduct 
could sometimes turn out to be one of the most serious public offences, as evidenced by 
the popular outcry against the mockery of the Eleusinian Mysteries in 415.58  However, 
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 There is a debate whether the accusation of not recognizing the gods means only lack of respect for the 
religious rituals, or also refers to the denial of the religious belief.  For the argument that the charge referred 
only to the religious practice, see J. Burnet 1924: note on Pl. Ap. 24 c1; for the more convincing view that it 
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there seems to be no evidence other than Xenophon’s that suggests the charge of 
violating the religious rituals.  The alleged violation of religious beliefs, on the other hand, 
might have something to do with Socrates’ philosophical pursuit, which, according to 
Aristotle, was a persistent quest for the universal in the ethical realm.59  As Vlastos 
argues, when regarding religious affairs, Socrates continued his task with the 
presumption that the gods must be perfectly moral without any exception.60  This was an 
extremely radical concept, for, as Vlastos indicates, to ask the Athenian gods to measure 
up to this requirement was as good as to destroy their traditional identities.61   
The introduction of new divinities (daimo/nia):   The accusers’ use of the plural term, 
daimo/nia, might be a genuine expression of their belief or a prosecuting strategy to 
exaggerate the systematic scale of his crime.62  However, most scholars agree, the alleged 
reference of this charge was Socrates’ daimonion that was perceived by no one else but 
Socrates himself.63  How serious could a charge like this be in a pantheist society such as 
Athens?  Parker argues that, though less serious than the denial of the gods of the state, 
private worship would not be tolerated if it turned out to be a challenge to the established 
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political authority.  He points out that in principle it was only under the recognition of the 
demos that the worship of new gods, whether private or public, was introduced into the 
city.64  Socrates’ daimonion, by contrast, was by no means recognizable to the demos, 
since it was revealed to Socrates alone.65  What was even worse is that in the name of this 
unrecognized deity Socrates, according to Plato, despised the authority of the Athenian 
court,66 or, as reported by Xenophon, dared to exert great influence upon his 
companions.67  Both of his pupils’ reports suggest the probability of serious conflict 
between Socrates’ private deity and the public authority.68 
Atheism:  Considering the religious diversity and flexibility in the Athenian society, its 
citizens seemed capable of expressing their opinions of gods with considerable freedom. 
Therefore, some scholars argue that atheism, though not mentioned in the indictment, 
was likely to have been one of the main reasons for the conviction of Socrates, since the 
denial of the existence of gods might appear much more irritating than his quarrelling 
with the mortal kindred over the intention of divinity, and finally must have crossed the 
boundary of Athenian religious tolerance.69  Though Plato has pointed out the logical 
contradiction between the charge of atheism and that of introducing the new deities,70 it is 
understandable in the common usage of language to call someone an atheist if he 
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substitutes the traditional gods with new ones that are not only strange but also 
indiscernible to anyone else.71  How serious could the charge be?  Socrates did have a 
well-established reputation as a natural scientist who doubted the divinity of the natural 
world through his alleged exploration above the sky and below the earth, 72 an image 
which reminds us of the prosecution of Anaxagoras as reported by Plutarch.73  Although, 
as argued above, the law by which Socrates was accused is unlikely to have been the one 
in the case of Anaxagoras, it might be true that there was a long-term tendency of popular 
suspicion towards natural research because of its atheist implication.  However, this 
hostility could not be deadly serious if, as Plato’s Socrates says, the atheist theory of 
Anaxagoras was still available on the street at a very low cost.74      
iii. The Political Causes 
There are three possible political charges: personal enmity, subversion of the democracy, 
and corruption of the Athenian tradition.  The first is different from the rest in its lack of 
genuine considerations of ideology or public interests.  Compared with the second charge, 
the charge of corrupting the traditional orders extends the range of crime from the 
administrative realm to all the basic norms of the Athenian society. 
Personal enmity against Socrates: One of the most plausible reasons for bringing 
Socrates to the court is the hostility that Socrates had incurred directly out of personal 
conflicts between him and the accusers or indirectly from rows between his companions 
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and theirs.  The accusers were not necessarily ashamed of claiming their personal 
hostility toward Socrates, for personal enmity by itself was an acceptable reason for 
bringing a public case to an Athenian court.75  This kind of enmity is also what Plato and 
Xenophon claimed to be the accusers’ true motive and the cause of the jury’s verdict.  In 
Plato’s version, the accusers were the agents of those reputedly wise men such as poets, 
craftsmen, politicians and orators who had been publicly humiliated by Socrates’ 
exposure of their ignorance. Their persistent slander was said to be a more important 
cause that led the jury to convict and execute Socrates.76  According to Xenophon, 
Anytus indicted Socrates as revenge for Socrates’ bold interference in the education of 
his son.77  Finally, the association of Socrates and some notorious oligarchs such as 
Critias and Alcibiades might have raised some people’s hatred toward him.78  Though his 
oligarchic association appears in the context of the ancient sources mainly as evidence of 
his danger to Athens and the democracy, it could also stir the memory of many people for 
their personal sufferings brought about by some of Socrates’ companions. 
However, the effect of personal hatred should not be exaggerated.79 It was far from a 
sufficient reason for the success of a public suit.  Personal hatred was acceptable in the 
court mainly because it proved that the accuser had a stronger motive than to exact 
money by blackmailing, which was serious misbehaviour.80     To win the jury’s approval 
or merely to avoid the heavy penalty for failing to acquire at least a fifth of the votes, the 
appeals of ideology or public interests were still essential.   Obviously, to claim that the 
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accusers had no other reasons than their personal hatred toward Socrates, as Plato and 
Xenophon did in their defences of Socrates, was a strategy not for justifying, but for 
discrediting, their accusation.  Besides, as mentioned above, the Athenian mechanism of 
sortition made the jury more or less a fair sample of the citizenry.  Though Socrates was 
notorious, it is unlikely that he had been involved in so many private quarrels that he had 
become a personal enemy of most Athenians.  Even Plato and Xenophon only claimed 
that the accusers, not the jurors, had direct or indirect personal conflict with Socrates.  
The jurors were said to have convicted Socrates not because of their own personal 
conflicts with Socrates, but because they were deceived by the long-term slander of his 
enemies who were reputedly wise and therefore by definition a small minority of the 
citizenry and the jury.  Moreover, the effects of the law reform and the reconciliation 
should be taken into account.  Their success, as the previous two chapters argue, strongly 
suggests a popular commitment to leaving behind the hatred of past partisan conflicts for 
the future of a law-abiding Athenian community.  Finally, the oath all jurors had to take 
bounded them to cast their votes according to the laws or their sense of justice, instead of 
indulging their personal enmity.81  Transgression of this principle, according to the oath, 
would incur grave misfortune to the wrongdoers themselves and their families.82  The 
oath would have carried some extra weight in religion-connected trials such as the one of 
Socrates.  
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Subversion of the democracy:  Socrates might have been accused because of his own 
alleged anti-democratic thought83 and his social association with the oligarchs who had 
overthrown the democracy.  Though often viewed as a violation of the amnesty of 403, 
this kind of charge was not necessarily so, since Socrates’ past behaviour could still be 
used as character evidence after 403.  Besides, the philosopher seemed to continue in his 
old way of life, which in the eyes of some Athenians, according to their experience, was 
going to cause trouble to the democracy.84   
While it is still an issue of much dispute whether or not the historical Socrates was truly 
an antidemocrat,85 there is agreement among most scholars that he did have a public 
image of being an oligarchic teacher.86  Plato’s Socratic works are full of Socrates’ severe 
criticism of the democracy.87  According to other sources, he was said to be courteous 
with the upper class, while contemptuous toward the common people.88 The image was 
characterized by his criticism of the democratic practice of sortition: that it was extremely 
foolish to appoint governmental officials not according to their virtue and knowledge, but 
by lot among the common and uneducated people.89  The image, which was still firmly 
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attributed to him in the days of Aristotle,90 would have reminded the jurors of the 
propaganda that had been involved in the disfranchisement of the commoners and of their 
other sufferings during the two oligarchic coups in 411 and 404.91  Even Xenophon did 
not deny that Socrates held this sort of view, though he was quick to argue that Socrates 
allowed only the means of peaceful persuasion, and therefore held no responsibility for 
the oligarchic violence and murders. 
The danger of Socrates to the democracy could be further affirmed by his personal 
friendship with some of the notorious oligarchs, an association which is beyond dispute.92  
Meletus and the other accusers are believed to have used it as a major point of attack to 
support their case in the court.93  Plato’s Apology admits that many of Socrates’ audience 
were rebellious young men from the rich or upper classes.94  Xenophon conceded that 
two of the most subversive political criminals, Critias and Alcibiades, were among the 
audience,95 a bond that was still firmly remembered and considered to be the reason for 
the execution of Socrates fifty years later.96  This political association, rather than the 
philosophical criticism in itself, may have been more responsible for the conviction of 
Socrates.97 
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How serious was the charge of oligarchic association?  It was easy for the accusers to 
accuse Socrates with his infamous image, pointing out that he would again corrupt the 
younger generation and create another Alcibiades or Critias.  More importantly, popular 
suspicion might have been gravely increased, as I.F. Stone points out, by the recent 
oligarchic revolt in Eleusis in 401.98  Considering the frequency and intensity of the 
oligarchic coups in the last decade, the jurors might very well have tended to believe that 
Socrates was a dangerous enemy to the fragile democracy at the present and in the future.  
Though some scholars argues that one’s personal associations should not be a reason for 
the conviction of any crime,99 there is little evidence that the Athenians shared the same 
belief.  
The corrupter of traditional norms:  This is the most profound charge against Socrates in 
terms of scale, referring not only to his behaviour against the democratic values and 
institution, but also to his corruption of the political order in the broadest sense: the 
totality of the Athenian norms.  It would have been to the accusers’ advantage should 
they have succeeded in imposing this charge upon Socrates, for it would have drawn 
more votes of conviction from the non-democratic conservatives by portraying him as an 
enemy to both the democracy and the traditional way of life.   
Though we do not have the accusers’ prosecution speech, Aristophanes’ Clouds 
demonstrates the corrupting effect of Socrates’ impiety on the young men in misleading 
them to defy all of the traditional values and practices.  In this comedy, initiated into 
Socrates’ Thinkery and converting his belief from the traditional religion to Socrates’ 
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new goddesses -- the Clouds, who were worshipped by sophists and sycophants100 -- a 
young man learned the oratorical art of making the wrong arguments the stronger.  He 
successfully defeated his father’s creditors, and found that with this new skill he could 
deny not only the norms of business contracts, but also all the other established 
authorities.  He was finally corrupted and considered all behaviour possible and perfectly 
justifiable, including beating up his own parents.101 
This charge was conceivable, since even Plato’s Socrates considered that Aristophanes’ 
portrayal constituted an essential element of his public image.102  Furthermore, though 
Aristophanes’ portrayal used to be considered an unfounded distortion,103 some scholars 
argue with certain plausibility that it was indeed a fair representation of the historical 
Socrates because of the basic similarities between the Aristophanic image and the one in 
Plato’s Socratic dialogues.104  It is argued that, considering the accounts of both Plato and 
Aristophanes without favour on the philosopher, Socrates appeared to be a radical 
revolutionary who proposed no alternative at all, that is, a nihilist.  In addition, while the 
charge perhaps had been considered merely ludicrous banter in 434 when the Clouds was 
staged, there were reasons in 399 that more and more Athenians might have taken it 
seriously because of the dramatic change of environment.  Several events might have 
altered their concept of Socrates’ influence.  Robert Parker suggests that the mutilation of 
Hermes and the profanation of the Mysteries in 415 committed by a group of young 
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oligarchs made religion a more sensitive issue in 399.105  Much more important, as 
mentioned above, should be Socrates’ association with Alcibiades and the Thirty.  These 
oligarchs, in the eyes of the Athenians, were not only anti-democratic, but also immoral 
villains, ready to satisfy their unbounded ambition and greed at the cost of other 
Athenians, democrats or not.  Given the repeated misconduct of those young oligarchs at 
the end of the fifth century B.C., the comedian’s words would have appeared more like 
an ominous prophecy than light-hearted jokes. 
IV. Conclusion 
i 
The discussion of the trial of Socrates in this chapter is divided into three parts.  As to the 
source issue, it criticizes the common tendency to consider the defensive works of Plato 
and Xenophon as impartial reports, arguing that an agreement between these two main 
sources should be a minimal requirement for our historical knowledge of the trial.  This 
methodological position has recently even won concessions from some leading scholars 
who believe in the historicity of Plato’s ‘Socratic’ dialogues.  However, it still needs to 
be emphasised and applied more strictly, so that the distinction between historical reality 
and philosophical speculation may be better maintained. 
ii 
Besides, the examination of the trial procedure indicates that the trial, following the 
regulations of the Athenian laws, was not as hasty as one might have thought.  It was not 
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based on a decree of persecuting scientific research.  One of the accusers, Anytus, was a 
moderate politician rather than an extremist.  There were heavy fines and severe 
punishment for abuse of litigation, such as blackmail and implausible accusation that 
acquired less than a fifth of the jury’s votes.  Jurors had to be adults over the age of 30 
and were selected through a sophisticated procedure of sortition that prevented efficiently 
partisanship and embracery of jurors.  The accused had the right to defend himself by 
speaking to the jury, calling witnesses and co-speakers, and interrogating his accusers.  
Though Socrates appeared to irritate the jury several times, he was allowed to exact all 
his rights as a defendant.  Finally, the Athenians had extra time to reconsider their verdict 
in the case of Socrates, for his execution happened to be postponed for a month due to a 
religious festival. 
iii 
Furthermore, we have clarified the complicated discussion of the causes of the trial, 
dividing them into six interlinked categories.  Three of them are religious accusations: the 
denial of Athenian gods, the introduction of new deities, and atheism.  The others are 
political ones: personal enmity, the subversion of democracy, and corruption of youth.  
The accusation of atheism seems less significant because the works of atheism were 
available on the streets of Athens.  Personal enmity is another weak accusation because it 
justified only the motivation of accusation but not the guilt of Socrates. 
 This analysis of the causes of the trial highlights the destructive effects of Socrates’ 
philosophy.  His elenchus is profound examination of established norms, being they 
religious, moral or political.  Common understandings of divinity, justice and other moral 
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concepts collapsed under his criticism.  Therefore, Socrates appeared to be irreligious, 
immoral and antidemocratic in the eyes of the public.  He would not have had such a poor 
public image if he had kept his philosophy to himself.  However, for some reasons, 
Socrates brought his philosophy into the public.  He used to stay in the agora, gymnasia 
and other public places all day long.  He debated with people there and proved their 
intellectual inferiority.  A group of young people, following him around the city of 
Athens, received his instruction or imitated his elenctic way of questioning.  They made 
themselves a nuisance to the public.  People were angry with Socrates because of this 
philosophical exercise by him and his followers, and the philosopher came to hold the 
public image described in Aristophanes’ comedy. 
Socrates justified his philosophical practice in the name of divine authorities and altruism.  
The former refers to the Delphic oracle and his daimonion, which are controversial or 
even unrecognizable.  As to the latter, there was an abundance of evidence after the 
Thirty Tyrants that Socrates’ philosophy produced the opposite effect.  Some of his 
followers were in the core of the oligarchic coup in 403.  Their lawless behaviour 
confirmed the long-term suspicion that Socrates and his philosophy corrupted the youth 
and was a threat to the democracy and other established norms. 
iv. 
In summary, we have presented a case of certain consistency among the three events of 
the Athenian democracy at the end of the fifth century B.C. : the law reform, the 
reconciliation and the trial of Socrates.  There might be some objection that the trial was 
a deviation from the law reform and the reconciliation rather than an example of them.  It 
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was said that the Athenians, having soon regretted their execution of Socrates, erected a 
statue of him in a public place and punished the accusers with death or exile.106 This 
legend suggests that the trial, not complying with the due process of law and deliberation, 
was a precipitate case under the impetuosity of the demos, like the trial of the ten 
generals in 406.107  However, as Aeschines’ famous testimony indicates,108 the Athenians 
did not regret their decision.  Besides, there is no evidence that the legal procedure and 
deliberation required by the laws were ever compromised in the case. 
 On the other hand, more voices claim that the trial was a violation of the amnesty.109  
However, as argued in chapter three, the amnesty was neither an unconditional nor a 
complete oblivion of the past.  Given the nature of the Athenian judicial system, the law 
could not prohibit the accusers from mentioning Socrates’ past behaviour as evidence of 
his character, nor did it protect him if he was judged to be a danger not only in the past, 
but also in the future.110  In fact, an Athenian democrat might even rebuke the pupils of 
Socrates, boasting that the trial was not only consistent with the amnesty literally, but 
also illustrated its spirit of maintaining communal harmony, as judged by the 
extraordinary internal stability of fourth-century Athens 
The previous two chapters, it is hoped, have pointed to a prevailing tendency among the 
Athenians, especially after 403, to rebuild Athens with a conservative nationalist ideal, 
that is, to define Athens as the community of the Athenian offspring ruled by the laws 
founded by their mythical common ancestors.  The common appeal of this ideal is 
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attested by the fact that since the beginning of the law reform in 411 almost every 
politician, democratic and oligarchic, justified their behaviour with the slogan of 
returning to the ancestral constitution.  The enormous power of this ideal made the 
Athenian democrats ungratefully turn away their foreign comrades, while embracing their 
former enemy, the Athenian oligarchs, with such an unprecedentedly generous amnesty 
that the democracy won unanimous praise even from its severe critics.   Its nationalist 
character expressed most clearly in the reconfirmation of Pericles’ strict law of 
citizenship that Athenian membership was in principle an inherited privilege granted for 
being born to Athenian parents, not to be earned by one’s political belief, knowledge, 
wealth or contribution to Athens. 
The consolidation of the democracy and the unity of Athens were then the two main tasks 
that the Athenians strived hard to achieve at the same time by making a difficult balance 
between them after the civil wars.  As discussed above, there were reasons behind the 
suspicion that Socrates was at odds with these serious causes.  On the one hand, he 
obviously still preferred some sort of hierarchical order based on virtues or knowledge to 
the democratic belief and practice of equality and participation.111  On the other hand, 
while the democrats and the victims of the Thirty had given up so much in exchange for 
the harmony of Athens upheld with the myth of the common ancestors, Socrates showed 
no intention of adjusting his individualistic way of philosophy that was imitated by his 
young followers to mock the elders as well as time-honoured practices of all sorts.  The 
defiance of traditional values was hardly acceptable at this period, for it would have 
appeared as a blunt mockery of the ancestral constitution that was the central principle for 
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the law reform, the amnesty and the peace agreement between the democrats and 
oligarchs.  Socrates’ way of life, therefore, would have been judged at that time as a 
conspiratorial act that would push the whole community back into the chaos of civil strife.  
The threat of Socrates was further confirmed by his close connection with Alcibiades and 
Critias, two of the most notorious oligarchs.  Judging by their experience that was still 
fresh and painful, the Athenians, especially the democrats among them, had reasons to 
suspect that Socrates would have soon cultivated another Alcibiades or Critias if they had 
failed to stop him in his way of life. 
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Chapter Five  
Xenophon and Athenian Democracy 
We have already examined in the earlier chapters the three important events completed 
by the Athenian democracy at the end of the fifth century B.C.:  the law reform, the 
reconciliation and the trial of Socrates.  While the last of these has discredited the 
democracy since ancient times as the impetuous murderer of maybe the greatest 
philosopher, the Athenian demos’ achievements in relation to the first two events has 
recently started to win it a reputation for generosity and observance of laws.  These two 
contradictory images of the direct democracy have now reopened an important debate 
among historians and political theorists: whether the Athenian democracy was a good 
government or not.  It is time now to re-examine what Xenophon and Plato said on this 
issue and consider their insightful thinking on and personal experience with the 
democracy. 
Xenophon and Plato used to be considered strict critics of Athenian democracy who attest 
the decline of Athens under the folly of the democracy at the end of the fifth century B.C.  
Their criticism of the democracy is easy to find in their writings.  However, when 
examining their works closely, we also find their recognition of the democratic 
achievements of law reform and reconciliation.  There are even signs that indicate their 
reconsideration of the trial of Socrates. 
Let us start with Xenophon, whose contribution to the discussion of ancient Greek 
political thought is often neglected.  Xenophon actually constitutes an interesting case 
compared with Plato.  Both came from similar social backgrounds, but approached issues 
of political thought from different perspectives.  Plato was of course the much more 
 156 
sophisticated and articulate philosopher, but Xenophon did not lack philosophical insight.  
He is one who would forgive Athenian democracy for its execution of Socrates, for he 
understood the importance of forgiveness in dealing with political conflicts caused by 
ignorance, envy or other human flaws. He was also more experienced in real politics as a 
politician and military leader.  His political experience provides a first-hand account of 
how an intellectual elitist struggled to be successful in popular politics, stories that we 
can hardly find in Plato or other ancient Greek writers. 
It is important to note that Xenophon was not only a political writer, but also a veteran 
soldier and politician who pursued fame in public spheres.1  His political ambition is a 
key to understanding his view of the democracy.  In a nutshell, Xenophon was 
undoubtedly an elitist who firmly believed in the ideal of political hierarchy in which the 
superior ruled over the inferior classes.  He was a pupil of Socrates and exiled by the 
democracy for thirty years for siding with Sparta against Athens.  However, as suggested 
in his appreciation of the rule of law and the reconciliation project under the democracy 
as well as in his persistent interest in Athenian politics, he did not hold a completely 
negative view of the demos’ political capability, despite all of his disagreements with the 
rule of the common people.  His moderate view is consistent with his life-long pursuit of 
a public career, a decision that would have been incomprehensible if he had thought that 
the demos was too wild to be led.  
                                                 
1
 The predominant voice in today’s discussion of Xenophon’s political thought is the Leo Straussian school. 
There seems to be a tendency among Straussian scholars to view Xenophon more as a Socratic philosopher 
than as an active general and politician, maybe because of their belief that philosophy was the ultimate end 
of both his theoretical reflection and practical deeds of politics.  However, some of them also recognized 
Xenophon’s lifelong interest in politics and the problems of interpretation caused by dismissing 
Xenophon’s active political life.  For the view that Xenophon was mainly a Socratic philosopher, see Leo 
Strauss 1975: 112, 136, Bruell 1987: 105, Pangle 1994: 150, Howland 2000: 876, Nadon 2001: 179, 180, 
Buzzetti 2001: 31.  For recognition of Xenophon’s interest and achievement in politics, see Bruell 1987: 91, 
111, Bruell 1994: x, Buzzetti 2001: 31. 
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As to the interpretive approach of Xenophon’s work in this thesis, there are certain 
assumptions as follows.  First, in contrast to the focus on the issue of historicity in the 
previous chapters, the main interest here is the political aspect of Xenophon’s works, that 
is, his view of political society and his judgement on the democracy.  The issue of 
historicity, therefore, will be discussed only when it is relevant to our examination of 
Xenophon’s political thought.  For example, we will not discuss in detail the level of 
historical accuracy in his Constitution of the Spartans or how documentary are the 
various dialogues between Socrates and his companions reported in his Socratic works.  
Another presumption, as mentioned in the previous chapter, is that all Xenophon’s 
Socratic works as well as his other works are considered as an expression of his own 
thought rather than that of Socrates or someone else.  There are of course materials from 
Socrates and others that Xenophon had borrowed, but they have been adapted and 
rearranged to an indistinguishable level.  It is often a futile task to distinguish clearly 
between an author’s thought and the views of those from whom he has learnt.  Lastly, it 
is presumed that Xenophon’s writings are basically consistent.  In contrast to the case of 
Plato, it is generally agreed that Xenophon wrote most of his works in the last decade of 
his life.2  It is less likely for his political views to have fundamentally changed in his old 
age, and most studies of Xenophon appear to presume philosophical consistency of his 
works.3 
                                                 
2
 The works of Xenophon that some scholars think might be written before 360s: The Apology of Socrates, 
The Constitution of the Spartans, the first part of Hellenica and a few books of Memorabilia.  See OCD 
‘Xenophon’, Higgins 1977: 131-2, Lipka 2002: 9.  For discussion of the publication date of individual 
works, see Cawkwell 1979: 15; 17; Waterfield: 1990: 7, 32;Gera 1993: 23; Dillery 1995: 14; Lipka 2002: 
13; Cawkwell 2004: 47. 
3
 See, for example, Higgins 1977: xii; Tuplin: 1993: 163; Pangle 1994: 128-9; Dillery 1995: 7-8; Nadon 
2001: 24-5, though they have different views on the central themes or ideas in the corpus of Xenophon.  
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This chapter begins with a brief account of the relationship between Xenophon and 
Athenian democracy, before examining his responses to the three important events 
individually.  
I. Xenophon’s Oligarchic Tendency 
i. Oligarchic values 
The relationship between Xenophon and Athenian democracy is a complex issue.  
Xenophon was mainly an oligarch; he understood politics from an elitist perspective, as 
revealed in his more theoretical writings such as his Socratic writings and The 
Constitution of the Spartans.  To be sure, he was not an extremist like Critias who wanted 
to ‘burn down’ the democracy;4 however, neither was he one who would have genuine 
sympathy with the people’s suspicion of dictatorial rule and their struggle for equal rule.5  
What concerned him were mainly the Athenian oligarchs’ political interests as well as the 
difficulties they encountered in a democratic society.  For example, the virtue of self 
control that he was never tired of emphasising was in fact only possible for those who 
were exposed to the risk of self-indulgence due to their fortune and leisure, while poor 
citizens, who lived constantly in austerity, would have had difficulty in proving that their 
way of life was a result of their free will rather than forced by necessity.6   
He also made an explicit criticism of the democratic practice of sortition.  Some Athenian 
politicians accused Socrates of mocking the democratic way of distributing governing 
                                                 
4
 This is the scene reportedly inscribed on Critias’ monument.  Hornblower 2000: 161. 
5
 For Xenophon’s oligarchic tendency, see also Anderson 1974: 40 ff.  For an example of democratic 
ideology, see Eur. Supp. 426 ff. 
6
 This issue was raised in Mem. 2.1.17 by Aristippus: ‘But, Socrates, how do those educated in the kingly 
art [self-control]…different from those who suffered bad things out of compulsion, at least if they are going 
to suffer hunger, thirst, cold, sleeplessness, and all the other toils willingly?’ Cf. Cyr. 7.5.80 where the 
virtue of self control was used as a means of political control.  
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positions by lot, and Xenophon did not deny it.7  In fact, he confirmed it later in his 
Memorabilia: his Socrates did maintain that the rulers should be those who knew how to 
rule, not those who were selected by lot.8  The Spartan way of choosing officials through 
fierce competition, in his view, was more appropriate.9 
Xenophon also revealed his contempt for ordinary citizens from time to time in his works.  
For example, he described in Cyropaedia a Persian official as a person of the sourest 
nature when the Persian objected to his colleagues’ mockery of the common soldiers.10  
Manufacture and commerce in his view were vulgar and not suitable for noble and ruling 
people,11 and in the account of his much admired Spartan constitution the citizens were 
not allowed to perform such activities at anytime in their lives.12  He also considered it a 
sign of corruption that the Persian army recruited artisans, labourers and people who had 
to work for a living.13  In contrast to the democratic belief of political equality, he 
believed educated people should rule over the ignorant.14  Finally, his obsessive interest 
in great leadership in effect obscured the role of the majority, giving the impression that 
the quality of leadership was all that mattered for the success of a political society, the 
form of its government notwithstanding.15  Some passages in his writings even have a 
hint that slavery under a benevolent master could be no worse than a free society.16 
                                                 
7
 Mem. 1.2.9-10. 
8
 Mem. 3.9.10-12. 
9
 Lac. 4.2, 10.1 and 10.3. 
10
 Cyr. 2.2.11. 
11
 E.g. Socrates’ comment on Anytus’ education of his son in Ap. 29-31, see also Oec. 6.10. 
12
 Lac. 7.1-2. 
13
 Cyr. 8.8.20. 
14
 Mem. 3.9.10-11. 
15
 E.g. Vect. 1.1; Oec. 21. 5-6; Cyr. 8.1.7. See also his accounts of Lycurgus in the Constitution of the 
Spartans, Agesilaus in Agesilaus and Cyrus in Cyropaedia.  
16
 Oec. 1.23; 13.1-14.10; Mem. 7. 1-14; Cyr. 8.1.44, 8.8.1. 
 160 
ii. Democratic involvement 
However, Xenophon did not reject democracy because of his oligarchic belief. On the 
contrary, as discussed below, democracy held a central position in both his life and works.  
He achieved the height of his political career in a democratically organized mercenary 
army, a success that won him the name of demagogue.  Democratic Athens was one of 
his main concerns throughout his life, and he returned to Athens after 30 years’ exile.  
Many of his works are treatises or handbooks about Athenian public policies that differ 
from his other works for their practicality.  
Throughout his life Xenophon looked for fame in various regimes, including democracy, 
monarchy and oligarchy.17  He was born in the 430s into the class of knights (i9ppei=j), 
the second highest class in Athens.  He was supposedly recruited into the Athenian 
cavalry in his twenties, but became a supporter of the oligarchic coup against the 
democracy in 404/ 3.  Two years after the restoration of the democracy he went to Persia 
with other Greeks as mercenaries under the Persian prince, Cyrus, to assist in the revolt 
against his elder brother, who was then king.  Cyrus was soon defeated and killed by his 
brother.  The Greek mercenaries, having lost their master and then their generals, 
reorganized themselves as a quasi-democratic organization in which the soldiers elected 
new commanders and made decisions on all important affairs in their assembly.18  
Elected as one of the generals, Xenophon and other generals led the army out of Persia.  
                                                 
17
 For general accounts of Xenophon’s life, see Diog. Laert 2.48-59, Cawkwell 1972 & 1979, OCD 
‘Xenophon’. 
18
 For the Greek mercenaries as a semi-democratic polis, see Anderson 1974: 120 ff, Dillery 1995: 93-94, 
Hornblower 2004.  Dillery divided the Greek expedition into several phases according to its development 
of military and civic character, arguing that Xenophon preferred the army as a military organization rather 
than a democratic one.  However, Xenophon did not abandon his generalship as the mercenaries became 
more and more democratic.  On the other hand, Hornblower (2004: 243, 263) seems to question the 
distinction of military and civic characters, suggesting that the success of the Greek army relied not on 
strong leadership, but on the army’s ‘civically generated cohesiveness and determination not to let one’s 
fellow fighter down’.  
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He and his army then served a Thracian prince called Seuthes before joining the Spartan 
expedition and went into Persia again in 399.  During his service to Sparta, Xenophon 
established a lifelong friendship with the Spartan king Agesilaus.  When Agesilaus 
returned to Greece in 394 because of the revolt against Sparta by poleis including Athens, 
Xenophon fought with the Spartans against his fellow Athenians.  As a result of his 
choice he was expelled from Athens and went into exile for around thirty years.19  He 
settled in Peloponnese until the decree of his exile was abolished in the 360s.  However, 
his connection with his fatherland remained strong despite his thirty years’ exile from 
Athens.20  He sent his sons back to Athens to serve in the cavalry, though they had been 
trained in Sparta.21  He himself returned to Athens, though he was said to have died in 
Corinth in the 350s.22  
Xenophon’s experience of various kinds of regime is also reflected in his writings.  He 
discussed the issues of monarchy, or tyranny, in Hiero and the greater part of Cyropaedia.  
As regards oligarchy, his main works are The Constitution of the Spartans, Agesilaus and 
part of Cyropaedia.  However, many of his works are about democracy.  His Socratic 
works discussed many important issues relating to the Athenian democracy, though 
                                                 
19
 There are disputes over the date of Xenophon’s exile.  Some scholars suggest an earlier date, arguing that 
he was banished from Athens because of his service to Cyrus, while others suggest that he was exiled in 
394 because of his fight against Athens.  As Higgins (1977: 22) argued, any earlier date of exile before 395 
is unlikely since Athens was Sparta’s subject city until that time.  Athens was still obliged in 399 to send 
300 troops for Sparta’s expedition into Persia.  The Spartan king Agesilaus would not allow Athens to 
expel Xenophon either for his service to Cyrus or for his Spartan association.  See Xen. An. 3.1.5, 7.7.57; 
Hell. Oxy. 6.1 ff; Dio. Laert. 2.51. Contra. Cawkwell 1972: 14n2; Andersons 1974: 148-9; Green 1994.  
For further bibliography on this issue, see Lipka 2002: 4n9. 
20
 Contra. Strauss’ doubt (1975: 136) about Xenophon’s patriotism. 
21
 The report by Diogenes Laertius (2.53) that Xenophon’s sons were sent to Athens for the Spartan 
interests is questionable.  The Spartan army recruited non-Spartans. Hell. 5.3.9.  If what concerned 
Xenophon was mainly Sparta’s interests, why did his sons not join the Spartan army?  
22
 See also Higgins 1977: 128; Anderson 1974: 192.  Contra. Cawkwell 1979: 14; OCD ‘Xenophon’. It is 
unlikely that Xenophon never returned to Athens, as some scholars argue.  For one thing, he must have 
seen with his own eyes the latest spatial arrangement of the public square in the city of Athens, or he would 
not have been confident in giving very detailed instructions about the exact procedure of cavalry parades in 
the city.  Xen. Eq. mag. 3.1 ff. 
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mainly from the perspective of the Athenian elite.23 Anabasis is his personal story of 
leading an army of ten thousand.  In addition, he wrote for the Athenian democracy 
detailed proposals for public finance and technical handbooks regarding various issues, 
such as Ways and Means, Cavalry Commander and On Horsemanship.  The first of these 
was in fact written as a public speech to the Assembly or its council. 
There is an interesting point in his treatment of the democracy.  Considering the extant 
corpus of Xenophon, it is only for the democracy that he ever developed itemized plans 
and step-by-step instructions as to certain political issues, while his discussion of 
monarchy and oligarchy are mainly in the form of theoretical reflection24 or disguised in 
the form of fiction,25 appearing more general and distant from daily politics.  A likely 
explanation for Xenophon’s unique treatment of the democracy is his membership of no 
other city but Athens.  While Xenophon was born as an Athenian citizen and entitled by 
the laws to participate in the government as a member of the sovereign group, he did not 
enjoy such civil rights in other political organizations and had to express his opinions less 
directly. 
With this background knowledge of Xenophon’s elitist values and democratic 
involvement, we move on to discuss his view on the three historical events.  
II. The Law reform 
Though Xenophon did not give a systematic comment on the law reform by the 
democracy, his attitude towards this important reform can be reasonably established from 
his views on two relevant issues: the possibility of a democratic order under the slogan of 
                                                 
23
 Xenophon’s Socratic works include Apology of Socrates, Symposium, Memorabilia and Oeconomicus. 
24
 An example of this is his Constitution of the Spartans, a general discussion of the Spartan constitutions 
as founded by its legendary Spartan lawgiver Lycurgus. 
25
 His main works on monarchy, Hiero and Cyropaedia, are both fictional. 
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the ancestral laws, on the one hand, and the substantial contents of the laws, on the other.  
It is argued that, while Xenophon recognized to some extent the respect the democracy 
had showed to the laws, he disagreed with the people over the content of the laws. 
i. The Obedience of the Demos 
As argued in the chapter on the history of the law reform, ‘the ancestral laws’ had been 
the political slogan in Athens since the end of the fifth century B.C.  No matter how the 
politicians’ proposals varied, almost all of them appealed to the public in the name of the 
ancestral laws, a phenomenon that attests the strength of popular reverence at that time 
for the traditional practices.  Xenophon himself also witnessed the great power of this 
popular belief in his report that the ancestral laws were claimed to be the foundation of 
the restored democracy in 403.26  While his Socrates recommended the use of the popular 
conservative sentiment as a most persuasive rhetoric strategy,27 Xenophon himself did 
not fail to exploit it from time to time in his political career.  He started his first speech to 
boost the soldiers’ morale by mentioning the glorious deeds of their ancestors when he 
was elected as a general of Greek mercenaries,28 while one of his later works, Ways and 
Means, also concluded with an appeal to restore the ancestral laws.29 
1. The dialogue between Socrates and the younger Pericles 
Was then the popular belief in the ancestral laws ever sufficient to form a strong basis of 
legal order in Athens?  This was the question the younger Pericles, the son of the famous 
Athenian politician Pericles, raised in his conversation with Socrates.30  In their 
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 Hell. 2.4.42. 
27
 Mem. 3.5.8 ff.. 
28
 An. 3.2.11. 
29
 Vect. 6.1. 
30
 This conversation in Xenophon’s Memorabilia 3.5, as far as I know, has received less attention among 
scholars than it deserves maybe because of its pro-democratic tendency.  Cf. Strauss’ remark (1972: 67-68) 
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conversation Socrates suggested that the Athenian people were now more obedient and 
ready to restore the ancestral way of life, for their impetuosity had been humbled through 
their defeat in the war with Boeotia.  He argued that ‘confidence implants neglect, 
easygoingness, and disobedience, while fear makes people more attentive, more obedient, 
and more orderly.’31  However, the younger Pericles responded in a typical tone of 
cynicism, claiming that there was no hope of lawful order for the Athenians who were 
rebellious, egoistic and keen to abuse the laws in prosecuting fellow citizens.32   Socrates 
immediately expressed his disagreement, pointing out the common people’s excellent 
performance on various occasions such as choruses, athletic contests and naval operation 
that proved both their spirit and discipline.  He said:  
Don’t at all believe that the wickedness with which the Athenians are sick 
is so incurable.  Don’t you see that they are orderly in naval matters, that 
they obey those in charge in athletic contests in an orderly manner, and 
that in choruses their subordination to their teachers is inferior to none?33 
Socrates also pointed out that the deliberation and action of the Council of Areopagus, a 
council consisting of senior ex-officials of the democracy, was second to none in terms of 
nobility, lawfulness and justice.34  The younger Pericles then corrected his prejudice 
against the demos, admitting that its dutiful obedience was in fact a wonder, especially in 
                                                                                                                                                 
that the dialogue was meant to be implicit criticism of Pericles’ policy of radical democracy and his naval 
strategy during the Peloponnesian war. 
31
 Mem. 3.5.5; cf. 1.2.19.  Strauss (1972: 68) tended to play down Xenophon’s praise of the common people, 
saying the cause of their discipline was their fear rather than their knowledge.  However, there is no 
plausible reason for his disconnection of fear and knowledge in this case.  What is meant in the dialogue, it 
would be more reasonable to assume, is that fear forced the people to recover their rationality, to make a 
proper evaluation of their situation, and to act accordingly.  In such a process, knowledge or practical 
wisdom was required.   
32
 Mem. 3.5.16. 
33
 Mem. 3.5.18. 
34
 Mem. 3.5.20. 
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contrast to the arrogant character of the hoplites and cavalry, who were from the upper 
class.35 
This important dialogue reveals certain aspects of Xenophon’s likely view on the law 
reform.  First, he recognized the existence of a democratic legal order.  The Athenian 
people, instead of abusing the laws in the name of tradition, had the genuinely 
conservative tendency to follow what they thought had been established on the Athenian 
soil in the course of time.36  Moreover, they had proved themselves that they could be 
obedient, cooperative and at the same time outstanding in their collective activities, even 
though it is quite unlikely, as in Socrates’ apparent eulogy, that they were the noblest, 
most harmonious, honour-loving, friendly and enthusiastic to sacrifice for the common 
good among the Greeks.37  
Second, there were two institutional arrangements in the law reform that won 
Xenophon’s welcome.  He would have approved of the procedure of election in selecting 
law investigators as described in the decree of Teisamenus,38 for, as mentioned above, he 
considered election a far superior way of choosing magistrates than the democratic way 
of sortition.  Furthermore, he would also have considered that the restored democracy had 
made the right decision by putting the execution of the laws under the guardianship of the 
Council of Areopagus,39 an institute that he thought was at the highest level in terms of 
wisdom and integrity.40 
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 Mem. 3.5.19. 
36
 For Xenophon’s recognition of the people’s reverence for the ancestral laws, see also Hell. 2.4.42-43; Eq. 
mag. 7.3 
37
 Mem. 3.5.2-3. 
38
 Andoc. 1.83-84. 
39
 Andoc. 1.84. 
40
 Mem. 3.5.20. 
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Finally, the dialogue between Socrates and the younger Pericles also provides an 
explanation for the success of the law reform.  Socrates suggested that military defeat and 
fear of the enemy played an important part in curing the demos’ disease of lawlessness, 
making it agree to put its freedom under some sort of regulation.  While the victory over 
Persia and the establishment of the Athenian empire had boosted the demos’ confidence 
and led it astray, its defeat by Boeotia in turn made it afraid and moderate, according to 
Socrates.  The demos, after being defeated, was now eager to obey just like sailors at sea 
under the threat of a storm, as Socrates said: 
And I would make this judgment also on the basis of those who are on 
ships.  For when they fear nothing, they are surely full of disorder.  But 
whenever they are in terror of a storm or enemies, they not only do 
everything they are bid to do but even keep silent, watching anxiously for 
further instructions just like members of a chorus.41 
2. Interpretive issues 
There are two interpretive problems regarding the dialogue between Socrates and Pericles.  
The first is that the dialogue was set to predate the law reform, and is therefore 
problematic as evidence of Xenophon’s view on the reform.  However, what is discussed 
here is the philosophical implication of the dialogue rather than its historicity, and the 
actual date of writing of the dialogue was decades after the reform.  It is therefore a 
reasonable expectation that this dialogue represents the author’s view at the time of 
                                                 
41
 Mem. 3.5.6. 
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writing.42  Besides, though the historical context of the dialogue was set decades before 
the law reform, and the military defeat mentioned there was their defeat by the Boeotians 
rather than their unconditional surrender to the Spartan alliance, this comment of Socrates 
fits even better the situation of Athens in 403 when the crisis was much more serious and 
the desire for reform presumably much stronger.   
The second and much more difficult problem is the supposed ironical tone in the dialogue.  
The younger Pericles was in fact one of the generals who were tried as a group and 
executed by the democracy.  Xenophon described the trial as a blunt violation of the legal 
procedure on the side of the people who let their collective passion overrule the due 
process of the laws.43  It is therefore very ironical when Socrates encouraged the younger 
Pericles, who was initially reluctant, to be a general of Athens with the assurance that the 
demos had learnt from its mistakes and was now moderate and obedient to the laws.  Was 
then Xenophon’s true meaning that the lawlessness of the demos was beyond all 
remedies, including the cruelty of war?  Maybe not, for the following reasons:  first, the 
person who encouraged the younger Pericles to go for a political career in the democracy 
and was therefore responsible for his execution was none other than Xenophon’s beloved 
mentor, Socrates.  He admired Socrates as the wise man who always gave beneficial 
advice to his companions.44  In fact, Socrates persuaded not only the younger Pericles, 
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 Chroust (1957: 229n32) put the historical background of this dialogue even as late as the days after the 
battle of Leuctra in 371 when a Boeotian polis, Thebes, defeated Sparta and became the most powerful 
polis in Greece. 
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 Hell. 1.7. 
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 Mem. 1.1.4. Strauss (1972: 68) tried to excuse Socrates by arguing that Pericles did not follow Socrates’ 
advice, for Socrates seemed to advise him to be a general of the army instead of leading the navy.  Since 
Pericles was executed by the democracy for his responsibility as a general in a naval battle, Socrates, he 
suggested, should not be held responsible for his execution.  However, his argument fails to pay sufficient 
attention to the importance of the navy in Athens.  The fleet was indispensable for protecting the route of 
grain supply to Athens.  It was natural for Pericles, once elected as a general, to lead the navy.    
 168 
but also many of his companions, to enter into the democratic politics.45  He even 
claimed himself to be a professional trainer of politicians.46  Therefore, an ironical 
reading of the dialogue between Socrates and the younger Pericles does not fit into 
Xenophon’s praise of Socrates as a great teacher of political art.  Furthermore, Xenophon 
himself, as shown in his life and writings, was constantly enthusiastic about politics all 
his life, considering public honour as one of the most important values.  There is, in fact, 
hardly a trace of political apathy in all his words and deeds.  Therefore, for the reasons 
given above, it appears that Xenophon did not mean to be ironical when his Socrates 
praised the moderation and obedience of the Athenian demos in the dialogue with the 
younger Pericles.  As to the conviction of the younger Pericles and other generals in 406, 
this infamous trial certainly revealed the great risk involved for politicians in the 
Athenian democracy and how the demos might be led astray.  Yet, Xenophon did not turn 
away from democratic politics because of this unfortunate incidence.  As discussed at the 
end of this chapter, he was still optimistic about the people’s sensibility and believed that 
the risk of a political career could be managed.  
ii. ‘The Ancestral Laws’ 
As to the substantial content of the ancestral laws, however, Xenophon was in 
disagreement with the democracy.  The law reform made it one of the most essential 
principles in the democracy that the only valid laws were those confirmed and written 
down through certain legislative procedures, while Xenophon had considerable 
reservations about the justice of these written laws for the reason that they were human 
                                                 
45
 In addition to the case of the younger Pericles, see also Mem. 3.1.1-3; 3.2.4; 3.3.1; 3.7.1; 4.1.2; Symp. 
9.42-43. Contra. Strauss’ claim (1972: 55, 72, 177) that, though Socrates might have trained some of his 
companions to be politicians, he did not encourage anyone into politics, except for Charmides and Callias. 
46
 Mem. 1.6.15. 
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invention rather than divine creation.  His ideal of the laws was probably the so-called 
‘unwritten laws’, which, rather than a collection of social customs and practices, were a 
loosely defined set of scientific principles that applied universally beyond human 
intervention.47 
His distinction between the written laws and unwritten laws disagreed at some point with 
the traditionalist tendency implicit in the term ‘the ancestral laws’.  The discovery of 
universal principles was a difficult task that required much more than conventional 
wisdom in exploring beyond particular cultures and societies.  Therefore, these universal 
laws would from time to time appear to be in conflict with what most people believed to 
be traditional practices, as we can see from Xenophon’s discussion of the two legendary 
lawgivers: Solon for Athens and Lycurgus for Sparta.  The two founders of the ancestral 
laws for Athens and Sparta in Xenophon’s description were in fact revolutionaries rather 
than traditionalists.  Solon was said to have ‘philosophized before he laid down most 
excellent laws’48, and Lycurgus was said to imitate no one, but invented the Spartan 
constitution by himself, as Xenophon said:  
I think that he [Lycurgus] reached the utmost limit of wisdom.  For it was 
not by imitating other states, but by devising a system utterly different from 
that of many others, that he made his country pre-eminently prosperous.49 
This kind of revolutionary innovation against established practices was not the privilege 
of the legendary lawgivers; on the contrary, Xenophon encouraged his contemporaries to 
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 See the important dialogue on the written and unwritten laws between Socrates and Hippias in Mem. 4.4. 
Cf. the famous conversation between Alcibiades and Pericles in Mem. 1.2.40-46.  Cf. Strauss (1972: 111 ff) 
suggested that even the natural laws mentioned in the dialogues between Socrates and Hippias did not 
really have universal validity. 
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adopt laws that were not from their own tradition, but ones that fitted their purposes.  For 
example, his Socrates urged the Athenians to learn from their own ancestors or, 
alternatively, from the Spartans.50  In his Oeconomicus an interlocutor was praised for his 
free combination of the Athenian laws and the Persian laws in his domestic 
management.51   
In summary, Xenophon did not seem to have a genuine belief in the ideal of the ancestral 
laws.  For him, it was mainly used as a tool of popular psychology.52  He believed that 
legal regulations would be more readily accepted by the people if they were convinced 
that these arrangements had been founded or accepted by their ancestors.  His Socrates 
said:  
If we wished them to lay claim to wealth that others had, we would show 
them that it is their patrimony and belongs to them, and it is in this way 
especially that we would set them on the path to claiming it; but since it is 
holding first place together with virtue that we wish them to attend to, we 
must show them that this, in turn, has long ago belonged most to them, 
and that by attending to this they would be best of all.53 
III. The Reconciliation 
Xenophon provided a much fuller account of the reconciliation than of the law reform, 
and his version of the reconciliation was friendlier to the democracy than that of the 
Athenian Politeia, which was another main source for our understanding of the event.54  
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He credited mainly the democrats and the Spartan King, Pausanias, with the success of 
the reconciliation, while blaming the Athenian oligarchs for the civil war.  His praise of 
the democrats was quite unusual, especially considering that he was supposed to be on 
the side of the oligarchs during the civil war. 
i. Condemnation of the Thirty 
Xenophon’s account gave the impression that the Thirty failed because of their extreme 
impiety and lawlessness.55  Their impiety was described most vividly in their dragging 
away one of their victims, Theramenes, from an altar where he was seeking divine 
protection.  A ruthless act like this was considered in ancient Greece one of the most 
impious crimes a human being could ever commit.56  As to their lawlessness, they 
unjustly executed many people, citizens and foreigners alike.57  At the beginning of their 
government, they still followed the formal legal procedure and put to death only those 
who were notorious for blackmailing oligarchic citizens.  As their authority became 
established, they started to arrest innocent people suspected of political opposition, or 
simply because of their wealth.  After their summary execution of Theramenes, who was 
a main opposition leader, their crimes increased to a much larger scale.  To make the city 
their own, they expelled most of the residents from it and redistributed those people’s 
property among themselves.  The height of their lawlessness was the collective execution 
of the Eleusians: they asked their fellow oligarchs to put to death these innocent 
Eleusians for no obvious reason other than as a sign of solidarity in their crime.  Worst of 
all, the whole process was staged as a mockery of the legal process of trial under blunt 
                                                 
55
 Xenophon was an unusually religious man, even by Athenian standards.  See his defence of his religious 
enthusiasm in Eq. mag. 9.8. 
56
 Cf. the story of Cylon’s revolt in Athens and that of Pausanias in Sparta in Thuc. 1.126 ff. 
57
 Hell. 2.3.12 ff 
 172 
surveillance and terror, a scene that, Xenophon observed ironically, was pleasant to those 
‘whose one thought was of their own advantage’.58 
ii. Praise for the democrats 
1. Piety and Justice 
In contrast, the democrats were described as pious and just.  They had divine favour 
because they were the victims of the Thirty’s injustice.59  Xenophon recorded two 
occasions on which divine favour was showed on the democrats’ side.  One was the 
dramatic change of weather to their great advantage at the beginning of their revolt,60 and 
the other was the sudden madness of their prophet, which was a sign of being enlightened 
by superhuman power.61  Besides, the democrats showed their piety in following closely 
their prophet’s instruction on the battlefield, as well as in performing sacrifices to Athena 
at the Acropolis as soon as they returned to Athens victorious.62  Though these episodes 
might appear trivial to modern readers, they did convey significant religious implications 
to Xenophon’s intended audience.63  
On the other hand, their revolt fitted the traditional concept of justice for the reasons that, 
instead of hurting the innocent, they were avenging the wrongs that the oligarchs had 
done to them, and that their aim was to recover what belonged to them lawfully - their 
property and their city - rather than committing theft and robbery.  This justification was 
mentioned in the democrats’ three speeches reported by Xenophon.  The democrats’ 
general, Thrasybulus, spoke to his soldiers before the decisive battle of Munychia that the 
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Thirty ‘robbed us of our city though we [the democrats] have done nothing wrong, the 
men who drove us out of our homes and who, by their proscriptions, have victimized our 
dearest friends.’64  What their victory would do for the democrats, he said, was to bring 
back ‘our country, our homes, our freedom, our honour and …our wives and children.’65  
A democratic soldier, Cleocritus, questioned the oligarchic army in the battlefield: 
‘Fellow citizens, why are you driving us out of the city?  Why do you want to kill us?  
We have never done you any harm.’66   Finally, Thrasybulus taunted the oligarchs after 
returning to Athens by saying, ‘Are you morally better?  Then why is it that the common 
people, though poorer than you are, never did you any harm for the sake of money, 
whereas you , who are richer than all of them, have committed many disgraceful crimes 
for the sake of your own profit?’67  
2. Sympathy and Commitment 
However, in addition to the traditional virtues of piety and justice, another two virtues 
were needed for the success of the reconciliation.  The traditional concept of piety and 
justice did not prevent the victims from taking vengeance on the perpetrators, nor stop the 
victors from taking full advantage of their defeated enemies.  The other two qualities of 
the democrats that made them prefer forgiveness and reconciliation to other options, 
according to Xenophon, were their sense of Athenian community and their virtue of 
keeping promises. 
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The democrats’ sympathy for the oligarchs was revealed most vividly after their decisive 
victory over the oligarchic army in Munychia.  Xenophon reported that the Athenian 
democrats appropriated the arms of the dead oligarchs, but did not strip off any dead 
citizens’ clothes.68  Implicit in the account is that the Athenian democrats had no 
difficulty in distinguishing their fellow citizens from non-Athenian dead soldiers, such as 
the Spartans and other oligarchic mercenaries, and treated their corpses in a different 
manner accordingly.  Furthermore, while the Athenian democrats and oligarchs 
approached each other and talked on the battlefield, Cleocritus urged the oligarchs to 
abandon fighting, recounting the details of the civil and military life that all the Athenians 
had shared, and assuring the democrats’ sympathy for the killed oligarchic citizens.  He 
appealed to the oligarchs:  
Fellow-citizens…We have shared with you in the most holy religious 
services, in sacrifices and in splendid festivals; we have joined in dances 
with you, gone to school with you and fought in the army with you, braving 
together with you the dangers of land and sea in defence of our common 
safety and freedom.  In the name of the gods of our fathers and mothers, 
of the bonds of kinship and marriage and friendship, which are shared by 
so many of us on both sides, I beg you to feel some shame in front of 
gods and men and to give up this sin against your fatherland…yet all the 
same you can be sure that we as well as you have wept much for some of 
those whom we have just killed.69 
                                                 
68
 Hell. 2.4.19. 
69
 Hell. 2.4.20-22. 
 175 
While the sense of community constituted a strong emotional impulse for the democrats 
towards reconciliation, their collective effort to maintain domestic harmony also helped 
secure the future of the reconciliation.  As might be expected, personal hatred and desire 
for vengeance could not be suppressed completely, but erupted from time to time 
threatening the post-war peace, despite the existence of overlapping communal networks.   
Therefore, some extra measures might have been needed as well.  For instance, Athenian 
Politeia reported that the democracy once made an example of a citizen by putting him to 
death without trial for his instigation of hatred against the oligarchs. Ever since the 
summary execution, according to Athenian Politeia, all the other Athenians observed the 
rules of reconciliation in the noblest manner.70  Xenophon, for his own part, considered 
that the collective willingness to honour the agreement of reconciliation on the side of the 
democrats was necessary.  Therefore, the democratic leader, Thrasybulus, was said to 
have asked his followers to perform one more deed after all their noble performances 
during the civil war.  He appealed to them: ‘my friends…all I ask is that you should give 
us an exhibition of just one more virtue in addition to all your other ones.  Show us that in 
all good faith you can keep your promises.’71  The majority of the Athenians did as he 
urged, as Xenophon concluded that till the day of his writing the democratic and 
oligarchic citizens lived together as fellow citizens, while the people honoured the oaths 
which they had sworn.72 
In summary, Xenophon’s account of the Athenian civil war presented an obvious case 
that, while members of the upper society, for all their upbringing and education, could be 
wicked to the worst possible level, the behaviour of the common people might be just, 
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pious, sympathetic and reliable.  A political lesson Xenophon gives us in his story of the 
reconciliation as well as the law reform is that a direct democracy was capable of creating 
a well-ordered society even in a most difficult situation.  Just as Socrates taught the 
younger Pericles not to have a cynical view of the democracy in a dialogue mentioned 
previously, so Xenophon suggests that the demos, instead of being an incurable mob, 
could be reasoned with and more obedient than the oligarchs, especially when the demos 
had learnt from the disastrous consequences of its own mistakes, as it did at the end of the 
fifth century B.C.     
The next question we should ask, then, is what Xenophon might have thought about the 
demos’ execution of Socrates exactly at a time when it was thought to have learnt from 
its mistakes and started to act in a sensible way. 
IV. The Trial of Socrates 
Though the trial of Socrates was a critical event in Xenophon’s life, it did not turn 
Xenophon away from politics.  He was still keen on pursuing public honour under 
Persian monarchs, Spartan oligarchs and the Athenian demos; politics remained the 
central concern throughout the rest of his life.  While defending firmly Socrates’ 
innocence, he did not seem to consider his execution an unforgivable injustice on the part 
of the democracy; on the contrary, he came to the unusual conclusion that Socrates 
himself attempted to end his life in the trial, a theory that in effect alleviates the 
responsibility of the democracy to some extent.73   We will examine respectively 
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Xenophon’s defence of Socrates against the charges listed in the previous chapter,74 
interpret his opinion of Socrates’ voluntary death, and conclude with the theory that 
Xenophon reconciled himself with the democracy over the execution of his admired 
mentor.   
i. The Defence of Socrates 
1. Religious defence 
Denial of the Athenian gods: Xenophon disputed this accusation, pointing out that 
Socrates offered sacrifices and consulted divinity both regularly and openly.  He said: ‘he 
visibly sacrificed often at home and often at the common altars of the city; and it was not 
difficult to see him using divination.’75  This testimony supposedly referred to an obvious 
fact and was therefore conceivable.  Xenophon was confident that many citizens had seen 
or heard of Socrates’ engagement in religious activities.  However, the reference to 
Socrates’ use of divination might not be only a defence, but also a support of another 
charge by his accusers, namely his introduction of new gods, the next issue that 
Xenophon had to address.76  Besides, Xenophon might have evaded another likely aspect 
of the accusation: though Socrates attended public sacrifices regularly, his eccentric 
concept of divinity might be as radical as denial of the traditional concepts of the gods.77   
The introduction of new divinities:  Xenophon had no intention of denying Socrates’ 
consultation with his daimonion, which was a well-known fact, but argued instead that it 
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was no different from the common practice of prophecy.  He said that Socrates ‘brought 
nothing newer than those who consult birds of omen, sayings, portents, and sacrifice 
victims because they believe in divination.’78  However, an important difference between 
the common practice of prophecy and Socrates’ cult was covered in this metaphor.  The 
former was established and familiar to the public, while Socrates’ daimonion was 
recognizable to him alone.  The secrecy of his cult might cause more trouble for him than 
his act of introducing new gods itself.79  In ancient Greece, priests did not have complete 
authority in their interpretation of divine will.  When the priests were suspected, as they 
often were, the public was more than ready to examine the divine signs themselves and 
reach their own conclusions.80  There was a fair possibility that Socrates, the self-made 
priest of a one-man cult, appeared to be a liar and an abuser of divinity in front of an 
audience as sceptic as the Athenians.81  While Socrates justified his behaviour and his 
advice to others in the name of his daimonion, the anger of the jurors might have been out 
of disbelief much more than out of envy.82 
Atheism: Xenophon refuted the accusation of atheism, using Socrates’ habit of giving 
divine consultation as evidence of his religious belief.  He said that if Socrates did not 
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have genuine belief in divinity, he would not be confident in giving advice to his friends 
as well as to other people.  However, many Athenians would not be impressed by this 
argument, for, as mentioned above, the divinity that Xenophon mentioned here was 
Socrates’ notorious daimonion, a secret cult that appeared more like a religious mockery 
rather than evidence of piety. 
Xenophon also denied the charge by arguing that Socrates was not a natural scientist, a 
profession that was often considered as atheistic in ancient times.  He attested that 
Socrates was not interested in natural and heavenly objects as natural scientists or some 
sophists were at that time; instead, Socrates occupied himself with the study of human 
affairs.83  However, this testimony is not without question.  As one can find in his 
Socrates’ criticism of natural scientists, Socrates was in fact not unfamiliar with their 
activities and studies. 
Another reason for his piety, Xenophon argued, was Socrates’ advice to his friends that 
they should seek instruction from the traditional gods.84  We have Xenophon’s personal 
testimony that he was advised by Socrates to consult the Delphic oracle about his Persian 
expedition.85  This is a better defence against the accusation of atheism as well as against 
another charge: the denial of the traditional gods, for it referred unequivocally to the 
worship of the traditional gods instead of to the cult of Socrates’ personal daimonion. 
Xenophon also did a better job in his explanation of Socrates’ distinction between human 
affairs and divine affairs; while the former should be managed by human beings through 
education, the latter belonged to the discretion of divinity.  His Socrates maintained that 
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‘what the gods permit to be done by those who have learned, one should learn, but that 
what is not clear to human beings one should try to ascertain from the gods through 
divination, for the gods give signs to those toward whom they are gracious.’86  This 
distinction, granting human independence of divine intervention to a higher level than 
some of his contemporaries admitted,87 might have earned Socrates a reputation for 
disbelieving the divine forces.  Xenophon, therefore, had the intention of dispelling this 
impression by clarifying Socrates’ position on the issue. 
2. Political defence 
Personal enmity against Socrates: as mentioned in the previous chapter, there were two 
kinds of personal hostility against Socrates: one was on account of quarrels between 
Socrates and others; the other was incurred through conflicts between his companions, 
such as Critias and Alcibiades, and others.  Xenophon did not deny that Socrates had 
made many enemies by his practice of disputing with people in the streets,88 but he 
insisted that Socrates’ behaviour was well meant and beneficial to those who accepted his 
advice.89  As to the damage or hatred caused by his companions, Xenophon claimed that 
Socrates, instead of being blamed for others’ misbehaviour, should have been rewarded 
for his effort to put them under discipline.90  It is not clear how persuasive this argument 
would have been to the jurors.  Some might have been persuaded and accepted the claim 
of Socrates to be a benefactor, but there must have been others who rejected Xenophon’s 
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defence as deceptive, insisting that Socrates was a patronizing freak, if not a mastermind 
behind anti-democratic conspiracies.91 
Subversion against the democracy: the two main possible reasons for this charge against 
Socrates were his criticism of the democracy and his association with Critias, Alcibiades 
and other extreme oligarchs.  As to his oligarchic association, Xenophon argued that 
Socrates had nothing to do with the oligarchs’ coup against the democracy in 404/3.  
Socrates, instead of collaborating with the Thirty, was critical of their murderous 
behaviour.92  The demos, as Xenophon said, should have rewarded Socrates for his 
chastisement of the young oligarchs, rather than punishing him for what he had not done.  
However, this defence was not successful.  Many Athenians still considered Socrates as a 
trainer, rather than an opponent, of extreme oligarchs, as shown in Aeschines’ famous 
testimony.93  
As to Socrates’ criticism of the democracy, Xenophon did not deny it, but claimed that 
Socrates pursued his political ideal only through the peaceful means of persuasion.94  He 
argued that persuasion was much more efficient and safe than violence and terror, and 
there was no reason for Socrates, who, he claimed, was a master of the art of persuasion, 
to prefer violence and terror.   Yet, was Socrates really a master of persuasion?  In terms 
of elenchus, he was; however, we do not know of any example where Socrates won 
public approval by addressing a crowd.  Even in his private conversation, most of the 
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time Socrates appeared more likely to win the debate rather than to acquire hearty 
agreement from his interlocutors.  Xenophon, deliberately or not, misled his readers by 
confusing two different arts of speech. 
Xenophon also disputed the accusation that Socrates justified violence against the demos 
with the story of the Homeric Odysseus who beat commoners in an arrogant way if they 
dared to stand up and make known their opinions about public affairs.95  Xenophon did 
not or could not deny Socrates’ citation of the Homeric story, but argued that those who 
Socrates most strongly prevented from discussion of public affairs were not the demos, 
but only those who were useless to Athens.  This qualification of political participation, 
Xenophon claimed, had nothing to do with social or economic status, but depended on 
one’s contribution to the community. 
However, this defence does not look strong.  The idea of limiting the right of political 
participation to certain groups was in fact nothing different in essence from the slogans of 
the oligarchic coups in 411 and 403.96  Besides, the violent implication and contempt for 
the demos in the Homeric story were too obvious to be glossed over.  It is also 
inconsistent with Xenophon’s claim that Socrates used only peaceful means of persuasion. 
Corruptor of the traditional norms: Socrates was accused of seducing young people and 
corrupting them into violence and rebellion against traditional morality, as he was 
described as doing in Aristophanes’ Clouds.  The immoral behaviour of his young 
companions, Critias and Alcibiades, testified to the Athenians what Aristophanes had 
said in his comedy several decades earlier.  Since Xenophon’s defence of Socrates 
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regarding his social association with extreme oligarchs has been mentioned above, the 
next paragraph focuses on the problems of Socrates’ political ideas. 
Other reasons for this accusation of Socrates, as surmised from Xenophon’s account, 
might be Socrates’ teleological view of morality and intellectualism.  The former refers to 
the view that the value of one’s action should be determined by some specific ends, while 
the latter claims that knowledge, rather than tradition, should be the base of authority.   
Firstly, Socrates was accused of justifying all deeds, no matter how vicious they might 
sound, as long as they produced gains (k°rdow), by distorting Hesiod’s words that ‘no 
work is disgraceful, but idleness is disgraceful’.97  Xenophon did not deny Socrates’ 
recitation of Hesiod’s words, but argued that the criterion of action should be its benefits 
(»f°leia) and good (égayÒw).  Therefore, both the accusers and the defender seemed 
to agree that Socrates judged the value of human actions by their consequences produced.  
What they disagreed upon was the teleological criteria preferred by Socrates.  It can be 
inferred from the context that the accusers believed it was material gains, while 
Xenophon suggested it was some sort of morality.  In any case, the accusers pointed out a 
worrying tendency in Socrates teleological way of thinking, that is, nothing was morally 
wrong as long as its consequences were acceptable according to certain specific criteria. 
Secondly, Socrates was accused of seducing young people, encouraging them to revolt 
against family and other traditional institutions, with the claim that knowledge, rather 
than tradition, should be the authority, for it was knowledge alone that provided the 
guideline to success or other beneficial outcomes.   With such claims Socrates was said to 
have deprived Athenian society and families of their respect among the younger 
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members.98  Socrates, Xenophon admitted, did make this kind of claim for the superiority 
of knowledge over traditional values; he was also proud of his influence among young 
people.99  However, Xenophon insisted that Socrates, instead of turning them away from 
their society, meant to teach them their responsibility to make a contribution to their 
associates.  The lesson Socrates had taught is that:  
If someone wished to be honoured—whether by a father, brother, or by 
anyone else—he would not neglect them, in reliance on the fact that he 
was related to them, but attempt to be beneficial to those by whom he 
wished to be honoured.100 
By doing this, without altering the essence of Socrates’ intellectualism, Xenophon 
changed its image from criticism of traditional values, which was used as an excuse for 
youthful rebellion, into a demanding requirement for young people who desired respect 
and honour from society.  However, the tension between Socrates’ intellectualism and the 
Athenian traditionalism did not disappear.  Though Xenophon recognized individuals’ 
duty to benefit the Athenian community, he was reluctant to admit the authority of the 
community over oligarchic citizens or its right to make decisions through the established 
democratic practices. 
ii. The Death of Socrates 
Though, as discussed above, there might be some problems regarding the persuasiveness 
of Xenophon’s defence of Socrates, Xenophon himself would have had no doubt about 
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Socrates’ innocence.101  He was therefore expected to blame the democracy for its 
execution of Socrates.  Nevertheless, as shown below, Xenophon’s view of the trial, due 
to some of his peculiar considerations, excuses the democracy for its trial of Socrates to 
some extent. 
Litigation in Athens was considered mainly as a contest between one man and his enemy.  
Victory brought psychological satisfaction and social reputation as well as material goods; 
the loser suffered the loss of property, respect and, in some instances, his life.  Therefore, 
we have seen that Anytus, one of the accusers, passed by Socrates and his friends in a 
truly swaggering manner, and Socrates received it with a prediction of misfortune for him 
and his son.102  After the condemnation of Socrates, there remained an important task for 
his friends and pupils: to save the philosopher from being remembered forever as an 
executed criminal, incompetent speaker and a loser in the court.103  We have seen 
Xenophon’s defence of Socrates’ innocence against the religious and political charges, 
but other strategies were used as well to save Socrates from the humiliation of defeat. 
1. Glorious defeat 
One of the strategies that Xenophon seemed to use was to turn upside down the 
customary implications of victory and defeat.  In the trial of Socrates, it was suggested 
that the victory was a disgrace because the accusers used cheating and other 
dishonourable methods.  Their accusation was said to be out of private envy rather than 
lofty considerations of common interest and justice,104 and they won with blunt lies and 
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perjury.105  By contrast, Socrates was glorious in his defeat by showing his fearlessness.  
He maintained his integrity perfectly in a most dignified manner, despite the jurors’ anger 
at his bragging.  Though he knew how to please the jury and win his acquittal, he would 
rather die than satisfy them ‘by slavishly begging to gain a much worse life.’106 
2. Justice from higher authorities 
The second strategy was to denounce the significance of contemporary public opinion, 
claiming that the true reputation came from one’s self-estimation and the judgement of 
his friends and future generations, rather than from the opinions of the jurors and other 
contemporary Athenians.  Xenophon’s Socrates remained confident that he had lived a 
most superior life among human beings, and he had confirmation in his self-evaluation 
from his friends.107  He also believed that his reputation of justice and piety would be 
restored among people other than the current Athenians.108  As to his contemporary 
Athenians who condemned him to death, Socrates predicted their infamy in the future for 
killing a just man.109 
3. Voluntary death 
The third strategy was Xenophon’s theory of voluntary death, namely, that Socrates 
decided to die in order to escape the sufferings of old age.110  This strategy is also the 
most relevant one to our discussion on the responsibility of the democracy for the 
execution of Socrates.  
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 Xen. Ap. 9.  However, begging for sympathy was never the only way to survive an Athenian court, as 
we can see from the works of the Athenian rhetoricians. 
107
 Mem. 4.8.6-7. 
108
 Mem. 4.8.10. 
109
 Mem. 4.8.9-10.  See also his prediction about Anytus in Xen. Ap. 29-31. 
110
 The Socratics were unlikely to have been the first users of these strategies.  There had been a tradition of 
self-consolation on the part of the defeated in litigious Athens.  Chroust 1957: 216 ff.  
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As we can see from his Memorabilia, one of Xenophon’s motivations was to solve the 
puzzle of why Socrates did not persuade the jury to acquit him. At the very beginning in 
the first book of Memorabilia he said: ‘I often wondered (§yaÊmasa) by what possible 
speeches those who indicted Socrates persuaded the Athenians that he deserved death 
from the city.’111  He then repeated the same question at the end of the first chapter as 
well as in the second chapter of the Memorabilia Book I.112   
Why was Xenophon shocked by the jury’s decision to execute Socrates?  The reasons are 
as follows.  The first, of course, was his firm belief in Socrates’ innocence.  To him, 
Socrates was a man of piety, justice and benevolence, as well as other moral 
characteristics, to the highest degree; it was impossible for a righteous man like Socrates 
ever to commit any crime that his accusers had charged him with.  The other reason, 
perhaps less obvious, but probably making a bigger contribution to Xenophon’s wonder, 
was his confidence in Socrates’ art of speech.  He said that Socrates was never seen 
defeated in his debate with others; on the contrary, he always mastered the course of 
conversation at his ease, exacting any kind of concession he wanted from his 
interlocutors.  It therefore came as a genuine shock to Xenophon that Socrates, instead of 
persuading the jury, was defeated and put to death by his accusers.  Xenophon 
summarized his understanding of Socrates as the conclusion of his Memorabilia:  
In my opinion, to be sure, inasmuch as he was such as I have described—
so pious as to do nothing without the gods’ judgement; so just as to harm 
no one, not even a little, and to benefit to the greatest extent those who 
dealt with him; so continent as never to choose what was more pleasant in 
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place of what was better; so prudent as not to make mistakes in deciding 
what was better and worse, nor to need another in addition, but to be self-
sufficient in his judgement of these matters; and competent also to say 
and to define such things in speech; and competent as well to test others 
and to refute them when they made mistakes, and to turn them toward 
virtue and gentlemanliness—he was such as a most good and happy man 
would be.113 
How then could the jury put Socrates to death?  Even if the accusers tried to convict him 
by the most vicious slander, there should have been no problem at all for Socrates to 
persuade the jurors of his innocence.  Arguably, it was under such a dilemma that 
Xenophon came to the unusual conclusion that Socrates sought his death with the 
purpose of avoiding the imminent disgrace of his old age.114   
According to Xenophon’s account, Socrates did not prepare for his defence speech; 
instead, he gave an arrogant talk in the court that irritated the jurors several times.  
Socrates claimed that his daimonion stopped him from defending himself.115  He inferred 
that this was a beneficial warning, saying that the divinity had prepared the easiest way 
for him to escape from the sufferings of old age.  He explained the miserable fate that 
was waiting for him in the near future had he won the trial and continued living:  
If I should live longer, perhaps it will be necessarily to pay the price of old 
age, both seeing and hearing less, and thinking more poorly, and ending 
by being less capable of learning and more forgetful, and becoming worse 
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in the things at which I was better before, moreover, for one who did not 
perceive these things life would not be worth living, while for one who did 
perceive them, how could it not be necessary that he live worse and more 
unpleasantly?116 
Arguing that Socrates acquired successfully what he had conspired, Xenophon claimed to 
clear his name of loser in the law court. 
If the interpretation above is correct, one of its implications is that Socrates himself, 
rather than the demos or the democracy, took the main responsibility for his death.  The 
democratic jury might not have had this intention, but were forced to put Socrates to 
death as he wished because of his deliberate provocation.  Nor should the democracy be 
blamed for his decision to end his life.  It was so decided due to his fear of disgrace in old 
age, rather than because of his disappointment with the democracy for any of its faults.   
Admittedly, the theory of voluntary death sounds rather like a not too perfect exercise of 
self-deception over the humiliation of being defeated.  Socrates did defend himself in the 
court, trying his best to ‘appear neither impious as regards gods nor unjust as regards 
human beings.’117  At some point, he seemed to flatter the democracy, praising its 
practice of electing generals.118  Though, according to Xenophon, Socrates did not allow 
himself or his friends to propose an alternative punishment to the death penalty proposed 
by the accusers, he did not stop them from defending him in the court as co-speakers, 
who obviously aimed to save his life.119  Moreover, after the verdict, there were indeed 
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bitterness and anger from the losers’ side. 120  Finally, Socrates, instead of showing 
appreciation, condemned both the accusers and the jurors for their help in relieving his 
coming sufferings.  He predicted that both of them would be ashamed in the future for 
their impiety and injustice in killing him.121 
In any case, this theory of voluntary death is what Xenophon convinced himself of: 
Socrates ended his life intentionally; he would have prevailed over the jury and 
annihilated his accusers in the court had he so wished.  The theory at least reveals one of 
Xenophon’s basic political beliefs that the demos and the democracy were not hopeless, 
but could be led by one who was equipped with a good public reputation and the art of 
persuasion, plus a share of divine favour.   For him, the death of Socrates was of course a 
tragic incident that taught an important lesson about the risk of political life, but it was far 
from a revelation of its complete unworthiness. 
As to the bitterness and grudge shown on a few occasions in his Apology and 
Memorabilia, there are also signs that these negative emotions were later replaced in his 
other Socratic writings with an understanding of sympathy and forgiveness.122  There is a 
story in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia in which a wise man was put to death on the charge of 
corrupting young people, an episode that manifestly refers back to the case of Socrates.123 
The father who had killed him confessed that he had done so out of envy over his son’s 
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affection for the murdered teacher.  Xenophon then had Cyrus,124 the hero of Cyropaedia, 
advises the son to forgive his father, for his crime was human.125    
V. Conclusion 
i 
As mentioned at the beginning, Xenophon was an ambitious politician as well as a 
political writer.  Though he was an oligarch, democracy had a peculiar place in his 
writings and political life.  It was a natural option for him to pursue a political career in 
the Athenian democracy, since he was born as one of its citizens.   He might have had the 
thought of replacing the democracy with an oligarchy of the Spartan style in his 
fatherland, but the failure of the oligarchic experiments at the end of the fifth century B.C. 
destroyed that dream.  Furthermore, the height of his political career was when he was 
elected a general of the Greek mercenaries who reorganized themselves along democratic 
principles.  While Xenophon led the army, he exerted his influence by addressing the 
soldiers’ assembly, just like a politician would do in the Athenian democracy.126  Besides, 
his plans for the democracy were much more specific and straightforward, suggesting a 
higher level of practicability when compared with his works on oligarchy and monarchy, 
which are mostly put in theoretical or fictional forms.  It is arguable that, had Xenophon 
not been exiled from Athens, he would have been an active politician in his fatherland, 
addressing the public in ways not too different from those used by a demagogue. 
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He was not reluctant either in criticizing the faults of his upper class society or in praising 
the political achievements of the common Athenians.  He praised the common Athenians 
for the respect they had shown for their ancestral practices and for their discipline in 
public gatherings and naval battles, while criticizing a rebellious tendency among many 
oligarchic citizens.  He approved the law reform by the democracy for its selection of the 
legislators by election rather than by lot, and of entrusting to the Areopagus council the 
responsibility of supervising the constitutional laws.  In like manner, he acknowledged 
the justice and piety of the democratic party in their victorious return to Athens, and in 
the success of the reconciliation he testified to their generosity to the oligarchs and their 
faithfulness to their promises, while giving his unreserved condemnation to the Thirty’s 
impiety and cruelty.   
As to the tragic death of Socrates, the responsibility of the democracy was in effect 
explained away to some extent in Xenophon’s defence of Socrates.  The execution of 
Socrates, he claimed, was not the accusers’ victory; instead, it was Socrates’ own wish 
that led the jurors to reach the verdict.  Socrates’ consideration in doing this, Xenophon 
believed, was his fear of the disgrace that came with old age, an inevitable natural 
consequence that had absolutely nothing to do with the democracy.  Maybe more 
importantly, if there was still bitterness left against the democracy, Xenophon suggested 
that it should be forgiven.   
ii 
There are some noteworthy points in Xenophon’s observation of the democracy.  First, 
Xenophon attested quite consistently a strong communitarian sentiment among the 
Athenian people, differing from today’s dominant realist approaches.  He commended the 
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sincerity of the Athenians’ belief and pride in the laws of their common ancestors, a 
tendency which should have received more weight as a main support for the 
constitutional stability in fourth-century Athens than most historians admitted.  On the 
other hand, through his account of an encounter between the democrats and the oligarchs 
on the battlefield during the civil war, Xenophon also showed us how the communal 
sympathy accumulated through daily public gatherings helped the Athenians to overcome 
the hatred of civil strife; yet, many historians have rejected Xenophon’s account as 
unrealistic. 
Second, Xenophon suggest a theory of an historical circle where a society declined as a 
consequence of its people’s disposition to indulge in times of success, but they would 
also revitalize themselves due to their ability to learn from their mistakes.127  As his 
Socrates indicated, the Athenians became carefree, soft and arrogant after their victory 
over Persia and the establishment of their naval empire; however, their ability for self-
examination was not completely lost.  They regained their discipline and the traditional 
way of rigorous life once their arrogance had been humbled in battlefields in the hardest 
way.128  Xenophon’s narratives of the Athenian civil war appeared to be arranged along 
this narrative pattern: the Athenian naval victory off Arginusae was followed by the 
notorious trial of the generals, after which came the capitulation of Athens to Sparta and 
the brutal rule of the Thirty; the demos, having suffered in its defeat and exile, turned to 
be virtuous and blessed, restoring its city miraculously.  The democracy, having 
recovered its moderation and prudence, and leaving behind the conflicts and hatred of the 
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past chaos, resolved to return to its ancestral way of life.129  Yet, though Xenophon 
confirmed that the demos lived by the ancestral laws after the civil war, he was expecting 
another cycle of decline in Athens, as he worried in the 360s that, though the Athenians 
were still proud of their ancestors, their determination to defend their fatherland might 
not be as strong as it had been.130  As to the performance of the democracy, this dynamic 
historical perspective provides an interesting alternative to other views that tend to 
attribute a fixed character to the demos. 
Finally, he considered that the Athenian common people were at least average men of 
reason.  They did good things and bad things just like the educated oligarchic Athenians.  
Xenophon’s account of the trial of the generals in 406 is often cited by modern scholars 
as evidence of the demos’ rashness.  However, when the demos was behaving nobly in 
the civil war as well as on other occasions, Xenophon did not fail to observe them 
because of his oligarchic tendency.  A satisfactory political order under the collective rule 
of the common people might seem to be an illusion to those who considered the demos as 
nothing but an unthinking rabble, but for Xenophon it was a perfectly reasonable goal, or 
simply a political reality in his times.  He would consider it a questionable presumption 
that the demos, always vulnerable to manipulation by demagogues, could never 
appreciate the value of a constitutional order nor learn to control its emotions and instant 
desires.  On the contrary, it was more likely, in his belief, that the demos, due to its moral 
and intelligent capacity, could be led to great deeds of nobility if its leaders were 
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competent and trustworthy.131  This kind of optimism is one of the reasons that made 
Xenophon a practical politician instead of a cynical philosopher. 
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Commander.    
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Chapter Six 
Plato and Athenian Democracy 
We have seen in the previous chapter how Xenophon adjusted himself between his oligarchic 
values and the democratic reality.   Plato, by contrast, is more hostile towards Athenian 
democracy.  While Xenophon accepted the rules of democratic politics as part and parcel of 
his pursuit of political career, Plato withdrew from the Athenian public arena into the 
Academy.  He developed a fierce criticism of democracy, especially in the Republic Book 8 
and the Laws Book 3, attacking every aspect of popular government from its core values of 
equality and freedom to its ways of decision-making. 
However, as we will find in this chapter, there are important passages in Plato’s works that 
indicates his appreciation of what Athenian democracy did in its law reform and the 
reconciliation project.  We will also find his reconsideration of the trial of Socrates from a 
perspective that acknowledges popular suspicion of Socratic philosophy and the need for 
Athenian democracy to contain radical intellectual activities under its laws.  These passages, 
though not proving Plato a supporter of Athenian democracy, constitute an alternative trend of 
thought alongside his much more apparent anti-democratic position. 
 The interpretative issue regarding Platonic works will be discussed first in this chapter.  My 
view is that it is still better to take the so-called ‘mouthpiece’ theory which identifies the main 
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characters in Plato’s works, normally his mentor Socrates, as his spokesperson.  There will be 
then a brief account of the debate over the relationship between Plato and democracy.  It 
indicates that, despite recent efforts to make him more considerate of the demos by some 
scholars, Plato was still largely an anti-democrat because of his intellectual elitism, the belief 
that political power should be in the hands of the very few people who holds knowledge.  His 
concession to democracy does not constitute a profound change of political position. 
With the background knowledge of interpretive issues and Plato’s political position, this 
chapter then move on to the discussion of Plato’s response towards the three important events: 
the law reform, the reconciliation and the trial of Socrates.  While the whole Platonic corpus 
will be consulted, the Laws and Statesman will be particularly useful for our discussion of the 
law reform.  The discussion of the reconciliation will focus on the relevant passages in the 
Menexenus.  As to the trial of Socrates, we will discuss Plato’s account of the trial in the 
Apology followed by discussion of his afterthoughts in the Protagoras, Republic and Crito. 
I. Interpretive Issues 
Interpretation of Platonic thoughts is much more difficult than that of Xenophon’s.  We do not 
have as much reliable information about Plato’s life as we do in the case of Xenophon whose 
extant autobiography provides useful guidelines for our understandings of his political 
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thought.  The two main extant sources about Plato’s life are the account of Diogenes Laertius1 
and the Platonic Seventh Letter.  While the former was written more than five centuries after 
Plato’s death and is of dubious historical accuracy, the latter might not have been written by 
Plato himself.  Therefore, though the account of the historical background in the Seventh 
Letter, such as the general information of his family and his visit to the court of Sicilian 
tyrants, is generally considered reliable, it is still risky to use it as a basis for the discussion of 
subtler issues such as Plato’s thoughts on the Athenian democracy.2 
Plato’s writing style is also more sophisticated than Xenophon’s.  With the latter, it is not 
difficult to find out his intention or political position, for he made his views known, even in 
his fictional works such as Cyropaedia.  Plato, by contrast, is much more elusive.  Apart from 
his letters where the authorship is a matter of debate, he mentioned himself in only three 
places throughout his enormous extant corpus—twice in the Apology and once in the 
Phaedo— and never voiced his personal opinions as the author.  Therefore, the thoughts and 
theories that are ascribed to him are inevitably disputable products of hermeneutic 
reconstruction out of the extant corpus, a large part of which is full of irony, playfulness and 
inconclusiveness.  Besides, the criticism of writing as a way of education in his Phaedrus and 
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the Seventh Letter raise the most radical question of whether Plato would ever have conveyed 
his philosophy to us through the medium of written words. 
i. Main theories of interpretation 
There are three principal ways of dealing with these elements of vagueness.3  The route that 
many scholars took is to dismiss them, presuming Plato’s dialogues as nothing essentially 
different from treatises, identifying the author’s arguments as expressed by the predominant 
characters in his corpus, and explaining contradictions between his spokesmen in different 
dialogues largely as the outcome of different developmental stages of his life.4  This approach 
is usually labelled the doctrinal or dogmatic approach, for its outcomes tend to be Platonic 
theoretic accounts on various issues.5   
The second approach is the esoteric teaching which takes the criticism of writing in the 
Phaedrus and the Seventh Letter most seriously, arguing that the Platonic corpus is apparently 
anything but his genuine philosophical teaching.  This perspective argues that the writings 
serve as a deliberate device for various concealed purposes, such as to turn away undesirable 
students or to introduce promising ones to real philosophy, etc.6  The best known example of 
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this approach in political philosophy is Leo Strauss and his students.7  Though they also 
emphasise the dramatic characteristics of Platonic dialogues as the next approach of dialectic 
reading does, their peculiar esoteric view should be singled out for their influence in the field 
of Platonic political philosophy.8 
Finally, many scholars nowadays claim that the dialogue form and other dramatic features, 
instead of being literary embellishment, are the key to the core of Platonic philosophy.9  They 
also believe that the reason that Plato kept silence and inconclusiveness in his writings is his 
refusal to commit himself to any set of established doctrines.10  This approach, which maybe 
called the dialectic interpretation, includes two subtly different concepts of Platonic 
philosophy.11  One view is that the engaged conversation between Socrates and his 
interlocutors is the immediate display of the spirit of Platonic philosophy, that is, Socratic 
elenchus.  This view of philosophy is best illustrated in Plato’s ‘Socratic’ dialogues where 
established beliefs are refuted with no substitute established.  Another view argues that, in 
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addition to the method of Socratic elenchus, there is still certain genuine Platonic teaching 
behind his dialogue setting, and it is the truth that one has to find for oneself and within 
oneself through the process of relentless questioning and answering, as shown in the Meno 
and the Theaetetus. 12  
To be fair, there is hardly any universal interpretive rule for the Platonic corpus as a whole.13  
One obvious problem with the doctrinal approach is its tendency to dismiss the dialogue form, 
absence of the author, irony and other dramatic elements in Plato’s writings, which are now 
believed by many scholars to be critical for our understanding of Plato.14  Besides, it is also 
criticized for explaining the contradictions and inconsistencies between and within individual 
Platonic works as products of different stages in Plato’s life, an assumption that was not 
without serious controversy and is now losing its popularity.15   
As to the esoteric reading, though guiding our attention to the important Platonic criticism of 
writing, it seems to create a hermeneutic cycle in which one is supposed to appreciate its view 
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only after one has been initiated into the inner group that is by definition the devoted 
supporters of esoteric teaching.16  The majority, by contrast, are not supposed to agree with 
the teaching, for they are all outsiders who, again by definition, cannot understand its truth 
due to their own ignorance.   
There are some problems about the dialectic reading of Plato.  It seems an overstatement to 
say that the Platonic works have no substantive views or theory whatsoever but Socratic 
dialectic.17  This perspective is more plausible in explaining the so-called Socratic dialogues 
in which playfulness and inconclusiveness might build up the effect of subverting the 
established opinions or arguments previously given in the dialogues, but would be less 
persuasive in other works such as the Republic and Laws where the predominant speakers 
bring out their substantial views at length. As to the view that Platonic dialogues refer to 
certain transcendental truth, it tends to see Plato as an all-wise philosopher, considering the 
insufficiency or contradiction of his arguments as part of his mastery scheme of leading the 
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readers to the elusive philosophical truth.18     This assumption is not only questionable but 
also unhelpful in developing critical understandings of Platonic philosophy. 
It might be said that, while the latter two approaches emerged as attempts to deal with the 
difficulties and contradictions that the traditional doctrinal approach failed to solve, it is 
doubtful if their interpretations could be more comprehensive and consistent without creating 
more interpretive problems.19  As suggested in Harold Tarrant’s vivid metaphor of civil war 
between many new schools of interpretation after the overthrow of the old despotic regime 
that was the doctrinal reading of Plato, the prospect of a new interpretive order is not yet in 
sight.  He says:  
Plato has been plundered by looting bands of opportunists anxious to make up 
for the time that agendas have been pushed underground.  The looters have 
at times failed to show respect either for the text itself and its historical context 
or for the need to establish lawful procedures of interpretation.  The war-lords 
of various factions have divided the spoils between them.  Rebuilding the 
discipline in a new and more democratic fashion will take years, and it will take 
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a quiet, thoughtful, inclusive approach that carefully assesses the merits of the 
views of all interested parties.20 
ii. The interpretative view presented in this thesis 
My view on this issue is closer to the doctrinal approach mainly in its tendency to identify 
Plato’s view with those of the predominant characters in his dialogues, an approach that is 
often called the mouthpiece theory.  This presumption, as Richard Kraut argued, though not 
without its problems, at least has been proved ‘a successful working hypothesis’.21  Scholars 
often dismiss this mouthpiece assumption by comparing Plato with playwrights such as 
Shakespeare or Sophocles, claiming that the Platonic characters do not represent Plato, just as 
Hamlet does not speak for Shakespeare, nor does Ajax for Sophocles.22  This analogy, I 
believe, fails to do justice to one of Plato’s unique dramatic arrangements, that is, the 
extremely unequal relationship between predominant and subordinate characters.23  It is the 
fundamental pattern throughout Plato’s writings that a predominant interlocutor holds almost 
absolute control throughout the conversation, while most of the time all the other characters 
play only subordinate roles as respondents, occasionally raising questions or objections only 
to be driven to aporia by the hero who is usually Socrates.  Moreover, what the main 
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 Tarrant 2003: 436.  The emphasis original. 
21
 Kraut 1992: 29. 
22
 E.g. Arieti 2000: 481; Clay 2000: 102; Blondel 2002: 18. 
23
 For a fuller and, I believe, persuasive defence against the comparison of Platonic dialogues with drama, see 
Kraut 1992: 25-30 
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characters normally do is not only to refute arguments given without revealing their own 
thoughts, but also, to the surprise of their interlocutors, proposing idiosyncratic ideas on 
various subjects such as the immortality of souls, the myth of afterlife and the rule of the 
philosopher-king.  Plato as the author should have been aware that such unbalanced narrative 
arrangements would naturally lead most readers to identify the author with the predominant 
characters, and there are good reasons to believe that this is the effect that he planned.24   
Besides, the literary context, it should be noted, will be taken into account, at least to a 
reasonable extent, within the mouthpiece perspective, since it is mainly through these 
predominant speakers that Plato conducted his irony, inconclusiveness and other tricks of 
vagueness. 
Finally, it should be noted that the acceptance of the mouthpiece theory in this thesis does not 
mean its siding with the doctrinal reading on other issues as well.  For instance, there will be 
no argument in this thesis for the existence of a systematic Platonic theory on democracy or 
other political issues.  On the contrary, through the following discussion in this chapter of his 
response to the democracy’s law reform, the reconciliation project and its trial of Socrates, it 
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 Blondel (2000: 18, 20, 42-3), though in recognition of the obvious dogmatist tendency created by the extreme 
inequality between Platonic characters, still insists that the form of dialogue ultimately rejects the mouthpiece 
assumption.  Cf. Ferrari’s incisive criticism (2000) that questions the logical association of dialogue form and the 
lack of doctrines; see also Schofield (2000a: 224): “Thinking with” does not exclude “acting upon”, and Lane 
(2001: 132): ‘To welcome something as theory provides no safeguard against dangerous attempts to put it into 
practice.’ 
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is shown that there is an ambiguity in the Platonic corpus as a whole toward Athenian 
democracy. 
Furthermore, we will not try to prove the coherence of Plato’s view on democracy with 
developmental theories that attribute Plato’s works to different stages of his life, as the 
proponents of doctrinal approaches often do.  Though it is assumed in this thesis that Plato 
reconsidered his criticism of Athenian democracy as the popular government proved itself a 
better government than most other contemporary regimes in the fourth century B.C., its 
position is based mainly on the common sense that people often revise their opinions 
following their experience, rather than using any specific developmental order of Plato’s 
works.  There are several problems of developmental theories.  For example, it is still an issue 
of many debates how we reconstruct the former from the latter, since we do not have 
sufficient knowledge of Plato’s life to decide the chronological order of his works beyond 
reasonable doubt.  It is further complicated by the fact that, as revealed in the next section, 
seemly contradictory views of democracy are often found not only among Plato’s different 
dialogues but also in the same single works such as the Republic and the Laws.  Before 
arguing for a general developmental pattern of thought throughout Plato’s life with a specific 
classification of his writings, there is then a need to prove the inherent coherence of individual 
dialogues, an enormous task that cannot be dealt with here due to the limitation of space.  
Therefore, it is better that we do not attempt to solve the problem of seeming inconsistency in 
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Plato’s work on his behalf, but keep it as a remainder of the level of complexity between 
philosophy and democracy.  As to the different views of democracy in the Platonic corpus, we 
would considers them more like thematic accounts rather than chronologic development of 
Plato’s thought.25  
II. Plato’s Antidemocratic Tendency 
The issue of Plato’s political preference as revealed in his works is a complicated issue of 
many controversies, especially since the Nazis’ infamous exploitation of Platonic ideas in the 
1930s and Karl Popper’s subsequent criticism of Plato in his Open Society and Its Enemies.26  
However, owing to the limitation of space, this section provides only a brief account pointing 
out Plato’s antidemocratic views, followed by a discussion of recent scholarship that tries to 
reconcile Plato and the democracy.  It should also be noted that Plato’s antidemocratic 
tendency means here his opposition to the values of equality and freedom from oligarchic 
rulers as revealed in the participatory politics of Athenian democracy.  It should not be 
confused with the modern concept of representative government and individualistic civic 
rights.        
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 See also the conclusion of 2.2 of this chapter. 
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 Lane 2001: 111 ff. 
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i. Oligarchic values 
Though both Plato and Xenophon came from similar oligarchic backgrounds, the former was 
less compromised in his antidemocratic position.   While sharing Xenophon’s dislike of the 
demos and its participatory government, Plato developed a highly advanced and radical 
criticism of the democracy in the Republic Book 8, the Laws Book 3 and throughout his 
works.  Furthermore, judging by his intellectualist criterion, Plato hardly found anything 
genuinely worthy in the democracy or in any actual regimes.  While Xenophon taught and 
practised the art of public speech which he believed was an essential part of great leadership, 
Plato usually dismissed it as brazen flattery of the ignorant masses.27    While Xenophon 
aimed to pursue a successful political career through which he claimed to benefit not just 
himself and his companions but also the wider community, Plato warned that political life was 
actually nothing more than a vicious circle of mutual corruption between politicians and the 
demos.28 
Plato’s criticism of the democracy at Athens, to put it briefly, can be explained with two 
interpretive propositions: his intellectualism and his elitism.29  He claimed that political power 
and decision making must be based on true knowledge rather than force, wealth or the number 
                                                 
27
 E.g. Grg. 463a ff.  Cf. Grg. 456b and Phdr. 462d ff where Plato considers the possibility of rhetoric to serve 
the interests of philosophy. [Professor Sarah Broadie’s comment.] 
28
 E.g. Grg. 502d-503a; 513 b-c; Alc. 132a; Resp. 492b-c. 
29
 See also Samaras 2002: 112-4; Bobonich 2002: 6-8; Schofield 2006: 54-55.. 
 209 
of people involved.30  He disputed the common people’s right to rule, since they, being 
uneducated, were ignorant of the true purpose of political community and of the means to 
achieve it.  Even worse was their unawareness of their ignorance or the refusal to admit it.31  
In Plato’s view, the democracy, rather than a proper government, was revelries of common 
people who, having rejected the discipline of rationality and becoming self-indulgent and 
riotous, would blindly lead the whole community into chaos.32 
Is there any chance that the common people could ever be educated and entitled to participate 
in the government?  Plato’s answer to this question is negative, following his elitist belief that 
knowledge is accessible only to a very small number of people.    While Socrates is said to 
commit himself to educating everyone who listens to him,33 Plato made it clear that only very 
few people would ever become possessors of true knowledge; ‘it’s impossible that a multitude 
be philosophic.’34  The rightful rulers who held knowledge were always the smallest in 
number. 
It is, therefore, from the smallest group and part of itself and the knowledge in 
it, from the supervising and ruling part, that a city founded according to nature 
                                                 
30
 E.g. Grg. 466e; Euthyd. 292b; Prt. 319d; Plt. 292c; Leg. 689c 
31
 Ap. 21b-e. 
32
 Resp. 564a; Leg. 701b-c. 
33
 Ap. 23; Saxonhouse 1996: 89. 
34
 Resp. 494a. 
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would be wise as a whole.  And this class which properly has a share in that 
knowledge which alone among the various kinds of knowledge ought to be 
called wisdom, has, as it seems, the fewest members by nature.35 
According to this belief, the Athenian democracy with its comprehensive scale of civil 
participation was by nature never a wise government. 
Having said that Plato provided a more critical and advanced account of the democracy than 
Xenophon did, does not mean that his antidemocratic position was absolutely intransigent.  
On the contrary, it is one of the basic presumptions of this thesis that Plato compromised his 
essentially elitist belief as a result of his recognition of the democracy’s successful 
reconstruction of political order after its disastrous military defeat and civil war at the end of 
the fifth century B.C.   However, with the reasons given above, it is concluded that Plato’s 
political thought was clearly and profoundly antidemocratic; his concession to the democracy 
constitutes only a significant set of exceptions to elitism. 
ii. Recent debates 
While there are numerous books and articles which challenge the traditional reading of Plato 
as an antidemocrat, we discuss only two recent efforts by scholars who aim to discover Plato’s 
likely appreciation of democratic values and institutions.  The first group of scholars, 
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 Resp. 428e-429a  See also Ap. 25b, Plt. 297b, Leg. 640a. 
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Thanassis Samaras and Christopher Bobonich, followed the traditional approaches of 
doctrinal reading and developmental theories, arguing that there was a radical change of 
Plato’s view from the outright opposition to the democracy in his early or middle works, 
especially in the Republic, to a moderate position in the Laws as well as in the other later 
works.36  Though far from saying that Plato changed from an enemy to a supporter of the 
democracy in the later works, both scholars pointed out Plato’s higher evaluation of the 
common people’s ability to know the truth or what was genuinely good for themselves, as 
suggested in his adaptation of certain democratic practices such as rhetoric, the written laws 
and participatory politics in the later works.  According to their interpretation, Plato’s 
recognition of public opinion, though limited, constituted a substantial difference from the 
strict intellectual elitism in the Republic. 
T. Samaras and C. Bobonich made a significant contribution to Platonic scholarship with their 
detailed survey of an important aspect of Platonic political thought.37  As they have argued, 
some of Plato’s discussion of the written laws, public opinion and democratic practices 
indicates a compromise of his anti-democratic position.  However, it seems an overstatement 
to say, as they did, that the Statesman and the Laws were less anti-democratic than the 
Republic overall.  The interpretation of the Platonic works is a delicate business, and it is risky 
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 Samaras 2002: 1-7, 235-245, 305-325; Bobonich 2002: 9-12, 478-9. 
37
 For the criticism of Samaras and Bobonich, see Rowe 2001, Kahn 2004, Stally 2004 and Brisson 2005. 
 212 
to make general statements even about one of his dialogues.  For example, few people would 
dispute that there was a strong elitist tendency in the Republic, but it is still problematic to 
claim, as Samaras and Bobonich did, that Plato had no appreciation whatsoever of public 
opinion in his Republic.  In fact, public opinion was defined in the Republic not as the 
opposite of true knowledge but something between it and ignorance.  Plato’s Socrates did say 
in one place in that dialogue that the common people could be persuaded to accept the rule of 
true philosophers.38  On the other hand, the Nocturnal Council in the Laws was arguably the 
corresponding institution to that of philosopher-king in the Republic.39  Some measures in the 
Laws were even more anti-democratic than in the Republic.  For instance, maritime culture, 
which had strong democratic implication in Athenian politics, constituted part of the city in 
the Republic, but it was rejected in the Laws as corruption of virtue.40  The common people 
who were members of the city in the Republic were enslaved in the Laws.41 
The other group of scholars who dispute the traditional interpretation of Plato as an 
antidemocrat, instead of following doctrinal reading and developmental theories, emphasise 
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 Resp. 499d-500a.  Cf. Kamtekar 2004. 
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 Brisson 2005: 109 ff; Strauss 1963: 87; contrast Samaras 2002: 285-301. 
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 Resp. 371a-b; Leg. 704b ff. 
41
 Rowe 2001: 74; Kahn 2004: 345; Stally 2004: 168; Brisson 2005: 97. 
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the literary characteristics of Plato’s works such as his form of dialogue and the element of 
irony.42  Their arguments are largely as follows. 
First, Plato is said to be a well-intentioned or loyal critic of the democracy.  The purpose of 
his criticism, some scholars argue, is not to discredit the democracy, but to improve the 
common good of the whole community by pointing out the imminent dangers, such as 
demagogic manipulation and the popular abuse of power, to which the democracy was 
liable.43  However, this argument is not very convincing, since there is no way of knowing for 
sure about Plato’s actual motivation.  Besides, the image of Plato as a loyal critic does not fit 
well with his explicit attack on the core values of the democracy, that is, its civil equality and 
political participation.44 
Secondly, Plato was said to be anti-political more than an anti-democratic, for he denounced 
all kinds of actual regimes, not just democratic governments.45  This argument might clear 
                                                 
42
 These scholars include Saxonhouse 1996, Euben 1997 & 2000, Monoson 2000, Clay 2000, J. Wallace 2001, 
Blondell 2002, etc.  Deneen (2000: 424) suggests that Euben is the leading scholar of this Platonic ‘democratic 
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Plato’s name as an advocate of authoritarian and totalitarian states, since he was critical of 
them as well.  However, it does not change his antidemocratic position. 
Thirdly, following the dialectic reading of Plato, more and more scholars argue that there is 
actually no doctrine in his works, either antidemocratic or any other kind of ideology.  They 
argue that by writing dialogues instead of treatises Plato meant to present his thinking in an 
essentially liberal and democratic vein.46  This theory draws our attention to the literary aspect 
of the Platonic writings that has been dismissed for most of the time in the past.  However, as 
mentioned in the section of interpretive issues, it is not very convincing with its assumption 
that the literary form of dialogue is the decisive factor in the interpretation of the Platonic 
corpus.  
Fourthly, an important approach in recent years has pointed out that Plato adopted many 
democratic practices in his writings, such as the freedom of speech, public hearing and audit, 
dramatic performance, rhetoric, etc. 47  Following this new perspective, it is suggested that 
Plato, instead of rejecting the democracy, expands many of its practices and values into the 
new territory of philosophical discussion.  This new approach makes a valuable contribution 
by complicating the relationship between Plato and the democracy, putting into doubt the 
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over-simplistic assumption that Plato was either a democrat or an antidemocrat.  However, as 
some commentators have pointed out, Plato’s adoption of certain democratic practices, or his 
‘democratic entanglements’, does not necessarily make him a friend of the democracy.48  He 
still stubbornly denounced the democratic core values of equality and participatory 
government.  The possibility is not ruled out that Plato’s use of the democratic conventions, 
deliberate or not, has the effect of subverting the democracy itself.  A good example is the 
oligarchic coup in 411 B.C. in Athens.  It was exactly by abusing the freedom of speech in 
particular that a group of oligarchs overthrew the democracy.49 
These scholars’ efforts to read Plato as a democrat, especially the last two arguments 
mentioned above, have enriched our understanding of Plato’s political thought.  However, 
Plato’s explicit opposition to the essential democratic principles of equality and participation 
should not be marginalized in our evaluation of his attitudes towards the democracy. 
In summary, my view is closer to Samaras and Bobonich for its doctrinal reading and 
emphasis on Plato’s discussion of the written laws, public opinion and democratic institutions.  
However, their developmental theory that Plato became less anti-democratic in his later works 
is still questionable.  It is probably better that, by borrowing Max Weber’s concept of ideal 
type, we consider Plato’s concession to the democracy as an alternative tradition that existed 
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alongside his much more obvious and dominant anti-democratic political thinking, both of 
which can be found not only in the Platonic corpus as a whole but sometimes even in the same 
dialogues.  Based on these assumptions, we move on to discuss Plato’s compromise to the 
democracy in his reflection on the three historical events conduced by the democracy.50    
III. The Law reform 
In a conversation reported by Xenophon in the previous chapter, Socrates was said to guide 
the young Pericles to see the prospect of democratic constitutional order.  There is a similar 
discussion in Plato’s Laws.  However, in those passages Plato, who seemed to be even more 
cynical than the young Pericles, did not share Xenophon’s optimism about the demos.51  For 
example, contrary to Xenophon’s praise of the demos’ discipline in naval exercises, Plato 
observed that the Athenian sailors, mainly common people, were a group of cowards without 
any sense of honour.  He said: 
Marines are quick to jump forward, then to retreat at a run back into their ships; 
they see nothing shameful in not daring to stand and die in the face of 
attacking enemies.  Excuses are readily made for them, and they’re quite 
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 Samaras (2002: 180-3, 346-9) also argue that history was the reason for Plato’s change of attitude, but as 
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prepared to throw away their weapons and flee, in certain routs they claim are 
not shameful!52  
Besides, when Xenophon extolled the demos’ harmonious cooperation and its willingness to 
obey in chorus competition, Plato, though not here questioning their discipline, maintained 
that it proved neither a genuine political order nor its possibility, for the people still did not 
hold the knowledge needed.  He wrote:   
It’s laughable that the great mob considers itself capable of knowing what is 
good harmony and good rhythm, and what is not, as many of them as have 
been drilled to sing to an aulos and dance in rhythm; they don’t realize that 
they practice these things without understanding each of them.53 
Moreover, as Xenophon observed, one of the reasons for the demos’ change of attitude from 
arrogance to moderation was the disastrous consequences of over-confidence in battlefields 
that had taught it the values of discipline and obedience, especially as critical danger loomed 
ahead.  Plato, on the other hand, though accepting the theory that people learned from their 
mistakes and were disciplined in the face of danger, considered it hardly applicable to the 
history of the democracy.   In his historical account, the demos learnt only once in the remote 
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 Leg. 706c. 
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 Leg. 670b-c.  Though this passage is mainly about music, its political implication is clear when compared with 
Xen. Mem. 3.5.16-18, where the demos’ music performance is used as evidence of the possibility of democratic 
order. 
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past at the time of the first Persian invasion when ‘the magnitude of the invading 
force…struck [the Athenians] with a helpless feeling of fear’ and converted them into willing 
‘slaves of the rulers and the laws’.54  Then, according to Plato, following their victory over 
Persia and the creation of the Athenian Empire there was a non-stop decline of traditional 
virtues as the people indulged in excessive equality and freedom.55  Plato suggested that 
should there be any chance that the people would ever learn to be moderate again, it would be 
in their afterlife in Hades.56 
Plato’s verdict on the Athenian democracy seems unfair and harsh, given its 80 years’ 
constitutional stability in the fourth century B.C., which is a fact commonly accepted among 
today’s historians.  Maybe Plato was judging with a different measure of time, for as he wrote 
in the Republic: ‘For surely, the whole of the time from childhood to old age would be short 
when compared with all time.’57  Or, it might be for the reason that the criterion Plato set for a 
good government was some sort of morality rather than durability in time, as he wrote in the 
Laws:  
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In our consideration of the nature of the land and the order of the laws, we’re 
looking now to the virtue of the regime.  We do not hold, as the many do, that 
preservation and mere existence are what is most honourable for human 
beings; what is most honourable is for them to become as excellent as 
possible and to remain so for as long a time as they may exist.58 
Nevertheless, the democracy’s long-term stability was not completely dismissed by Plato, 
even if it was not one of his most cherished political values.  As shown in the later discussion 
of the written laws, Plato pointed out the amazing durability of some regimes whose 
corruption, when judged from intellectualist points of view, were deeply rooted beyond any 
cure.59  The Athenian democracy was arguably one of the regimes in Plato’s mind when he 
raised this issue, since it emerged in his discussion of the written laws of the democracy.  
Though different from Xenophon’ view, Plato considered that the cause of democratic 
stability, rather than anything virtuous on the demos’ side or its learning any lesson from its 
mistakes, was more likely an accidental outcome of an institutional design of the democracy, 
that is, its radical fragmentation of political power that made the democracy relatively 
incompetent to make any change from worse to the worst.60 
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i. ‘The Ancestral Laws’ 
Plato, like all who participated in the discourse of constitutionalism in fourth-century Athens, 
resorted to the slogan of the ancestral constitution.61  This slogan, we may say, consisted of 
two closely connected but nevertheless different aspects: archaism and communitarianism.  
Archaism means here the inclination to worship established practices mainly for the reason of 
their presumed connection with ancient or legendary times.  The popularity of this concept is 
best attested in the Athenian practice of naming all their laws after legendary lawgivers and 
kings, such as Solon, Draco and Theseus.62  Communitarianism, on the other hand, 
emphasises the significance of what is supposedly common or shared among all citizens or 
members of the community.  These two ideologies were intertwined with each other, since the 
Athenian community used to identify itself with the past, as shown in the historical-ethnic 
belief that all Athenians were offspring of the common ancestors who had grown up nowhere 
else but from the Athenian soil.  However, Athens was also defined by another two non-
historical elements: communal participation and common interests.  That is, in Athens all 
political decisions were to be made collectively by the citizens in the name of shared interests.  
By analogy with Lincoln’s famous saying, Athens was supposedly of the citizens, for the 
citizens, and by the citizens directly. 
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Following the distinction above between archaism and the two communitarian concepts: 
communal participation and common interests, we move on to discussing Plato’s use of ‘the 
ancestral constitution’.  
1. Archaism 
First of all, Plato, though occasionally claiming the superiority of ancient conventions to later 
ones,63 was not a faithful archaist; on the contrary, he recognized the innovative or even 
revolutionary dimensions of legislative projects.64  In his view, conservative sentiment was 
more like a double-edged sword that could help or hinder a constitutional project.  He said:  
The tribal unity, the similarity of language and of laws, since they imply a 
sharing of the sacred things and all such matters, create a certain friendship; 
but then again, they do not easily accept laws and regimes different from their 
own.  Sometimes, even when they have suffered from civil strife as a result of 
the wickedness of their laws they still prefer, out of habit, to live with the same 
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habitual customs that corrupted them before.  So they give trouble to the 
founder and lawgiver and become disobedient.65 
For Plato, the power of tyranny seemed much more tempting than the potential of popular 
reverence for tradition.  He suggested in the Laws that the most efficient way to fulfil a 
constitutional project was not to persuade the uneducated demos, but to cooperate with tyrants 
who had the power to reconstruct the whole community as they liked single-handedly.  He 
said:  
You’d see that if a tyrant wishes to change a city’s habitual ways, he doesn’t 
need to exert great efforts or spend an enormous amount of time.  What he 
has to do is first proceed himself, along the route he’d like the citizens to turn 
toward, whether it be toward the practices of virtue or the opposite.  He need 
only first trace out a model in his own conduct of all that is to be done, praising 
and honouring some things while assigning blame to others, and casting 
dishonour on anyone who disobeys in each of the activities.66 
2. Common interests 
On the other hand, the value of common interests was much more important in Plato’s view 
than the other two claims of tradition and popular participation.  For instance, Socrates 
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defended his public elenchus as divine benefaction to the whole city in the Apology.67  The 
search for the common interests between rulers and the ruled is arguably the central theme of 
the Republic.68  In the Laws, Plato emphasised that all the laws should have no partisan 
consideration but be for the community as a whole.  He wrote:  
Nor do we declare any laws correct that are not laid down for the sake of what 
is common to the whole city.  Where the laws exist for the sake of some, we 
declare the inhabitants to be ‘partisans’ rather than citizens, and declare that 
when they assert their ordinances to be the just things they have spoken in 
vain.69 
3. Civic participation 
Plato’s discussion of civic participation in legal affairs is more complicated.  Civic or demotic 
participation was principally incompatible with Plato’s elitist intellectualism that we have 
discussed in the previous section.  However, he showed limited but significant compromises 
in his Laws.70  Though the initial legislation of the laws remained in the hands of professional 
lawgivers and elected magistrates in the Laws, the demos was now allowed to play a role in 
the revision of the laws.  Plato suggested that the laws, once established for a decade, should 
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not be changed without the consent of the whole citizenry.71  His concern here, though, 
seemed more about the stability of the laws rather than the intrinsic value of civic 
participation.   
Plato’s second concession, in contrast to his denouncement of rhetoric in Gorgias, is his 
recognition of the need for public persuasion for a more efficient rule of law.72  He saw 
problems both in the enforcement of the laws and in the fulfilment of their educational 
function if the demos was left out and stayed uninformed of the spirit of the laws.  While the 
dialectic method applied at most to very small groups of people, the democratic practice of 
public speech was then adapted as a tool of communication between the large crowd and the 
professional lawgivers.  With such consideration Plato argued that the lawgivers should add 
persuasive speeches into their laws.73 
The most obvious communitarian consideration in terms of civic participation in the Laws 
was in his discussion of the local judicial system.  It is there that Plato explicitly said that even 
common citizens should participate in the procedures of trials, exactly because of their 
interests and rights as members of the community.  He said:  
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In regard to crimes against the public, it is necessary, first, that the majority 
have a share in the decision.  For when someone does an injustice to the city 
everyone suffers the injustice, and they would justly be vexed if they had no 
share in such trials…Even in private suits it is necessary that everyone take 
part as much as possible.  For anyone who does not share in the right of 
judging considers himself not at all a sharer in the city itself.74 
There is a complicated debate about whether these concessions mentioned above constituted a 
real difference from Plato’s intellectual elitism exemplified in the ideal of philosopher-king.75  
After all, all these participatory institutions were likely to be nullified under the sovereignty of 
the Nocturnal Council and various other limitations in the Laws, such as its strict law of 
citizenship and rigorous censorship.  Therefore, Brisson argues that ‘in short, power no longer 
resides in the discourse which, particularly in Athens, unfolds at the Assembly and the courts, 
but in the knowledge possessed and cultivated  by the members of a Council [the Nocturnal 
Council] established by law, which escape all control.’76  In any case, we can at least say that 
Plato’s use of democratic institutions in the Laws reveals something different from his 
intellectual criticism of the democracy.  He recognized that the institution of assembly, instead 
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of destroying the order of law, could sometimes be used to protect its stability.  It is also 
suggested that rhetoric, instead of being an arch-rival of philosophy, could be a tool in making 
people understand or be obedient to the rule of philosophy.  Maybe the most interesting of all 
is the reason he gave for citizens’ participation in the judicial process.  In saying that, to be a 
member of the community, citizens must share in the decision-making, he appeared to 
recognize certain communitarian values that, if not superior to, were at least independent of 
his intellectual critique.  All these are noteworthy, even though they did not constitute the 
main principles for the construction of Magensia in the Laws. 
ii. The Written Laws 
The recording of the laws is one of the most revolutionary projects in the democracy’s law 
reform.  For the first time in the history of Athens the laws were systematically collected, 
inscribed and archived in Agora for public consultancy.  Only laws that had been written 
down through this or other procedures of legislation had legally binding force in Athens.  The 
authority of these written laws was further strengthened in this reform to an unprecedented 
level by other constitutional principles.  The written laws were proclaimed to be the superior 
authority over decrees by the Council and Assembly; all magistrates were required to rule by 
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the written laws that should be applied to the citizens indiscriminately.  A result of this 
development, then, was strict control of administrative discretion under the written laws.77 
In the following discussion we will find that Plato’s first reaction to this constitutional switch 
to the written laws was negative, for he thought that writing was not an ideal medium of 
instruction.78  Nevertheless, he then compromised his criticism of the written laws by 
switching from the intellectualist position to the sympathetic considerations of the reasons 
why the demos preferred the written laws to professional statesmen.  He came to a conclusion 
that rule by the written laws was the second-best form of government, though it was still far 
inferior to the rule of true knowledge as humankind were from God.79  The transformation of 
his view on the written laws is seen most clearly in his Statesman.80  
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 Lane (1998: 151, 154 and 160-1) disagrees that the discussion of the written laws in Plt. 297 ff referred to 
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Rowe (2001: 70) that ‘It has long bothered me that Plato should have spent so much space and energy—in the 
long section immediately preceding 300a…—in attacking current methods of legislation as absurd, and as likely 
to produce nothing but absurdities, only then to turn round and say “Well, at least the established laws are based 
on experience, and on the basis of advice and persuasion; so they are acceptable/ tolerable—better them, in any 
case, than allowing individuals a free hand.’  See also Annas 1995: xix; Lane 1998: 156; Gill 1995: 293.   
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1. Criticism of written laws 
At first, Plato, judging from his intellectualist view, considered that the written laws could not 
provide perfect instruction because their rigidity inevitably disregarded human diversity and 
mutability.  He said: 
Legislation can never issue perfect instructions which precisely encompass 
everyone’s best interests and guarantee fair play for everyone at once.  
People and situations differ, and human affairs are characterized by an almost 
permanent state of instability.  It is therefore impossible to devise, for any 
given situation, a simple rule which will apply to everyone for ever.81 
Even worse is that writing, instead of educating people, in fact increased their ignorance and 
arrogance by misleading them to take the written words for true knowledge.  The former, 
Plato believed, were nothing more than ‘dream images’ of the latter.82  He condemned the 
inventor of writing, saying that  
It will introduce forgetfulness into the soul of those who learnt it: they will not 
practice using their memory because they will put their trust in writing, which is 
external and depends on signs that belong to others, instead of trying to 
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271b. 
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remember from the inside, completely on their own.  You have not discovered 
a potion for remembering, but for reminding; you provide your students with 
the appearance of wisdom, not with its reality.  Your invention will enable them 
to hear many things without being properly taught, and they will imagine that 
they have come to know much while for the most part they know nothing.  And 
they will be difficult to get along with, since they will merely appear to be wise 
instead of really being so.83 
2. Reconsideration of written laws 
This criticism of the written laws is largely based on Plato’s intellectualism.  According to this 
view, the main problems of the written laws lie in their ignorance of the true condition of 
human diversity, their incompetence in representing Plato’s ideal of true knowledge, and their 
prejudicial effects on the education of true knowledge.  However, this intellectualist view that 
takes the written laws as an educational tool is not without its own problems.  The idea of true 
knowledge on which Plato based his criticism of the written laws is an elusive concept that 
could not be recognized by the majority in the real world.  As Plato himself put it: ‘as long as 
we fail to understand what this knowledge [i.e. political expertise] is, we’ll never be able to 
distinguish a king with his wisdom from those who merely pretend to be statesmen.’84  In fact, 
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even if someone could ever find such knowledge, another problem is that, according to Plato’s 
elitist view, the majority were still too ignorant to appreciate its importance.  As Plato stated 
unambiguously: 
That it’s quite out of the question for a large number of people—never mind 
who they are—to acquire this knowledge and so govern a state with 
intelligence.  No, if we’re to discover the one and only perfect political system 
we’ve been talking about, we have to think in terms of scarceness, rarity—
uniqueness, even.85 
Such considerations refer sinisterly to a justified use of deception or even violence, as Plato 
actually did with the metaphors of medicine and captainship.  He wrote:  
What about when people have been forced to go against their written code 
and their traditions, then, and to follow a course of action which is more just, 
moral and honourable than what they were doing before?  How is one to react 
when these people express dissatisfaction with the constraint they’ve been 
subjected to?  Wouldn’t it be the height of absurdity to say that those who 
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applied the pressure treated those who were at the receiving end of it wrongly, 
unjustly and badly?  Wouldn’t that be the last thing one should say?86 
However, at this point came a radical switch of perspectives.  Instead of condemning the 
practice of written laws from his theory of knowledge, Plato turned to re-examine the cause of 
its emergence from a perspective that was less intellectualist and more sympathetic to the 
demos’ concerns.87  He took more seriously the demos’ suspicion of politicians and the 
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 There is a debate in what sense Plato recommended rule by the written laws.  There are three plausible reasons 
that it was at least not as bad as lawless regimes (e.g. 300b), that the written laws were sanctioned with 
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from Plato’s handling of the issue that laws and customs established by trial and error, deliberation and popular 
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people’s effort to curb the abuse of political power with the written laws.  We find that his 
elitist intellectualist metaphor of medicine and pilotage in fact was not so convincing to the 
suspicious Athenians,88 as he wrote: 
People doubt that any one could ever live up to this ideal rulership; they doubt 
the possibility of a moral and knowledgeable ruler who would dispense justice 
and deal fairly with everyone in the matter of their rights; and if such a ruler 
were possible, they doubt that he would be prepared to rule in that way, rather 
than injuring and killing and harming any of us whenever he felt like it.89  
A logical conclusion following this suspicion of politicians is what the Athenian demos 
actually did: to prevent the government from falling into private hands with the various 
                                                                                                                                                         
consent are not what he would regard as knowledge.  At the same time he appears to concede that in a 
democracy or oligarchy they might be regarded as constituting a body of wisdom and expertise.’ 
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 Plt. 301c-d.  This consideration is confirmed by Plato’ mouthpiece in Leg. 875a-d. 
 233 
arrangements of direct democracy such as the assembly, sortition of governing positions, 
preview and review of magistrates’ performance, and of course the written laws. 
Since this is our impression of them [the apparent experts], that we were to 
make it a matter of policy that members of these professions are no longer to 
be allowed unchecked authority over anyone, not even a slave, let alone a free 
man.  We decided to convene ourselves into an assembly which might either 
be open to the whole citizen body or be restricted to the wealthier 
citizens…Once the assembly has heard all this advice, whether it has come 
from doctors and captains or else from laymen, the majority decision about 
these matters is written up on the official notice-boards and inscribed on stelae 
(and also included within the unwritten code consisting of our time-honoured 
traditions), and from then on it dictates the ways in which sailing and the 
treatment of the sick are practised.90 
Even more, the actual existence of the written laws provided another reason for Plato’s 
revaluation.  In any case, the principle of ruling by the written laws was firmly established in 
fourth-century Athens by the democracy.  For all his criticism of the written laws, Plato 
recognized a much graver danger in governing officials’ abuse of the laws once the authority 
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of law had been established.  He warned that the state, if not falling into chaos altogether, 
would suffer the tyranny of magistrates who pursued egoistic interests in the name of the 
laws.91  He then came to the conclusion that the strict rule by the written laws was the best 
way of government available in the real world. 
States which are governed by these bodies of people [democracies and 
oligarchies] apparently have no choice, then; their only chance of being true 
reflections of the authentic political system we’ve been talking about, which is 
government by a single person with expertise, lies in their never allowing the 
slightest infringement of their written laws and their time-honoured traditions, 
once these have been established.92 
3. The status of democratic rule with written laws 
After his justification of the written laws Plato proceeded to provide a classification of 
regimes in terms of the obedience to the laws and the number of rulers.  There were three law-
abiding regimes: kingship, aristocracy and democracy which were respectively ruled by one, a 
limited number or a large group of people.  There were also three law-breaking regimes: 
tyranny, oligarchy and democracy that were again respectively ruled by one, a limited number 
and a large group of people.  Democracy, when following the laws, was the least desirable of 
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the law-abiding regimes, but was the most acceptable of the law-breaking regimes.  The 
reason for democratic regimes’ mid-position in the classification, Plato said, is their 
fragmentation of power among large numbers of the people that made the governments least 
competent in either enforcing or abusing the laws.93  Here, the status of democracy was 
considerably upgraded compared with that in the Republic and the Laws where democracy or 
the Athenian democracy was characterised by the tendency of lawlessness with chaos looming 
ahead.  Here, democratic regimes, including the Athenian one, were not denied the possibility 
of being a law-abiding government.  Even when they were breaking the laws, the damage they 
incurred was not as harmful as the other two forms of bad regimes. 
Nevertheless, this discussion of regime classification appears somehow awkward in this 
context.  It is followed by a reconsideration of the written laws in the Athenians democracy in 
which Plato described the idea and practices of the written laws that happened in no other 
regimes but in the democracy.94  Then, suddenly he told us that there were another two forms 
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of law-abiding government, kingship and aristocracy which he had not mentioned before.  The 
readers may get confused in which ways the written laws emerged and operated in non-
democratic governments, especially when considering that the main reason for people’s 
preference for the written laws, according to Plato’s earlier account, is their envious suspicion 
of the rulers.  How were such people ever persuaded to trust a few politicians with their 
government?  Besides, a main problem of the Athenian democracy in Plato’s description here 
was its obsession with the authority of the laws: no one was allowed to challenge the laws for 
whatever reasons.  Therefore, when Plato told us that there were two kinds of democracy: the 
law-abiding and the law-breaking ones, the readers may be confused again in what conditions 
the law-breaking democracies came to be, giving up the written laws that were supposed to 
protect their interests and rights against vicious politicians. 
Another issue of interpretation regarding this part of the discussion in the Statesman is its 
ironical tone.  Plato made the democracy a ludicrous scene in which a group of uneducated 
bumptious people, playing professionals, put their oars into the most complicated and 
important business of the state.  Moreover, the people, having become complacent with the 
misconception that they were already knowledgeable, would not tolerate criticism of the 
written laws.  The chance of the people and their written laws being examined and improved 
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was therefore diminished.95  Plato described a scenario of intolerance that reminded us of the 
Athenians’ trial of Socrates. 
whoever develops theories about these matters which go beyond what has 
been written down in the legal code—is, first, not to be called an expert in 
medical or naval matters, but a sophist, talking hot air and drivel…and if it is 
decided that he does influence people of any age to behave illegally and in 
contravention of the written code, then we shall impose the maximum penalty 
on him.96 
The young Socrates, a minor interlocutor in the dialogue, after hearing all the mockery of the 
democracy, made the following comment:  
Obviously it [the democracy] would completely obliterate expertise in all its 
forms, and the ban on research means that there’d be no chance of it ever 
recurring again either.  Life is hard enough as it is, but the effect of all this 
would be to make life absolutely unbearable in the future.97    
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However, I believe, what Plato did here is more than providing another intellectualist mockery 
of the democracy.98  He was actually starting to see democratic politics from a different 
perspective that was more practical and sympathetic to the demos.  It has been emphasised 
several times in this part of the dialogue that, with no truly trustworthy statesmen in sight, the 
best way available to the people is to make out their laws together, write down the laws, and 
stick to them, as the Athenian democracy had actually done.99  The sarcastic observation, then, 
should be taken as a reminder of the immeasurable distance between the written laws and true 
knowledge, rather than outright denial of the democracy.100 
4. The wonder of democratic order  
The reply of the young Socrates, on the other hand, reminds us of the cynical young Pericles 
in Xenophon’s Memorabilia 3.5.101   As Xenophon’s Socrates influenced the younger Pericles, 
similarly Plato or his mouthpiece the Elean stranger led the young Socrates to see the 
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democracy from a more positive perspective.  When hearing the young Socrates’ pessimistic 
view on the democratic rule by the written laws, the Elean reminded him that the rule by the 
written laws was actually the best way available in a world where no ideal ruler existed.  He 
pointed out the disastrous consequences of breaking the laws once their authority had been 
established.  Finally, he comes to the showdown of their discussion on the written laws.  The 
Elean stranger pointed out the long-term stability of some regimes that could not be explained 
from intellectualist perspectives.  These regimes, like the Athenian democracy, were regulated 
by their written laws and traditions that were considered completely ridiculous and corrupt 
according to Plato’s intellectual elitism.  Plato, we may say, appeared to admit here that the 
stability of the democracy and other regimes is a wonder beyond the understanding of his 
intellectualism, as revealed in the following sentence.  
Do we wonder, then, Socrates, at all the evils that turn out to occur in such 
constitutions, and all those that will turn out for them, when a foundation of this 
sort underlies them, one of carrying out their functions according to written 
rules and customs without knowledge—which if used by another expertise 
would manifestly destroy everything that comes about through it?  Or should 
we rather wonder at something else, namely at how strong a thing a city is by 
its nature?  For in fact cities have suffered such things now from time without 
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limit, but nevertheless some particular ones among them are enduring and are 
not overturned.102 
The overall interpretation above of the Statesman 297d-303b is largely with the traditional 
reading that there emerged a certain form of written constitutionalism that was independent of, 
or even contradictory to, his intellectual elitism.103  Accordingly, Plato, willingly or not, came 
to recognize the government of the Athenian democracy whose practices of law were 
mentioned in this passage as typical of a law-abiding regime, in contrast to his criticism of the 
democracy in the Republic Book 8.  However, Christopher Rowe disagrees with this 
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interpretation, arguing that Plato’s position of intellectual elitism and his strict criticism of the 
democracy remained unchanged in 297d-303b.104  A brief examination of Rowe’s view, 
therefore, will be provided as the conclusion of this section. 
Rowe’s central concern seems to be the coherence of Plato’s political philosophy.  He worries 
that Plato’s substantial concession to the legal practice of the Athenian democracy would 
amount to a betrayal of his mentor, Socrates, who had been condemned by the democracy, 
and consequent subversion of Socratic/ Platonic philosophy.  Rowe says:  
If Plato really is willing even to contemplate the idea that the democracy was 
justified in killing Socrates, he will surely have abandoned everything he ever 
seemed to stand for—not only the idea of free inquiry, but the main thing that 
that inquiry always seemed to be for, namely the goal of a better and more 
virtuous life…This must be so, because on any account the laws to which strict 
adherence would be required would be imperfect, and would be framed with 
ends that are not only different from those of the virtuous city, but actually 
inconsistent with them (because they would be framed by people without 
expert knowledge).  In short, if we are being asked to settle for absolute 
adherence to law, under the terms given, we are also being asked to approve 
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of the killing of Socrates.  So my question is: can we really suppose Plato to 
have been quite so prodigal with his principles (and if so, what would the 
consequences be for our assessment of him?)105     
Therefore, in his interpretation, Plato was remarkably consistent throughout his work in his 
intellectual criticism of the democracy.   The Statesman, instead of offering any justification 
for the democratic rule by the written laws, ‘is arguing against the [popular] view that sticking 
to the established laws is the first and best option for city-states.’106  Though the rule by the 
written laws was undeniably called the second-best form of regime, Rowe dismisses it as ‘a 
pretty poor second’.107 
Rowe’s perspective, of course, is fully justifiable, and his research is to a very high level of 
scholarship.  Plato’s criticism of the democracy was indeed a dominant theme throughout his 
works, and Rowe’s warning of the effect that the tendency to make Plato a democrat might 
produce in misleading our understanding of Plato should be kept in mind by all scholars of 
ancient political philosophy.108  However, some interpretive problems of the text also arise 
from his attempt to observe the Platonic intellectual criticism of the democracy at every step 
of his interpretation of the Statesman 297-302.  Firstly, he seems not to pay enough attention 
                                                 
105
 Rowe 2001: 67. 
106
 Rowe 2001: 73-4.  See also Rowe 2000: 244. 
107
 Rowe 2001: 74. 
108
 Rowe 2001: 74. 
 243 
to the democratic implication of Plato’s distinction between law-abiding and lawless regimes.  
As Rowe himself has agreed in the previous discussion, the laws must be enacted through 
democratic procedure, and therefore Plato’s recognition of the law-abiding cities implied his 
recognition of the democratic practice of law, to some extent at least.  Though the immensity 
of the gap between the ideal city ruled by experts and the law-abiding city was emphasised 
over and over again in the Statesman, it is still worth asking in what sense Plato might think 
that the democratic procedure of popular consultation could make a difference to the quality 
of the laws.  If Plato still refused to consider the possibility that the majority could be 
equipped with some limited capability to partake in philosophical knowledge, could he be 
suggesting some sort of popular and practical wisdom that was essentially different from 
philosophical knowledge?  Or, Plato’s consideration here might have nothing to do with the 
people’s intellectual capability, but something based on his appreciation of the institutional 
arrangement of the democracy, as suggested in his observation of the positive outcome of the 
fragmentation of political power in a democracy.   
Secondly, Rowe appears to play down Plato’s more realistic observation as suggested in the 
concluding passage of the Statesman 301e6-302b3.  His reading of the passage as an 
expression of Plato’s ‘chilling’ and pessimistic view about the prospect of all actual political 
regimes does not have sufficient support from the text itself.109  This passage is in fact one of 
                                                 
109
 Rowe 2000: 250.  See the previous footnote 90. 
 244 
the rare occasions, and probably the clearest one, that Plato came to recognize an important 
development of the actual world that he confessed constituted a difficulty to his intellectualist 
understanding. 
On the other hand, it might be worth pointing out Plato’s recognition of the destructive side-
effects of Socrates’ philosophic activity.  As discussed later in this chapter, Plato did make 
some changes to the Socratic way of life.  It was no longer an open exercise free to every one 
as described in the Apology, but an exclusive training offered only to a small group of the elite 
based on their talent, education and age in the Republic and Laws. 
Does any of Plato’s substantial recognition of the democratic practice of law, as Rowe argues, 
constitute his betrayal of the ideal of Socratic/ Platonic philosophical life?  Probably, but there 
is no need of exaggeration on this issue.  Plato did not offer us a clear-cut solution to the 
conflict between the Socratic way of life and the democracy.  What we have found in the 
Statesman 297-302 is his hesitation and reconsideration of the value of democratic politics, or, 
to borrow Ruby Blondell’s word, he might just entertain the idea of putting the claim of the 
democracy before that of philosophy for once.  This kind of mental exercise is not necessarily 
a betrayal of Socrates; on the contrary, it could be seen as a perfect exercise of his mentor’s 
philosophical practice, that is, critical examination of all established opinions, including his 
own prejudices. 
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IV. The Reconciliation 
Though the maintenance of political harmony against the danger of civil strife is one of the 
main concerns in Plato’s political thinking, the Athenian reconciliation after the brutal civil 
war in 403 largely seemed to escape his notice.  While Xenophon provided a historical 
account that became one of our major sources of this important event, Plato mentioned it only 
briefly in his mockery of the practice of funeral speech in the Menexenus.  While Xenophon 
praised the piety, generosity and other virtues the democrats had shown in their reconciliation 
with the oligarchs, we can hardly see any difference these exceptional efforts made on Plato’s 
general critical view of the democracy.  Plato’s solution of civil strife, generally speaking, is 
idealistic.  As shown in both his Republic and his Laws, his main interest, rather than 
analysing and improving the performance of actual regimes in dealing with the problem of 
political conflicts, was to prevent the causes of civil strife and other sorts of conflicts at source 
with the radical arrangements regarding nurture, education and other institutions that 
constituted his ideal cities.110 
i. The seriousness of Platonic funeral speech 
The only occasion we find that Plato explicitly mentioned the success of the reconciliation is 
in his Menexenus where he presented a mock public funeral speech.111  Within a brief passage 
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in the speech the Athenians were praised for setting up a laudable model of reconciliation that 
was definitely to be followed by all other Greek cities in their own crises of civil strife.112  
The reconciliation was such an exceptional achievement that it defied all expectations of other 
cities, yet the Athenians were said to do it simply as a matter of course.  The very fundamental 
reason for the miracle of the reconciliation, according to the speech, was the ties of blood 
shared by all the Athenians.   
Plato’s observation and explanation of the reconciliation in the Menexenus should be cited in 
full before further discussion. 
There was civil war among us, fought in such a way that, if people had to 
engage in internal strife, no one would pray for his city to be stricken in any 
other.  So readily and naturally—so much contrary to the expectations of the 
other Greeks—did the citizens from the Piraeus and those from the city deal 
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with each other!  So moderately did they bring the war against the men at 
Eleusis to a conclusion. 
And the sole cause for all that was their genuine kinship, which provided them, 
not in word but in fact, with a firm friendship based on ties of blood.  We must 
also remember those who died at each other’s hands in that war and try to 
reconcile them in ceremonies such as today’s by what means we have—
prayers and sacrifices—praying to the gods below who have power over them, 
since we ourselves are reconciled as well.  For they did not lay hands on each 
other through wickedness or enmity, but through misfortune.  And we, the 
living, are witnesses of this ourselves, since we, who are of the same stock, 
have forgiven each other for what we did and for what we suffered.113 
What Plato truly meant here is far from clear.  The Menexenus is particularly notorious even 
among his works for its unusual density of playfulness.114  At the beginning of the Menexenus 
Socrates already made fun of the Athenian practice of public speech, saying that the speeches 
constantly made him feel ‘taller and nobler and better looking all of a sudden.’115  Besides, in 
addition to the typical ironical tone in his conversation with the young Menexenus, Plato’s 
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Socrates also cast doubt on the authorship of the funeral speech that he reported in the 
dialogues.  He denied that he was the author of the speech; on the contrary, he claimed to have 
learned it from Pericles’ non-Athenian lover Aspasia who made up the speech in one go by 
combining what came to her mind and some of the surplus material from her composition of 
Pericles’ famous funeral speech.  The speech reported in the Menexenus, then, appeared to be 
a playful practice to seduce the young Menexenus who was enthusiastic about rhetoric, rather 
than an expression of serious reflection on the history of Athenian democracy.  Furthermore, 
as many scholars have pointed out, the historical narrative in the funeral speech is full of 
distortion and deception that raised the Athenians to an unlikely point of perfection.  Plato’s 
portrayal of the Athenians here could hardly fit into his political criticism in his other writings.  
Finally, some events mentioned by Socrates are obviously an anachronism, for they happened 
only after his death in 399.  By such means, Plato indicated his playfulness to readers of the 
dialogue. 
How then should we interpret Plato’s account of the reconciliation in the Menexenus?  Given 
the irony in the dialogue, there is a strong tendency to dismiss his account as a mockery of 
this important event.116  Following this view, what Plato suggested might be as follows: the 
democracy did not truly honour the terms of reconciliation; persecution and collective 
conflicts among citizens continued after the civil war, and the demos showed nothing 
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praiseworthy in its decision to reconcile with the oligarchic citizens, for it was not their self-
control, generosity or sense of community, but their egoistic calculation that forced them to 
choose reconciliation instead of revenge.  After all, this image of the demos is more consistent 
with his general criticism of the democracy.   
Nevertheless, there could be another interpretation.  First of all, it has demonstrated in a 
previous chapter that the democracy was credited with the success of the reconciliation; even 
Plato could not dispute the consequent peace that had been achieved in this exceptional 
project.  Besides, there is a tradition of considering the Platonic funeral speech a serious work 
since ancient times,117 and many of today’s scholars still believe that Plato gave serious 
suggestions to the public in the speech.118 Furthermore, there is no reason to presume that all 
of Plato’s ironical expressions are the opposite of what he thought to be true.119  In respect of 
the effects that the author tried to achieve, the speech could also be a partial distortion or 
exaggeration of facts rather than complete untruth.  Finally, it should be noted that Plato 
himself considered the Athenian practice of funeral speeches, not complete fiction but rather a 
mixture of true and untrue statements.  This comment of his should carry substantial weight in 
our interpretation of his funeral speech.  Plato wrote:  
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[The orators] do their praising so splendidly that they cast a spell over our 
souls, attributing to each individual man, with the most varied and beautiful 
verbal embellishment, both praise he merits and praise he does not.120   
What then was the function of the ironical element in his account of the reconciliation?121  
There are several plausible explanations.  Firstly, Plato might have meant to make fun of the 
Athenians’ excessive complacency over the achievement of the reconciliation, which, though 
exceptional, was not immaculate.  For example, the encounters between the democrats from 
Piraeus and the oligarchs from the city were not the happy ending of reunification as Plato 
reported.  There were bloody battles before the initiative to reconcile.  It is uncertain whether 
the Athenian audience would be willingly deceived by Plato’s rosy version of the past, or 
whether the memory of fierce fights and heavy casualty at that time would come to their 
minds again. Secondly, Plato might have suggested that the motives behind the reconciliation 
were not simple and selfless as the democracy had claimed.  It sounds simplistic, if not naïve, 
to claim, as Plato was playfully doing here, that the civil war was caused by nothing but 
misfortune and ended solely because of the citizens’ belief in their common ancestry.  Thus, 
Pownall comments that ‘the Speaker [of the Platonic funeral speech] takes a point of which 
the Athenian democracy could legitimately be proud and exaggerates it to the point of self-
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parody, in mockery of the tendency of the Athenian orators to tailor historical facts to flatter 
the masses.’122 
However, even these two explanations are not without problems.  Firstly, while some scholars 
says that Plato was making mockery of the democracy by exaggerating its motive and the 
achievement of the reconciliation, Plato’s account was actually not as flattering as other 
contemporary versions of the reconciliation; on the contrary, he seemed to be more keen on 
glossing over the oligarchic citizens’ responsibility for the civil war by playing down the 
democrats’ contribution to the reconciliation.  Secondly, Plato’s version of ‘genuine kinship’ 
or the myth of autochthony with which he credited the success of the reconciliation might not 
have been particularly to the democrats’ liking, either.  As also shown in the discussion below, 
there are serious messages in this story despite its incredibility; what Plato did with the myth 
of autochthony in the Menexenus as well as in the Republic was to promote his elitist values 
by appropriating traditional superstition.  
Therefore, it is likely that one of Plato’s purposes in his account of the reconciliation in the 
Menexenus is to exhort the Athenians demos to go a step further along the reconciliatory 
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principle of not remembering the past wrongs.123  He seemed to say that, to truly reconcile the 
Athenians, the democracy should have done more than granting a legal amnesty to the 
oligarchs; it should also have given strictly equal recognition of the oligarchic cause in the 
civil war as it did to the democratic party in all its public ceremonies and institutions of social 
welfare.  Only then should the bitterness in the Athenian collective memory of the past be 
replaced with true peace and harmony.       
ii. The Myth of Autochthony 
What was Plato’s attitude towards the established myth of autochthony, according to which all 
Athenians were the offspring of Attica the Motherland,124 when he claimed that the genuine 
kinship based on the myth was the one and only reason for the reconciliation? 
The story that people were born from the earth might sound unbelievable to our modern ears.  
Besides, Plato was apparently not a believer in the myth, but he recognized its usefulness in 
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politics.  In the Phaedrus when Socrates was asked if he believed in a mythic story of an 
Athenian princess abducted by the god of the north wind, he appeared to be indifferent, saying 
his priority was to examine himself rather than to assess the truth of popular stories.125  In the 
Republic, Socrates told us explicitly that the story of autochthony in his ideal city was a lie, 
though a noble one.126  Therefore, there are reasons to suspect that what Plato was doing here 
is nothing else but making mockery of popular superstition or self-deception.    
However, there are also some serious messages behind Plato’s ironic tone.  First, Plato’s 
doubt about the truthfulness of the myth of autochthony does not necessarily contradict the 
people’s belief in the myth and the role it played in the reconciliation, though it was unlikely 
to be as decisive as he claimed in the Menexenus.  People often sincerely devote themselves to 
some religious ideas that seem groundless or even laughable in philosophers’ sceptical eyes, 
as proved many times in the human history of religion.  This basic fact of human society did 
not escape Plato’s notice.  The myth of autochthony, instead of being discarded as sheer 
superstition, constituted an important foundation of Plato’s ideal city in the Republic.127 
                                                 
125
 Phdr. 229b-230a. 
126
 Resp. 414b-e.  The passage, however, does not necessarily prove Plato’s disbelief.  Many of the Athenians 
took it for granted that their indigenous status was unique among the Greeks; all other cities’ myths of 
autochthony, including the one of the ideal city in the Resp., were then considered fake.     
127
 Resp. 414b-e. 
 254 
Besides, Plato’s version of autochthony is not an ironic flattery that discredits itself with many 
excessive eulogies of the Athenian democracy, as many scholars might have thought.  On the 
contrary, Plato’s story does not put as much weight on democratic values as the reports of 
Xenophon and other orators normally did.  Lysias claimed that freedom was one of the core 
values in the reconciliation,128 while Isocrates emphasised the value of political equality.129  
Even Xenophon highlighted the culture of civic participation that built up strong bonds of 
comradeship among the Athenians.  Plato’s account, by contrast, switched the focus from the 
civic relationship to those between Attica the Motherland and her offspring or between the 
city and her members, associations that were modelled on ideal families of caring parents and 
filial children.130  The Motherland and the city gave birth to the citizens, nourished and 
educated them, while the citizens responded with affection and obedience as their offspring.  
The values of equality, freedom and participation that constituted the civic life of the Athenian 
democracy were then pushed out of the spotlight in Plato’s account. 
To be fair, Plato mentioned that political equality and freedom were implied in the myth of 
autochthony or common ancestry.  His funeral speech claimed that the Athenians who were 
‘all brothers sprung from one mother, do not think it right to be each other’s slaves or masters.  
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Equality of birth in the natural order makes us seek equality of rights in the legal and defer to 
each other only in the name of reputation for goodness and wisdom.’131  Yet, Plato’s account 
of equality and freedom here, with his emphasis on election of political leaders rather than 
rotation of magistrates by lot, made the Athenian regime more like a modern representative 
government or even a Greek oligarchy rather than a direct democracy.  He wrote: the 
Athenian government ‘was the same then and now, an aristocracy; we are now governed by 
the best men and, in the main, always have been since that remote age.  One man calls our 
polity democracy, another some other name that pleases him; in reality, it is government by 
the best men along with popular consent…There is, rather, one standard: he who is thought 
wise or good exercises power and holds office.’132   
While the equalitarian implication of the myth of autochthony was compromised in the 
Menexenus, it was further subverted and replaced with the rule of hierarchy in the Republic, 
where Plato attached to the original myth another tale that divided the fellow citizens of the 
same ancestry into classes of different ‘metals’.  The power of religious beliefs that used to 
support democratic values was then converted by Plato into justification for the rule of his 
authoritarian guardians.133  Plato’s Socrates told the citizens of his ideal city that ‘all of you in 
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the city are certainly brothers’ born of the same mother, ‘but the god, in fashioning those of 
you who are competent to rule, mixed gold in at their birth; this is why they are most 
honoured; in auxiliaries, silver; and iron and bronze in the farmers and the other craftsmen.’134 
iii. Responsibilities for the Civil War and the Reconciliation 
Though the Platonic funeral speech in the Menexenus praised the reconciliation as the perfect 
happy ending of the Athenian civil strife at the end of the fourth century B.C., its account of 
the civil war and the reconciliation was in effect far less pleasing to the democrats’ ears than 
were the versions of Xenophon and most orators.   In their accounts, the civil war was the 
conflict between the good democrats and the evil oligarchs.  The former were virtuous and 
victorious, while the latter wicked and defeated.  The responsibility for the civil war was put 
squarely on the oligarchic leaders without a shadow of doubt, if not on all of their supporters 
as well, whereas the democrats were largely credited with the achievement of the 
reconciliation.135 Though the prosecution of the oligarchic supporters was prohibited by the 
amnesty, the civil war was still remembered as the glorious victory of virtuous democracy 
over evil oligarchy in terms of intelligence, morality, military strength and divine favour.   
Plato’s account, by contrast, put the roles of the democrats and oligarchs in the civil war on 
exactly the same terms.  Both the parties were equally innocent of the atrocity of the civil war, 
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which was said to be caused not by any citizen’s wickedness or enmity among them, but 
through misfortune alone.  If there should be some people responsible for the civil war, it was 
every citizen’s responsibility, not just the oligarchs’.  Besides, the oligarchic citizens suffered 
as much as the democrats did, and deserved the same amount of sympathy as granted to the 
democrats.  Likewise, the civil war was ended not as a victory to the democrats, but through 
equal affection and coordination between the two parties.  The reconciliation, rather than the 
democrats’ mercy on the oligarchs, was therefore mutual forgiveness between the citizens for 
what they had equally done and equally suffered at each others’ hands. 
Following his account of the civil war and the reconciliation, Plato concluded his account 
with the exhortation that the Athenians should remember not just the killed democrats, but all 
the citizens, democratic and oligarchic, who had been killed fighting each other in the civil 
war, and soothe their hatred against each other in Hades.  This is odd, to say the least, for a 
funeral speech was supposed to favour the dead buried on the spot, not their enemies and 
murderers.  Nevertheless, there are reasons for Plato’s exhortation.  Presumably, the oligarchs 
killed in the civil war were neither buried in the same public cemetery,136 which was ‘in the 
most beautiful quarter outside the city wall’,137 nor honoured regularly as the dead democrats 
were in public funeral speeches and many other state ceremonies such as this one of funeral 
                                                 
136
 This is inferred from Plato’s claim that the dead democrats and oligarchs must be reconciled at other 
occasions. 
137
 Thuc. 2.34. 
 258 
speeches and many others,138 for the oligarchs were killed as enemies of Athens or the 
democracy.  Besides, life in Athens for these oligarchs’ families would not be easy.  Their 
parents and children, instead of receiving support and protection from the state as the family 
of Athenian citizens killed in wars normally did, might from time to time in their daily life 
encounter suspicion and discrimination for their oligarchic background.  Finally, the public 
memorial and regular commemoration of the victory of the democracy in the civil war did the 
opposite of soothing the emotions of these oligarchic families.  In summary, despite the 
success of the reconciliation and the amnesty, many oligarchic supporters and their families 
never felt themselves fully reintegrated into the democratic community, because the civil war 
was remembered as the struggle between the good democrats and evil oligarchs, and the 
reconciliation as the victors’ mercy on the defeated. 
After giving a lavish list of support, protection and honours that Athens provided for the war 
dead and their families, the funeral speech concluded that: ‘Quite simply, for the dead she [the 
city] stands as son and heir, for their sons as a father, for their parents as a guardian; she takes 
complete and perpetual responsibility for all of them.’139  When reading this, we cannot help 
but wonder: what about the dead oligarchs and their families? 
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Plato therefore seemed to suggest here that for the reconciliation to be completed the amnesty 
or legal prohibition on prosecuting for the past crimes was never enough.  The oligarchs were 
still remembered as enemies rather than fellow citizens.  To bring true peace to the memory of 
the past and genuine harmony to the community, Plato argued, the oligarchic dead must be 
remembered and honoured in the same ways as were the dead democrats.  That is to say, the 
collective memory of the civil war and the reconciliation, not to be suppressed into oblivion, 
should be reinvented as Plato exemplified in his funeral speech: the war should be 
remembered as a hideous manipulation of supernatural forces for which no citizen should be 
held responsible, and the reconciliation, rather than condescension of some part of the 
citizenry to the other, must be a joint enterprise of the same-blooded citizens, democratic or 
oligarchic, working in unison.   
V. The Trial of Socrates 
The trial of Socrates was arguably the most influential factor in the formation of Plato’s 
attitude toward the democracy.  After his execution, Socrates was reborn as the hero in most 
of Plato’s works, and the conflict between Socrates and the democracy, or the relationship 
between philosophy and politics, became a central theme of his political philosophy.  For a 
person whose political view was mainly based on the democracy’s execution of his beloved 
mentor, it is understandable why it was so difficult for Plato to reconcile himself with the 
democracy.   
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Plato’s account of the trial is even more uncompromising than Xenophon’s in a sense.  
Though there are many similarities between the two pupils’ defences of Socrates, Xenophon 
at least made an effort to represent the defendant in line with the traditional norms, while 
Plato made his mentor a stubborn character to the utmost degree who put his own divine or 
philosophical mission before all social expectations.  Besides, there is no theory of voluntary 
death in Plato’s account to excuse the democracy’s execution of Socrates; instead, a myth of 
an afterworld was added to create a divine substitute for the secular authority of the Athenian 
court. 
Nevertheless, we have also identified a number of Platonic passages that suggested a tendency 
of reconsideration and reconciliation with the democracy over its execution of Socrates.  As 
we have seen in his treatment of the law reform and the reconciliation, Plato was at times 
willing to express views that appeared to be more sympathetic to the democracy than was his 
intellectual elitism, even on issues such as the trial of Socrates.  To give a fuller account of 
Plato’s view on the trial of Socrates, we would not only discusses his defiant defence of 
Socrates against the charges by his accusers and his response to his mentor’s defeat in the 
Athenian law court in the Apology, but also draws attention to those passages that indicated a 
less obvious side of his view on this important issue. 
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i. The Defence of Socrates 
At the beginning, there should be a few words about the interpretive position regarding the 
Apology that separates my view from some main commentators.140  Firstly, as mentioned in 
the previous chapter on the trial of Socrates, I argue that the Apology is a sophisticated 
mixture of facts and fiction rather than a factual report of what the historical Socrates had said 
in the law court.  Secondly, it should be noted that the purpose of the Apology was not to 
serve as a law court defence in searching for the defendant’s personal acquittal in the court.  
There was no point for Plato to do this after the execution of Socrates.  Instead, his Apology 
should be considered as a post-trial justification for the posthumous reputation of Socrates and 
his philosophical way of life against the infamy caused by his defeat and condemnation in the 
law court.141  Thirdly, given its apologetic nature, we should be cautious about Socrates’ 
repetitive claim in the Apology that he was an artless speaker and would say nothing other 
than the truth.  His claim, rather than an honest announcement, was more likely a defensive 
response to the accusation of him being a cunning sophist, as Leo Strauss pointed out:  
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Socrates’ accusers had said that he is a clever speaker, and it was generally 
believed that he was a most artful speaker—that he could render the weaker 
speech the stronger (18b8-c1).  It was therefore imperative that he should 
state right at the beginning that he will not speak artfully…he can speak 
artfully.’142 
Lastly, there should be no presumption of Socrates’ innocence, justice or altruism.  The 
philosopher might as well have been a person of integrity to the highest level as Plato claimed 
in the Apology.  However, there is simply no sufficient evidence to prove that.  It is risky to 
base our interpretation of the Apology on such convictions as Brickhouse and Smith claim, 
that Socrates ‘must do everything within his power compatible with law and morality to make 
the truth known to the jurors about the real nature of the activities for which he has been 
brought before them.’143  On the contrary, we should be cautious of the danger indicated by 
another scholar that ‘motivated by our own pious feelings toward Socrates, we may distort 
Socrates’ philosophical activities by inadvertently smuggling non-eudaemonistic altruism and 
suspiciously Christian charity into his motives.’144 
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It might also help to remind the readers that the main purpose of this section is not to judge 
the justice of the trial of Socrates, but to evaluate the persuasiveness of Plato’s defence of 
Socrates in the Apology in light of the historical background that we have learnt in the 
previous chapters.  We start with the religious defence and then discuss the political ones. 
1. Religious defence 
The denial of the Athenian gods: Contrary to this accusation, Plato portrayed Socrates as a 
favourite of the gods who devoted himself to the service of them.  Socrates was said to start 
his critical examination of himself and others after the oracle of Apollo at Delphi announced 
that no one was wiser than he.145  His claim, though not well known to the public, was 
supported by a brother of his friend, Chaerephon, who was also a well-known democrat.  
Pondering over the implication of the oracle, Socrates came to the conclusion that the god was 
using him to teach people a moral lesson: human beings should not be complacent with their 
wisdom which was actually worthless compared to the gods’.  In Socrates’ view, the oracle 
seemed to say: ‘this man among you, mortals, is wisest who, like Socrates, understands that 
his wisdom is worthless.’146  Socrates, following his interpretation, occupied himself with the 
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mission that he thought was imposed on him by the god, to the extent of neglecting his own 
private business and traditional social and political obligations imposed on Athenian adult 
male citizens.  He said:  
So even now I continue this investigation as the god bade me—and I go 
around seeking out anyone, citizen or stranger, whom I think wise.  Then if I 
do not think he is, I come to the assistance of the god and show him that he is 
not wise.  Because of this occupation, I do not have the leisure to engage in 
public affairs to any extent, nor indeed to look after my own, but I live in great 
poverty because of my service to the god.147 
This oracle story was problematic as a defence against the charge of not recognizing the 
Athenian gods for the following reasons.  Firstly, the amount of evidence that Socrates had 
provided was barely sufficient for such an unusual story.  As Strauss pointed out, ‘the truth of 
the story is guaranteed, not by the god, not by the Pythia, nor even by Chairephon, who is no 
longer alive, but by Chairephon’s brother.  The story of the Delphic oracle is new to the 
audience.’148  Stokes even suggests that it was a convenient invention, saying that ‘the 
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function of the oracle appears to be the provision of a rhetorically plausible account of 
Socrates’ way of life without detailed and necessarily lengthy argument in its favour.’149 
Secondly, the story, even if true, did not actually answer the charge of not recognizing the 
Athenian gods, that is, defying the established religious practice and belief.  Instead, Socrates 
evaded the charge by changing the definition of piety from following the established religious 
practices to devoted pursuit of his personal divine mission.  While Xenophon mentioned at 
least Socrates’ regular offerings at the public altar, Plato’s Socrates unapologetically plagued 
the inhabitants of Athens with loaded questions that exposed their nothingness, claiming that 
his way of life was the most pious way of paying tribute to the gods.  It is even doubtful that 
he participated in the religious activities of the city on any regular basis, since he was so busy 
with his individual divine mission.150  While Socrates claimed that he and his eccentric way of 
life had a mandate from an established oracle, it is unclear how many Athenians believed in 
this extraordinary story and accepted his definition of piety, or it might be more likely that 
they considered it one of the barely disguised and most outrageous blasphemies they had ever 
heard.151 
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The last problem is the gap between the oracle story and Socrates’ mission of examining 
others.  Even if we accept the truthfulness of the oracle story and agree that Socrates’ elenchus 
could be a form of pious activity, the oracle itself still did not grant real support for Socrates’ 
interpretation.  As M. H. Hansen observed, the statement of the oracle that no one was wiser 
than Socrates does not necessarily mean, as Socrates claimed, that he was the wisest; it could 
also simply mean that Socrates was only as wise as other people.152  Besides, as many 
scholars pointed out, the oracle did not command Socrates to examine others or to expose 
their ignorance.153  As Mark McPherran puts it, ‘the report of the Oracle appears to be utterly 
nonprescriptive, and hence, no source of obligation at all’, and ‘it is understandable that some 
have found Socrates’ derivation of his alleged divine obligation as analogous to pulling a 
rabbit from a hat: a rabbit concealed within the hat by the magician himself.’154 
All these problems of the oracle story not only weaken Plato’s defence against the charge of 
not recognizing the gods, but also put all of his arguments in the Apology into serious doubt.  
As we are going to see in this section, the two pillars of the defence in the Apology for 
Socrates and his philosophical way of life were the Delphic oracle and the daimonion which 
was equally controversial.  Without the support of these divine authorities there seems no 
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compelling reason for the Athenians to tolerate or honour Socrates for his ‘service’ to the city.  
Though Plato did also mention some non-religious reasons, such as Socrates’ moralist 
motives, his insistence on justice and law, and the beneficial outcome of his elenchus, these 
arguments acted more like supplements to the religious justification.155 
The introduction of new divinities.  Plato’s Socrates did not deny his use of his personal 
daimonion; on the contrary, he showed if off in front of the jury.  He appreciated the 
daimonion’s warning for him to keep away from public affairs, having found that politics 
were too intolerant and dangerous for honest people like him.156  He even considered his 
irritating speech in the court and the consequent condemnation by the jury a good sign, since 
the daimonion had no objection about that, as he said: ‘it is impossible that my familiar sign 
did not oppose me if I was not about to do what was right.’157 
On the other hand, according to Plato’s account, Socrates’ daimonion could hardly be a threat 
to the community due to some of its curious characteristics.  The daimonion was said to issue 
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only prohibition rather than instruction.  Socrates claimed that it ‘is a voice, and whenever it 
speaks it turns me away from something I am about to do, but it never encourages me to do 
anything.’158  This claim has the advantage of evading responsibility for many daimonion-
related activities or plots of which Socrates might have been accused.  While in Xenophon’s 
version Socrates and his daimonion gave out instructions to other people and were therefore 
partially responsible for their behaviour,159 Plato’s Socrates removed such blame from himself 
and his divine sign. 
With such claims mentioned above Plato might have cleared some suspicions of Socrates’ 
secret cult, but the religious tension between the democracy and Socrates remained especially 
because of the latter’s tendency to put the order of his private daimonion before secular 
authorities.  For instance, Socrates referred to his daimonion as one of the reasons for his 
disengagement from the democratic politics and for his outspoken speeches in the law 
court.160  By these stories Socrates seemed to tell us two things: one is that the daimonion did 
not like the democracy, and the other is that he was ready to follow his daimonion rather than 
the democracy if the two disagreed. 
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Yet, the core of controversy about Socrates’ daimonion, as mentioned in the previous chapters, 
is its secret nature.  The great majority, or all the people except Socrates himself, had 
absolutely no access to the daimonion, since it appeared only to ‘few or none in the past’.161  
It is a reasonable doubt that the daimonion was Socrates’ invention to crown himself with 
some supernatural aura.  As Brickhouse and Smith put it, ‘even if his jurors accepted what 
Socrates says about his daimonion (which doubtless many would not have done), they might 
worry that Socrates has made a faulty induction.’162  Leo Strauss made the point more explicit 
by saying that Socrates ‘refers to a mysterious power to which everyone must bow and which 
cannot be asked questions; recourse to the daimonion is needed only for justifying refusals (to 
act).’163  
Atheism: Plato’s Socrates defended himself more straightforwardly regarding the charge of 
atheism.  Instead of using curious stories and complicated arguments, he simply denied this 
charge by calling for witnesses and by pointing out an obvious logical contradiction between 
the charges of introducing a new cult and of not believing in the existence of divinities.  He 
was confident that no one ever saw him in the practice of natural sciences as he was said to be 
in Aristophanes’ comedy.  He confidently asked the jury to testify to his claim: ‘all those of 
you who have heard me conversing, and many of you have, should tell each other if anyone of 
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you has ever heard me discussing such subjects [natural sciences] to any extent at all.’164  On 
the other hand, he appeared to ridicule successfully his accuser Meletus, saying that he was 
speaking ‘in riddle and in jest’ by accusing him of believing in divinities but not believing in 
their existence.165   
Both Plato and Xenophon put up a good defence against the charge of atheism.  However, it 
should be noted again that Socrates’ belief in his mysterious daimonion and other 
unconventional ideas, though logically incompatible with atheism, could sometimes give the 
impression of Socrates being an atheist in the eyes of the public.166 
2. Political defence 
Personal enmity against Socrates.  There were two kinds of personal bitterness: one was 
caused by Socrates himself, and the other indirectly by his companions.  Plato’s Socrates 
defended himself with different strategies in respect of the causes of personal enmity.167  In 
response to the first kind of enmity, he said that he had incurred immense hatred from many 
people because of the humiliation they had suffered under his critical examination.168  He 
                                                 
164
 Pl. Ap. 19c.  However, Socrates’ claim here is contrary to his statement in Phadeo 96a-c: ‘when I was a young 
man I was wonderfully keen on that wisdom which they call natural science, for I thought it splendid to know the 
causes of everything, why it comes to be, why it perishes and why it exists.’ 
165
 Pl. Ap. 27c-d. 
166
 See the previous chapter. 
167
 His strategies, as we will see below, were not only used against the charge of personal hatred but also against 
the other two political charges. 
168
 Pl. Ap. 22e-23a. 
 271 
argued that this kind of hatred was wholly unjustifiable, since his practice was a divine 
mission sanctioned by the Delphic oracle,169 not motivated by plots, material gains or other 
blameworthy considerations.  Besides, he claimed that his mission was to benefit the 
Athenians, not to hurt them.170  Finally, he suggested that those people deserved humiliation 
not by him but by their own arrogance and ignorance.  He never meant to flaunt his intelligent 
superiority at his interlocutors’ cost.  On the contrary, he claimed to search sincerely for 
someone who was wiser than he. 
As to the other kind of enmity caused by his followers, he seemed unable to deny the harm 
that his associates or followers had done to others and to the city.  However, he denounced 
any responsibility for their behaviour.  He admitted that some young fellows, having learnt his 
skill of questioning during their association with him, went on harassing people, enjoying 
seeing their victims irritated and humiliated.  Socrates confessed that there was indeed 
pleasure in this operation; yet, he immediately emphasised an essential difference between his 
practice and his associates’ imitation.  While there was an element of hubris in the others’ 
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behaviour, what he did was a deadly serious divine mission.  He alone had the mandate from 
the god.171  He said:  
As they listen they take pleasure in the examination of people who think they 
are wise, but are not.  It is, indeed, not unpleasant.  But I, as I say, have been 
ordered by the god to do this, both in oracles and in dreams and in every way 
in which any other divine dispensation has commanded a man to do anything 
at all.172 
However, those bully-boys indeed learned their elenctic skill from no one else but Socrates.  
Should he not be held partially responsible for their behaviour?  Socrates denied this, arguing 
that his examination of others was an individual pursuit of a divine mission, not a pedagogic 
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project.173  He was not a teacher and taught nothing, but people learned his interrogative skill 
by observing his interaction with others.  He never encouraged them; on the contrary, he 
claimed to help the city by constraining some of the young people from using his method on 
the public.174  He concluded that  
I have never come to an agreement with anyone to act unjustly, neither with 
anyone else nor with any one of those who they slanderously say are my 
pupils.  I have never been anyone’s teacher.  If anyone, young or old, desires 
to listen to me when I am talking and dealing with my own concerns, I have 
never begrudged this to anyone, but I do not converse when I receive a fee 
and not when I do not.  I am equally ready to question the rich and the poor if 
anyone is willing to answer my questions and listen to what I say.  And I 
cannot justly be held responsible for good or bad conduct of these people, as I 
never promised to teach them anything and have not done so.  If anyone says 
that he has learned anything from me, or that he heard anything privately that 
the others did not hear, be assured that he is not telling the truth.175   
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This explanation by Plato is similar to Xenophon’s in their claims of Socrates’ beneficial 
motivation and his rightful innocence of other people’s behaviour, though Plato’s account has 
a stronger religious flavour by connecting Socrates’ elenctic practice to the Delphic oracle. 
How persuasive was Socrates’ defence against this charge?  It seems not very successful.  As 
to his account of the enmity aroused by him personally, the main problem is that Socrates 
justified himself by claiming himself an agent of the Delphic god, a story that, as argued 
earlier in this section, was highly controversial, if not untrue. Therefore, Socrates’ repetitive 
mentioning of his divine mission, instead of making a compelling case, had a hollow ring.  
Even worse is that it produced a knock-on effect on the credibility of his other claims.  If the 
suspicious oracle story was Socrates’ chief justification, the reader has reasons to doubt the 
truth of his altruism and his service to the city.  At the end, the only plausible justification left 
seems to be the argument that those victims of Socrates’ elenchus deserved their share of 
public humiliation due to their own complacency, or simply because of their defeat by 
Socrates in the game of elenchus.    
As to the harm and enmity caused by his followers, Socrates denied any serious collaboration 
between him and his associates.  He was alone on his divine mission while other people came 
to him and left as they wished.  He also claimed that there was a critical difference between 
his elenchus and his followers’ imitation: his, again, a divine mission while others’ was 
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derision for the sake of pleasure.  This strategy of defence in fact caused more trouble than it 
solved.  At first, the evidence for Socrates’ close association with a particular group of people 
was too obvious to be denied, and their relationship, as we found in Plato’s and Xenophon’s 
works, went much deeper than the casual interaction between acquaintances.  The relationship 
between Socrates and the followers, as Socrates said, might not have been that of teachers and 
paying pupils; yet, that does not exclude the possibility that he exacted other forms of reward, 
such as loyalty and company, from his young and beautiful friends. 
Therefore, there was a need for Socrates to denounce his companions even further by saying 
that their behaviour was an abuse of his elenctic method in search of pleasure at other 
people’s expense.  ‘It is, indeed, not unpleasant.’ confessed Socrates.176  These words, in my 
opinion, turn out to be the most revealing sentence in the Apology and indicate the other side 
of Socrates’ divine mission.  Did Socrates ever enjoy his mission?  And if he did, was the 
enjoyment, instead of his suspicious divine mandate, the true reason for his relentless 
examination of others?  Though Socrates utterly denied that his behaviour was for the sake of 
pleasure, not a few commentators suspect that he did enjoy it.  For instance, de Strycker and 
Slings observed that Socrates’ distinction between his elenchus and others’ imitation is ‘not 
entirely satisfactory’.177  Strauss wrote: ‘it is not unpleasant not only for possibly frivolous 
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youths but simply; it is not unpleasant for Socrates himself.’178  Metcalf writes: ‘there is 
something gratifying… in witnessing someone’s inflated opinion of himself being deflated 
publicly.’179 
The Apology 33c, therefore, constituted a difficulty for scholars who are sympathetic to 
Socrates’ elenctic activity.  Its divine sanction was suspicious, and now it could not even be 
differentiated from teenagers’ hubristic behaviour.  Emile De Strycker and S.R. Slings tried to 
solve the problem by repeating Socrates’ altruistic motive, saying that ‘we can see that what 
inspires him is something quite different: it is the concern for the well-being of others, and 
quite especially of his fellow citizens that motivates Socrates.’180  More commentators take a 
much bolder strategy.  They suggest that despite the nature of his intention Socrates’ 
examination of others was justified as long as the consequence was good for the people 
involved.  For instance, McPherran writes: ‘there is no obligation to undergo the elenctic 
examination of an ill-intentioned Sophist unless (oddly enough) there promises to be a net 
gain in virtue for all.’ 181  Robert Metcalf, pointing out the elenctic effect as described in the 
Sophist of restoring one’s sense of shame by purging his complacency, suggests that ‘the 
Eleatic Stranger does not address the enjoyment one has in subjecting others to elenchus, but 
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such enjoyment would not, in any case, diminish its cathartic effect, for some degree of moral 
improvement comes out of the encounter.’182  Brickhouse and Smith even come to maintain 
that those malicious imitations of Socrates’ companions could also bring benefits to their 
victims.  They said: ‘though… there is no suggestion that in doing so they recognize their 
practice as a religious mission, there is equally no suggestion that in imitating Socrates they 
inevitably somehow fall significantly short of obtaining the same result he had obtained.’183 
However, this mode of consequentialist interpretation has the effect of confusing the 
distinction of the good elenchus by Socrates himself and the bad imitation by others, a 
difference that Socrates maintained in the Apology 33c.  Another problem is that we can 
hardly find anyone in the ancient sources whose moral status had been improved through 
Socrates’ elenchus.  On the contrary, we see many vicious characters conversing with 
Socrates in Plato’s and Xenophon’s works.  The need for Socrates to denounce his associates’ 
behaviour in the Apology speaks loudly about the degree of their corruption.  It is certainly 
arguable that Socrates should not be responsible for the crimes his associates had committed; 
yet, the point is that he seemed unable to justify his philosophical life with the claim that it 
had produced positive influence on his associates, the fellow citizens, or the city. 
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Subversion against the democracy.  Discussion of this charge is divided into two sub-
categories: Socrates’ view of the democracy and his personal association with the oligarchs.  
Socrates gave different defences regarding these two issues.  He did not conceal his criticism 
of democratic values, but strongly denied any involvement in the oligarchic regime of the 
Thirty, since his practice was well beyond any considerations of partisan politics. 
Plato’s distrust of the demos’ ability to deliberate over public business was as obvious in the 
Apology as in his other works.  He named the three most important institutions of the 
democracy: the law courts, the council and the assembly, suggesting that they were ruining 
the young generation rather than improving their true interests.184  In his elitist view, it was 
only the professionals, who could only be a few, who knew how to accomplish such an 
important and difficult task.   
Furthermore, Socrates’ metaphor of the experts and the ignorant bore a dangerous hint that 
violence could sometimes be a justified tool for suppressing the popular demand for 
participation in the government.  As we have seen in the previous chapter, Xenophon tried to 
gloss over this issue with the theory that Socrates used only the peaceful means of persuasion 
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in pursuing his political ideas.  Plato said little on this issue in the Apology, and in his other 
works he even seemed to argue that the means of violence was justifiable when necessary.185 
As to his political association Socrates applied the same tactic he used in denouncing his 
responsibility for his companions’ abuse of his elenchus.  He maintained that he was an 
outsider of both democratic and oligarchic causes, since neither of them could come up to his 
moral calibre.   He mentioned that while many people in the city collaborated with the Thirty 
during their reign of terror, he refused to follow their order to arrest an innocent person for 
execution, disregarding the risk of death.186  Besides, though he admitted that he was often 
surrounded by people from oligarchic backgrounds, he was never biased towards the rich 
people.  On the contrary, they came to him and left as they wished just like everyone else.187   
Socrates said that he was not with the democracy, but rather with law and justice.  He did 
mention his dutiful military service under the democracy, saying that ‘I had, like anyone else, 
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remained at my post where those you had elected to command had ordered me.’188  He also 
mentioned one of his close friends who had joined the democratic revolt against the Thirty.189  
Yet, he claimed that he himself would never obey the democracy if it committed anything 
wrong.  He pointed out his single-handed confrontation with the wrath of the crowd during the 
infamous trial of the generals in 406, addressing the jury that he would ‘run any risk on the 
side of law and justice rather than join you, for fear of prison or death, when you were 
engaged in an unjust course.’190  
In summary, Socrates claimed that, as he was not responsible for his followers’ anti-social 
behaviour, neither was he responsible for their anti-democratic plots.191  He was alone in his 
divine mission sanctioned by the god to help Athens, following the daimonion’s warning and 
his own prudence.  He was not a democratic partisan, nor did he have any private relationship 
with the oligarchs, be it based on political, financial or any other motivations.  Though there 
were constant flows of people followed him and imitated his practice, he was not willingly 
involved in any of their activities, and therefore should not be responsible for their crimes. 
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Socrates’ defence against the accusation of his anti-democratic association was basically the 
same as he said in denying his responsibility for his followers’ other culpable behaviour, and 
was therefore equally problematic in convincing the audience.  However, there should be 
some credit given to Socrates for the courage and integrity that he had shown on the two 
occasions mentioned above during the democracy and the reign of the Thirty.  Both the 
illegality of the trial of the generals and the injustice of the Thirty had been well recognized 
by the public by the time Socrates was on trial.  Besides, contrary to what happened in his 
religious stories, there were many witnesses who could testify to Socrates’ words and the 
amount of danger involved in the two cases.  His opposition to the political authorities on 
these occasions, as he himself claimed, did constitute ‘great proofs’ of his integrity.192 
The corruptor of the traditional norms.  This charge of corruptor, as mentioned in chapter 
four, included the other charges of impiety, personal hatred and subversion of the democracy.  
Plato’s defence against this charge was therefore intertwined with the arguments used in 
response to other charges.  For instance, there were claims to justify Socrates’ behaviour, such 
as his divine mandate, the benevolent motivation and his independence of all closed 
relationships and partisan groups that excused him from the responsibility for the crimes done 
by his followers; there were also attacks on the accusers, such as the conspiracy theory that 
the trial was motivated by unjustifiable personal hatred rather than by genuine considerations 
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of the common good.  All these strategies were used to refute the corruptor charge as well as 
other accusations. 
There were another three defence strategies that are more relevant to the corruptor charge than 
to other charges.  The first two of them disputed the logic of the charge and punishment.  The 
last one called on witnesses to testify to his innocence, but sounded suspicious when 
considered together with Socrates’ previous claim that anyone who claimed to have learnt 
from him was lying. 
Firstly, Socrates disputed Meletus’ claim that the democracy was credited with the 
improvement of the young generation while Socrates alone was responsible for their 
corruption.193  He argued that the young generation were more likely to have been corrupted 
by the common people rather than by individuals, since the majority were ignorant of the 
professional knowledge needed to educate the young.194  This argument of probability was as 
good as accusing the democracy of being a corrupt regime and of interfering with Socrates’ 
divine mission. 
Secondly, Socrates questioned the validity of the corruptor charge, arguing that no one of 
sound mind would ever corrupt his fellows deliberately.  His arguments ran as follows: to 
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corrupt someone was to make them worse, and it was in no one’s interest to corrupt his 
companions, for these people, having become corrupted and worse, would hurt the corruptor 
in return.  Therefore, Socrates argued that if one really corrupted his companions, he must be 
insane or acting out of ignorance.   In either case, he concluded, what a corruptor deserved 
was not a trial and punishment but help and education.195  In response to this sophistic defence, 
the accuser or the jurors might simply have retorted that the death penalty was the most 
salutary chastisement for his corrupt nature.196 
Lastly, Socrates seemed fully confident that none of his companions or their families would 
ever testify to the charge of him being a corruptor.  He said that all of them and their families 
were more than ready to help him out in the court.  He provided an array of names as his 
witnesses, including members from both aristocratic and democratic backgrounds.  He asked 
the jury why these people so eagerly came to his rescue if they or their families were ever hurt 
by him, as the accusers said.  This sounded a powerful argument for its logic and the list of 
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witnesses provided.  However, put back into context, the argument was not in perfect 
harmony with what Socrates had said a few lines earlier.  Before providing his witnesses, 
Socrates denied that he had taught anything to anyone, insisting that ‘if any one says that he 
has learned anything from me, or that he heard anything privately that the others did not hear, 
be assured that he is not telling the truth.’197  His disclaimer seems like a response to a certain 
specific accusation.  A plausible inference we might gain from this is that the accusers also 
produced their witnesses who testified to Socrates’ teaching or corruption of someone they 
knew.  Socrates was therefore forced to denounce any relationship with those named by the 
accusers’ witnesses.  If this inference is plausible, the actual situation would not be as 
Socrates boasted that none of his companions or their families would testify against him in the 
court. 
In summary, the main problems of Plato’s defence of Socrates in the Apology lies in its 
theological structure in which the divine sanction for Socrates was derived from the stories of 
the Delphic oracle and his daimonion.  With these stories Socrates turned out to be the most 
pious person in Athens contrary to the accusation of impiety.  While the daimonion exempted 
Socrates from his duties to participate in the democratic government, the oracle testified to the 
superiority of Socrates and his way of life, gave him the right to harass or even humiliate 
people in the streets, and excused him from responsibility for all troubles related to his 
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behaviour, since the god or his loyal agent was by definition inculpable.  However, as we 
have found, the validity of these religious stories was not beyond reasonable doubt, and the 
moral or political justification Socrates drew from them was equally questionable, if not 
deceptive.  There is no way to prove the existence of the daimonion, and the oracle, if ever 
having recognized Socrates’ wisdom, did not encourage him to ridicule people in the streets.  
The foundation of the whole defence in the Apology for Socrates and his way of life, therefore, 
seems shaky. 
The dubiety of his religious stories also casts a shadow on Socrates’ other claims.  How can 
we believe in his integrity, the altruism of his motivation, the enormous benefit that the city 
could have received from his service of elenchus, and all other assurances that we hear 
Socrates claiming in the Apology, after his apparent exploitation of the popular reverence for 
the supernatural spheres?  There are actually some reasons for the sceptic Athenian audience 
to believe that Socrates’ elenctic practice had nothing essentially different from his associates’ 
imitation; both of them aimed for a malicious type of pleasure at their victims’ expense. 
ii. The Death of Socrates 
As argued in the previous chapter, in addition to proving Socrates’ innocence, another 
important task of Xenophon’s and Plato’s defences was to clear the humiliation of their 
mentor as a loser in the law court.  While in dealing with the task Xenophon argued for 
Socrates’ glory in his defeat, denounced the public opinions by appealing to alternative 
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judgements, and worked out the theory of Socrates’ voluntary death, Plato’s strategies include 
the first two, but had no use for the last one.  Besides, he added a myth of afterlife that we do 
not find in Xenophon’s writings.198 
Firstly, Socrates pronounced that the victory of his accusers was shameful, and his defeat in 
the law court a moral victory.  In his view, the accusers were motivated by unjustifiable 
personal hatred,199 and they won the case not because of any truth in their prosecution but 
mostly due to an entrenched social prejudice against him.200  Socrates recognized the extreme 
difficulty of his case, since he was facing a hostile jury already under the profound influence 
of the prejudice well established decades earlier.  Despite his claim that he could easily have 
won if he had ever compromised himself to adapt the conventional formula for successful 
defence, that is, to cry and beg for mercy with as many children, relatives and friends as he 
could have brought into the law court.201  However, Socrates claimed that he was too proud to 
make himself such a miserable creature.202  He reminded the jury of his reputation as a 
superior in society, saying that they should not expect him to behave in any pitiful way, 
saying that: ‘if those of you who are considered superior, be it in wisdom or courage or 
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whatever other virtue makes them so, are seen behaving like that, it would be a disgrace.’203  
His execution was therefore a result of his choice to die with honour rather than to live in 
disgrace. 
Secondly, Socrates also dismissed the thought that public opinion and the jury’s verdicts 
could do him any harm, referring to his divine mandate and benevolent motivation in pursuing 
what he had done in his life.204  Despite most jurors’ disbelief which he himself recognized, 
he insisted on the truthfulness of what he had said.205  Compared with Xenophon’s version, 
Plato’s claim here was actually more unworldly due to its transcendental tendency.  While the 
latter rejected the humiliation of being defeated by referring to the defendant’s self-assurance 
regarding his truthfulness and ultimately to the divine intention, the former made an additional 
appeal to the human judgement of the friends as well as generations other than contemporary 
Athenians. 
Lastly, a myth of the afterlife came up at the end of Plato’s Apology to relieve the pain of 
defeat and execution.206  Considering his future destiny, Socrates said that death was likely 
one of the following two things: non-existence without any perception left, or departure for 
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another world.  Either way, he claimed, was much better than living in this world.  In the first 
case, death, rather than anything abhorrent, was like a dreamless sleep which, Socrates 
believed, even a great king preferred to his power and wealth in the world.  It is even better in 
the other scenario.  Socrates believed that if he was going to another world after his death, that 
place would be nothing like democratic Athens.  There he would receive the just verdict from 
the true judges composed of legendary sages and demi-gods, enjoy the company of great 
writers and heroes, and continue his critical examination of other people with no risk of being 
put to death again.  
iii. After the Apology 
What we have found in Plato’s Apology is a proud Socrates who declared his privileged 
divine favour as well as his moral and intellectual superiority.  With an aloof manner he 
disclaimed his responsibility for all the troubles caused by his associates, saying that he was 
too honest to be involved in any social or political activities.  Sometimes he even passed the 
responsibility to the democracy and society.  On the other hand, he dismissed the 
condemnation of the jury, saying that he was by no means to be hurt.  He said that death was 
not a capital punishment but a blessing, for there was a good chance that he was going to a 
 289 
better place where he would be rewarded for his justice by the real judges.  In a word, the 
Apology, just like Xenophon described, was indeed a megalhgori/a. 207 
However, as one major concern of this thesis is to search for philosophical recognition of 
Athenian democracy, it might be worth asking: did Plato ever soften his position on the trial 
and death of Socrates like Xenophon did who, at first, proposed the theory of Socrates’ 
voluntary death and then replaced his bitterness towards the democracy with sympathetic 
understanding and forgiveness?  This issue is too complex and cannot be discussed in detail 
here.  As the trial of Socrates was one of the defining events in Plato’s life, any 
reconsideration of this event would inevitably generate profound effects on all his political 
philosophy.208  What is provided here then is to draw attention to several important passages 
in Plato’s other dialogues that indicate some trends of development in his reconsideration of 
the trial of Socrates.  There will be no further discussion in this thesis on related issues raised 
by these passages due to the limitation of space. 
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1. Patriotic values 
Firstly, Plato came close to a sympathetic understanding of the imperfect nature of human 
beings in his interpretation of Simonides in the Protagoras.  Plato wrote: ‘I do not seek an 
utterly blameless man, of us who reap the fruit of broad earth…I shan’t praise anyone for 
being such a man; it is enough for me if he is in between and does nothing bad, for I praise 
and love all.’209  Following this understanding, it was argued that it was in bad taste to protect 
his reputation by criticizing his people and the city from a detached moral high ground.  A 
noble person, even when he was wronged, should repress his anger and reconcile himself with 
his fatherland and fellow citizens.  Plato wrote:  
An honest man often forces himself to be a friend and praise someone; for 
instance, it often happens that a man has an unnatural father or mother, or 
country, or something like that.  When that happens to bad men (tou\v 
ponhrou&v) he views it almost with pleasure and makes a great display of 
castigating and blaming the shortcomings of his parents or his country, in 
order that he himself may not incur any blame or reproach for his neglect of 
them, so he berates them even more than need be, and deliberately makes 
new enemies on top of those he can’t avoid.  But good men (tou\v a0gaqou\v) 
conceals it all and forces himself to praise them, and if he gets angry at his 
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unjust treatment by his parents or his country he calms himself down and 
makes friends again, forcing himself to love and praise them.210 
This passage of the Protagoras might be seen as providing a negative version of Socratic 
elenchus, which is to find fault with one’s own country and to make a good display of what he 
had found.  There are several interesting points of comparison between this passage and 
Plato’s more positive account in the Apology.  Firstly, though the Protagoras also indicates 
the pleasure of elenchus, its account is somehow different from the version in the Apology.211  
While the latter suggests that the pleasure is a psychological result of seeing people 
humiliated publicly, the former indicates that it could also come from one’s self-justification 
for one’s dislike of one’s fatherland and the negligence of patriotic obligation.  Secondly, 
while the Apology argues strongly that Socrates should not be blamed for the hatred against 
him that had been incurred during his elenchus,212 the Protagoras suggests that he could be 
responsible for ‘making new enemies on top of those he can’t avoid’.  In summary, contrary 
to the Apology where the elenchus is described as a divine mission and the greatest act of 
generosity,213 the Protagoras considers it vulgar rather than noble, since the motivation 
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behind that kind of behaviour is ingratitude and other egoistical considerations.  For all the 
faults one has found in one’s own country and the injustice he has suffered in its hands, this 
passage in the Protagoras suggests that he should still love and praise, turning a blind eye to 
all the problems and conflicts; a suggestion that might have been demonstrated in the Platonic 
funeral speech in the Menexenus. 
However, this passage is inconclusive.  It was suggested as Socrates’ interpretation of 
Simonides’ poetry during his contention with Protagoras in which an obvious sense of 
playfulness existed.214  Besides, the tolerant and patriotic sentiment recommended in this 
passage is not in perfect harmony with Plato’s strict criticism of the Athenian demos and its 
government in the other dialogues, which according to his interpretation of Simonides is 
behaviour in bad taste.  What we can say with certainty is that Plato was familiar with theories 
of tolerance and forgiveness, though he might not have accepted them. 
2. The corruption of Socratic philosophy 
Secondly, Plato readdresses the issue of Socrates’ responsibility for his associates’ behaviour 
in greater details in the Republic where the issue was formulated as the following argument.  
Adeimantus challenges Socrates:  
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Now someone might say that in speech he can’t contradict you at each 
particular thing asked, but in deed he sees that of all those who start out on 
philosophy—not those who take it up for the sake of getting educated when 
they are young and then drop it, but those who linger in it for a longer time—
most become quite queer, not to say completely vicious; while the ones who 
seem perfectly decent, do nevertheless suffer at least one consequence of the 
practice you are praising—they become useless to the city.215 
Socrates’ answer, at first, was similar to the strategy used in the Apology.  He claimed that 
philosophy had absolutely nothing to do with evil and crimes, for it was by definition the 
pursuit of truth.  Philosophers minded only their own business and kept themselves away from 
partisan activities.  They did not corrupt young people; instead, the young were corrupted 
because of themselves, their relatives, the democracy and the whole society.216   
However, Socrates himself then admitted that philosophy itself was a highly precarious 
business.  He said: ‘How a city can take philosophy in hand without being destroyed.  For 
surely all great things carry with them the risk of a fall, and, really as the saying goes, fine 
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things are hard.’217  He recognized the destructive effect of his elenctic practice against the 
established norms.  He said:218  
When a question is posed and comes to the man who is so disposed, ‘What is 
the fair?’—and after answering what he heard from the lawgiver, the argument 
refutes him, and refuting him many times and in many ways, reduces him to 
the opinion that what the law says is no more fair than ugly, and similarly 
about the just and good and things he held most in honor—after that, what do 
you suppose he’ll do about honouring and obeying as rulers the things he 
heard from the lawgiver? 
The answer to this question is that the practitioners of Socratic elenchus became dangerous 
nihilists.  
When they themselves refute many men and are refuted by many, they fall 
quickly into a profound disbelief of what they formerly believed.219 
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Furthermore, he was once afraid that his practice of philosophy would turn in a sinful 
direction and make him an involuntary murderer.220  He only prayed that he might be excused 
with the reason that his crime was only an unintended consequence of his honesty.  He said: 
To speak knowing the truth, among prudent and dear men, about what is 
greatest and dear, is a thing that is safe and encouraging.  But to present 
arguments at a time when one is in doubt and seeking—which is just what I 
am doing—is a thing both frightening and slippery.  It’s not because I’m afraid 
of being laughed at—that’s childish—but because I’m afraid that in slipping 
from the truth where one least ought to slip, I’ll not only fall myself but also 
drag my friends down with me.  I prostrate myself before Adrasteia, Glaucon, 
for what I’m going to say.  I expect that it’s a lesser fault to prove to be an 
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unwilling murderer of someone than a deceiver about fine, good, and just 
things in laws.221  
With such recognition of the danger of philosophy, the Socratic way of life could no more be 
a free exercise open to everyone in public places as described in the Apology.   Though Plato 
might have still insisted on the innocence of Socrates, he would not approve his mentor’s 
street style of elenchus.  Instead, philosophy became in the Republic and the Laws the most 
selective and secret practice that was accessible only to a very small elitist group who must 
have been proved talented, experienced and mature in addition to many other qualifications.222  
Besides, the minimum age for the admission into philosophic education was thirty; all 
younger people were thus rejected for their immaturity.  We should never find in Plato’s ideal 
cities the scene of an old Socrates ‘whispering with three or four boys in a corner’.223 
3. The sovereignty of law 
The last but not the least is the theory of obedience to the laws in the Crito.224  While in the 
Apology Socrates used to counter the democracy and the city by citing the higher authorities 
                                                 
221
 Resp. 450d-451a with emphasis added. 
222
 For instances, Resp. 494a, 536a-b, 539b ff; Leg. 951d ff. 
223
 Grg. 485e. 
224
 Another important passage about the trial of Socrates and the laws is Plt.297d-303b.  For discussion of this 
passage, see section 3.2.2-4 of this chapter.  The relationship between the Apology and Crito is a complicated 
issue of many debates.  I only point out the change of tone and emphasis in the Apology and Crito, but does not 
argue the consistency or inconsistency between the two Platonic works.  For recent discussion and bibliography 
 297 
of divinity and morality which he believed were on his side, in the Crito at least the laws now 
came to the aid of the city and the democracy.225    To be sure, the laws had no dispute over 
Socrates’ innocence, but argued that Socrates should obey them and accept his execution even 
when the jury’s verdict was grossly unjust.  
The main argument ran as follow.226  The city and the laws deserved full respect and 
obedience from the citizens, for they, just like parents, gave birth, nurtured and educated the 
citizens.  Besides, the city was far from being a tyranny.  If citizens disagreed with the laws or 
instruction of the city they were given the chance to change them by persuasion.  Even when 
the citizens failed or did not want to persuade, or for whatever reason they were dissatisfied 
with the city, they were free to leave.  However, for those who remained within the city, they 
were bound by an agreement with the city: they should either persuade the city to change or 
follow its laws and orders.  Socrates was born and grew up in the city.  He fully understood 
the government of the city, but still stayed in Athens all his life when he was free to go.  He 
was given the chance to persuade the jury of his innocence, but failed.  He therefore had no 
excuse to escape his execution. 
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The three passages discussed above might be seen as part of Plato’s effort to understand and 
alleviate the conflict between philosophy and politics.  The distinction between good and bad 
persons in the Protagoras emphasised the value of sympathetic understanding of human 
nature, arguing that philosophy should not be used as a cynical excuse to deny one’s civil 
responsibility.  The readdressing of the corruptor issue in the Republic admitted the dangerous 
side-effects produced in the practice of philosophy that needed to be put under careful control.  
The speech of the laws in the Crito maintained that for whatever reason they had, individual 
citizens had no right to dismiss the regulation of the laws single-handed, for the laws, based 
on the principle of reciprocity and agreement between the community and its members, 
should not be changed without the consent of the community. 
IV. Conclusion 
i. 
We have proved in this chapter that there is an alternative tradition of Plato’s political thought 
that, compared to his basic position of intellectualist elitism, is more sympathetic to the 
Athenian democratic way of life.  This alternative tradition has been demonstrated in this 
chapter through our investigation of Plato’s responses to three important historical events in 
Athens at the end of the fifth century B.C.: the law reform, the reconciliation and the trial of 
Socrates. 
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In the discussion of the democracy’s law reform, we have found Plato’s recognition of the 
democracy’s participatory practices.  For instance, the institution of assembly, for all its 
defects, could help maintain the stability of the laws.  Rhetoric or the art of public persuasion, 
instead of being corruptive deception, was here an efficient tool for the education of the 
people and the execution of the laws.  The law courts at the local level should be composed of 
common citizens, and Plato here agreed with the democracy that to be a citizen was to 
participate in public affairs. 
On the other hand, Plato put up a case for the democracy’s trust in the written laws rather than 
in political experts.  Experts with true political knowledge were hard to find, if not impossible, 
and if they were available, there was popular suspicion that they might abuse people’s trust to 
their own advantage.  Given such sceptic considerations, the people had reason to believe that 
it was safer to specify the form and content of the ruling power in writing before they granted 
anyone the power of government.  Furthermore, after the laws had been written down and 
were in force a more important task is to make sure that the government follow the written 
laws as strictly as possible.  No violation of the laws should be tolerated, for Plato argued that, 
though the written laws were always inflexible and had all the other deficiencies as an 
imperfect product of popular opinion, strict compliance with the laws had the invaluable 
advantage of preventing them being abused by dishonest magistrates, which was a much more 
worrying consequence especially when the laws had now been endowed with great authority.   
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In the end, Plato concluded that the observance of the written laws itself constituted another 
criterion of good government in addition to his intellectualism.  Some law-abiding regimes 
did enjoy surprisingly long-term stability, even though their laws were full of misconception 
and corruption compared to the rule of true expertise. 
As to the democracy’s reconciliation project, we have also found Plato’s positive response in 
his Menexenus 243e-244b.  Contrary to many scholars’ view, there is actually no sign of 
scepticism or cynicism about the success of the reconciliation or the democracy’s hidden 
motivations in Plato’s account of this important event in this dialogue.  Neither is Plato’s 
account here a mockery of the Athenian democrats’ complacency by exaggerating their 
reconciliatory achievement to a ridiculous level.  Compared to other contemporary accounts 
which almost unanimously condemned the oligarchs for the civil war and extolled the 
democrats alone for the post-war peacemaking, Plato alone raised the oligarchs to a position 
perfectly equal to the democrats by playing down the latter’s leading role in the 
reconciliation.227  Therefore, it appears that there were in fact serious messages beyond the 
ironic tone of the dialogue.  Plato recognized the democracy’s self constraint in not 
prosecuting the oligarchs after their victory in the civil war; however, he also maintained that 
that was not enough to create true harmony in Athens, for the bitterness of the civil strife was 
still much alive in the citizens’ memory and public rituals.  He believed that there was a need 
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for the Athenians to go further along the reconciliatory path by revising their collective 
memory of the past.  That is, as he had demonstrated in his rosy story, the civil war should be 
remembered as sheer misfortune for which no citizen should be held responsible, and the 
reconciliation as the equal co-operation of all the citizens rather than the democrats’ 
forgiveness of the oligarchs. 
A sympathetic trend of thinking can be found even in Plato’s account of the trial of Socrates.  
While Plato portrayed an innocent and uncompromising Socrates in the Apology who swore to 
go on with his divine mission even if the democracy issued an injunction against his critical 
examination of citizens, he had second thoughts on the relationship between philosophy and 
the democracy in his other dialogues.  In the Protagoras he mentioned a theory of filial 
obedience to the verdict of one’s own country no matter how wrong it was.  Furthermore, in 
the Republic, he even recognized the corrupt effect of Socratic elenchus, suggesting that the 
art of elenchus should only be practised among small groups of selected well-trained elites, 
contrary to Socrates’ indiscriminate style.  Finally, in the Crito as well as in the Statesman he 
provided justification for rule by the established laws, arguing that the authority of the laws 
must be protected even at the cost of the philosopher’s life. 
ii. 
What should we make of the discrepancy between Plato’s basic position of intellectual elitism 
and his sympathetic understanding of the direct democracy that we have found in this chapter?  
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A common solution to this difficult question would be certain developmental scenarios that 
Plato revised his criticism of Athenian democracy as this popular government proved its 
competence through time, or simply because he grew older and more experienced.  This is 
highly plausible. However, we can not go much further than this general presumption and, as 
many scholars did, arrange Plato’s works into different stages of his life, each of which has its 
own set of philosophical principles and ethic values.  As mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter, we do not have enough reliable information for such detailed reconstruction of the 
relationship between Plato’s life and works.  Besides, we have often found that the conflicting 
claims of elitist criticism and appreciation of the democracy coexist in the same Platonic 
works.  This happens in many of his political works, including the Republic, Statesman and 
Laws.  It seems futile to divide Plato’s political works into different stages of development 
regarding his attitude toward the Athenian democracy. 
Therefore, it is better not to use developmental models, but provide only a thematic account of 
Plato’s compromise with the democracy, especially with its participatory way of life.  In 
summary, this account consists of the following four parts. 
The first part is Plato’s re-examination of his intellectualism that one’s claim to political 
power should only be based on his possession of knowledge.  The first problem with the 
intellectualism is the extreme scarcity and elusiveness of true political knowledge.228  The 
                                                 
228
 See section 3.2.2 of this chapter. 
 303 
attempt to rule a city according to true knowledge would be impracticable if such intelligence 
could not be found, or if found, how could one prove its authenticity?  Another problem is 
that the intellectualist criterion might be set at such a high level that some valuable aspects of 
practical politics would not receive their fair share of attention.  For instance, the long-term 
stability of some actual regimes presented a ‘wonder’ to the intellectualist minds, for, by their 
prediction, such regimes were corrupt and should have collapsed into chaos of lawlessness 
long ago.229  Last but not least, the essential part of the intellectualist training or Socratic 
elenchus might produce nihilistic side-effects.  There is a true danger that the procedure of 
Socratic critical examination, rather than guiding people toward anything constructive, simply 
makes them rebellious by destroying their capacity to believe.230 
The second part is Plato’s recognition of the demos’ intellectual capacity, if only to a limited 
degree.  He recognized that the people were not wholly ignorant, but could be knowledgeable 
in a sense or even able to partake in Plato’s philosophical knowledge.  Given his intellectualist 
criterion as revealed in his theory of the philosopher-king that the claim to political power 
should be based on the possession of knowledge, the people were now entitled to participate 
in politics in proportion to their share of knowledge.  His recognition of the people’s 
intelligence can be found in the Laws where Plato chose to promote the fulfilment of the laws 
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and the virtues of the ruled not through violence, but by means of public persuasion,231 a 
decision that presumes the people’s ability to distinguish the good from the bad as well as 
their willingness to pursue their true interests.  Besides, his view of the rule by the written 
laws as a form of good government in the Statesman also indicates a positive assessment of 
the demos’ intelligence, since these laws were the product of demotic deliberation.232 
Thirdly, Plato could also find some positive results from the democracy’s institutional designs.  
He observed that its participatory institutions might have the effect of maintaining 
constitutional stability, since the fragmentation of political power caused by massive 
participation would constitute enormous difficulties for attempts to change the laws.233  He 
also noticed that these participatory institutions could also be efficient tools in preventing the 
abuse of power.234  The demos, having no trust in people in power, would like to have the 
government in its direct control both by way of direct participation and through the written 
laws that had been enacted not by legal professionals but by the demos itself.  Plato shared 
this concern of the demos; therefore, though he was still critical of its non-professional ways 
of government and legislation, he accepted the use of these participatory practices in 
preventing the abuse of power when the true ruler was not available. 
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Lastly, Plato recognized that civic participation could also be justified from a communitarian 
point of view: the people were entitled to participate in the public decision-making not 
because of their intellectual capacity, but simply for the reason that they were members of the 
city.235  This argument can be seen clearly in his discussion of the local jury composition in 
the Laws where he claimed that all citizens should participate in the law courts as much as 
possible, since they were part of the political community.
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion 
There are deep-rooted suspicions of Athenian democracy in the history of western political 
thought.  It seems unlikely to many people that a government consisting of a group of 
uneducated people could be effective, for themselves or for others.  Indeed, it is often thought 
that, without the guidance of professionalism, there will be much more conflict than 
consistency in their policies.  The decision-making process of Athenian democracy is often 
considered highly inefficient on account of the enormous size of its assembly, which consisted 
of six thousand citizens.  Athenian democracy, therefore, is classified in most cases as an 
undesirable form of government. 
The image of Athens has improved substantially since the publication of Grote’s History of 
Greece in the mid-nineteenth century.  The city’s military and political achievements in the 
fifth century B.C., such as the victory over Persia and the establishment of the Athenian 
empire, are now well recognized.  However, the credit for these deeds goes largely to its 
leaders rather than to the Athenian demos and its democracy.  The suspicion of direct 
democracy remains.  A common theory is that the Athenian demos was lucky to have 
Themistocles and Pericles whose powerful leadership, having overcome all the deficiencies of 
direct democracy, led Athens to greatness.  It is often regretted that Athens lost its empire 
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after its golden age under Pericles, fell into civil wars, and suffered a terminal decline because 
of the folly of the common people. 
The view that presumes a relationship between the decline of Athens after the days of Pericles 
and the importance of leadership in its history has been questioned by a group of scholars of 
ancient history since the 1980s.  They point out correctly that Athenian democracy was not in 
a process of terminal decline after the death of Pericles.  On the contrary, it restored order and 
stability after the civil wars not only successfully but also efficiently.  Many of them also 
dispute the traditional focus on its politicians, suggesting that the participation of the Athenian 
citizens might play an essential role in making their city what it was.  Given the intensity of 
civic participation in the democracy, their suggestion points to a better understanding of 
Athenian politics. 
Nevertheless, this new trend of historical research has been largely disregarded in the more 
theoretical studies of Athenian democracy.  Most scholars of political philosophy and 
democratic theory maintain the negative view of direct democracy, holding the established 
view that Athenian democracy was inherently corrupt and needed external remedies such as 
great leaders, the rule of law or some forms of professionalism.  Even for those who have 
noticed the recent trend of historical research, none of them has appreciated its full 
implication for our understanding of the first democracy. 
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This thesis, following the lead of Josiah Ober and other scholars of ancient history, offers a 
new interpretation of Athenian democracy by focusing on three important events at the end of 
the fifth century B.C.: the law reform, the reconciliation and the trial of Socrates.  The first 
two projects, by founding the democratic stability of fourth-century Athens, proved the 
political capability of the demos that has been largely concealed in its long-term negative 
image.  The trial of Socrates, on the other hand, has arguably made the greatest contribution to 
the traditional suspicion of Athenian democracy.  A revisiting of this notorious case is 
therefore essential for our evaluation of Athenian democracy. 
The second chapter has shown the complexity of the Athenian law reform.  It was caused by 
serious military crises and went through five regimes in twelve years, mixed with, on the one 
hand, the nationalistic ideology of ancestral laws and, on the other hand, murder, terror, 
foreign intervention, coups and civil wars.  Nevertheless, despite all of these difficulties, an 
unprecedented and stable legal order was finally established in 399. 
It is fair to say that the law reform is largely a result of the Athenian demos’ collective 
decision, especially after its defeat in the naval battle of Aegospotami.  Of the three oligarchic 
regimes involved in the law reform, the Five Thousand lasted too briefly to make any 
significant contribution, while the Four Hundred and the Thirty brought Athens into much 
deeper chaos.  The first restored democracy from 410 to 405 did substantial legal work, such 
as the systematic investigation of laws, but it also used the laws freely in persecution and 
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eradication of political enemies.  This strong partisan tendency made Athenian democracy in 
this period look more like a tyranny of the majority rather than a lawful government. 
A drastic change of political atmosphere came in 405.  The law reform turned in the direction 
of tolerance and inclusiveness, probably because the democracy had learnt from its defeat at 
the battle of Aegospotami.  It was now able to consider its partisan interests in the wider 
context of the whole Athenian community, and realized the common interests between the 
democratic and other Athenian citizens.  As a result, the Athenian laws after the reform, rather 
than mere partisan tools, were more like solemn agreements of all citizens on which a stable 
political order was established.  For instance, the non-democratic or oligarchic elements were 
now incorporated into the democracy’s legislation procedure, as shown in Teisamenus’ decree.  
Recorded and archived, the laws were accessible and applied to all citizens.  Every magistrate 
was required to rule only by the laws.  While the abuse of law, as happened in the regimes of 
the Four Hundred and the Thirty, was certainly ruled out after the law reform, the scene of the 
laws being bluntly disregarded by a mob, as in the trial of the generals at 406, would also 
become much rarer, if not having disappeared altogether. 
The complexity of the law reform, though a major issue of scholarly debate since the mid-
1980s, is not fully appreciated.  Some scholars consider the law reform a success of 
constitutionalism over populism.  The problem in their separation of Athenian laws from their 
democratic process has been pointed out by many scholars.  Most scholars argued that the law 
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reform was a sophisticated exploitation of the laws by the democracy to protect its power and 
interests.  This theory, though basically correct, tends to overlook two points.  Firstly, the laws 
were more than a means to an end, as they also embodied important democratic values such as 
equality, participation and suspicion of arbitrary power.  Secondly, the demos’ concept of 
self-interest did not remain the same throughout the period of law reform.  The democracy 
changed from an oppressive regime to a tolerant government after a military crisis in 405.  
This was a transformation that indicates the people’s capability to readjust what they thought 
was in their best interests.  Without taking into account their experience in 405, it is hard to 
explain why the demos did not make the result of law revision as harsh as it could. 
The discussion of the reconciliation in chapter three demonstrates the great effort that 
Athenian democracy made to restore the harmony between democratic and oligarchic citizens.  
For instance, the democracy not only forgave most of the crimes committed by the Thirty and 
their supporters, but also arranged another city for those of them who did not want to stay in 
Athens under its government.  The demos even repaid Sparta the loan that the Thirty had 
borrowed to fight them.  Considering the cruelty of the Thirty during the civil war, the 
democracy’s generosity towards the oligarchs should be called one of the greatest deeds in the 
history of Athenian politics. 
Most scholars, holding to the traditional view of Athenian democracy, tend to play down its 
achievement of reconciliation.  They question its success with the reason that political tension 
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and conflict still existed in post-war Athens.  They also believe that the democracy, rather 
than out of its own free will, was forced into reconciliation with oligarchs because of external 
pressures from Sparta, constraint by moderate politicians, or disagreement among Athenian 
citizens.  Nevertheless, as argued in chapter three, the reconciliation was successful both in 
terms of the achievement of its goals and by the criteria of the reconciliatory terms.  Besides, 
none of the external factors mentioned by scholars so far has been proved as a sufficient cause 
for the reconciliation and the subsequent period of peace in Athens.  Therefore, the central 
role of the democracy must be admitted, since it won the civil war and restored its authority in 
the city. 
Another theory has recently suggested that the success of the reconciliation was due to the 
nationalistic concern for the unity of Athens that not only suppressed the people’s desire for 
revenge, but also compromised the authority of direct democracy.  The great strength of 
nationalistic concerns is well attested at the end of the fifth century B.C., especially by the 
popular appeal of the ancestral laws and the tightening up of the ethnic qualification of 
Athenian citizenship.  It has also substantial textual support from ancient writers, including 
Xenophon and Plato.  However, this theory overstates the importance of this nationalistic 
concern, claiming that the democracy’s victory in the civil war was annulled and its power 
and values were virtually sacrificed for the harmony of the Athenian community.  What we 
actually see in Athenian history is that, alongside the reconciliation, the Athenian government 
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soon restored its radical form of direct democracy.  Popular participation was encouraged 
rather than discouraged at the same time with extra financial reward for citizens attending the 
assembly.  Therefore, it is more reasonable to include both democratic consolidation and 
communal harmony as goals of the Athenian reconciliation. 
As we have seen in chapter four, we can question the use of the trial of Socrates as a case 
against direct democracy.  Athenian trial procedure was not hasty, but incorporated elements 
of deliberation.  For instance, the accusers risked harsh punishment if presenting 
unconvincing cases to the law court.  The corruption of the jury was prevented by a 
sophisticated way of selection.  Despite his arrogant style, Socrates’ right as defendant was 
well respected in his trial. 
As shown in chapter four as well as in our analysis of Xenophon’s and Plato’s defences of 
Socrates in chapters five and six, the Athenians had reason to believe that Socrates had not 
only been partially responsible for the crimes of the Thirty, but would also be a threat to the 
restored democracy and the Athenian community in the future.  Socrates might very well have 
meant to benefit his fellow Athenians with his philosophy, but his way of life was neither 
justified by any positive outcome nor sanctioned by the divine authorities claimed in his 
defence.  What the Athenians actually experienced was the destructive effects of Socrates’ 
philosophy.  Common norms and beliefs collapsed under his critical examination.  Young 
people, fascinated by the power of his philosophy, became hubristic.  Some of his pupils led 
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an oligarchic coup that brought the whole of Athens into the chaos of civil war.  Furthermore, 
Socrates’ claim that his way of life was instructed by the divine authority of his daimonion 
and the Delphic oracle is suspicious.  His private daimonion could not be recognized by 
anyone else, while the Delphic oracle did not ask him to scorn traditional beliefs or 
democratic values on the streets. 
In summary, what emerges in our historical examination of the three Athenian events at the 
end of the fifth century B.C. is a contrast between a successful direct democracy and failed 
Socratic philosophy.  Athenian democracy not only had equality and freedom, but was also 
lawful and generous.  It was able to adopt the conservative nationalism that was the basic 
value of its law reform and the reconciliation.  Socratic philosophy, by contrast, was 
associated with lawlessness and cruelty.  Its radical criticism, having so efficiently exposed 
the faults of existing norms and institutions, turned in a tyrannical direction. 
The success of Athenian democracy and the failure of Socratic philosophy are also attested to 
in the works of Xenophon and Plato.  Contrary to the common impression that they were 
uncompromising critics of direct democracy, we have found significant passages that indicate 
appreciation of democratic values and deeds.  Xenophon and Plato were undeniably oligarchic 
writers, and the passages that have been discussed in this thesis are far from representing a 
general picture of their philosophical concerns.  Nevertheless, these passages constitute a 
remarkable aspect of their experience of democratic Athens.  It is therefore problematic to 
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disprove Athenian democracy with the works of Xenophon and Plato, as many scholars 
usually do. 
With regards the law reform, Xenophon disagreed with the Athenian common people over the 
content of the ancestral laws, but he also pointed out their reverence for the laws that 
associated them with the glorious past and gave instruction about the future.  He disputed the 
cynical view that the demos was incorrigible in their abuse of law, arguing that it could be 
obedient to authority as shown in the chorus, athletic competition, and naval exercises.  As to 
the reconciliation, Xenophon was obviously in favour of the common people.  In his account, 
they were pious, just, trustworthy and sympathetic to the oligarchs.  He suggested that it was 
because of their virtues that the reconciliation was successful.  As to the trial of Socrates, 
though he had no doubt about his mentor’s innocence, the democracy’s responsibility for 
killing Socrates was first exonerated as a result of his theory that Socrates actually conducted 
his own death, and then forgiven as Xenophon developed a deeper understanding of human 
fallibility. 
Xenophon therefore understood Athenian democracy from perspectives different from the 
negative view of direct democracy that has been well-established since ancient times.  Firstly, 
in contrast to dominant realist theories that tend to consider the Athenian demos short-sighted 
and selfish, he pointed to the importance of communitarian values such as reverence for 
tradition and fellowship in the success of law reform and reconciliation.  His report of the 
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battle between Athenian democrats and oligarchs at Munychia is one of the most revealing 
stories that indicate the dramatic power of a close-knit community over the division of civil 
war. 
Secondly, in contrast to the myth of the decline of Athens, Xenophon suggests a theory of 
historical circle based on the understanding of human nature that people tended to become 
corrupt because of their success, but they also learnt from failure.  His Socrates, having seen 
the Athenians’ arrogance after their victory over Persia and their modesty after being defeated 
by Boeotia, concluded that ‘confidence implants neglect, easygoingness, and disobedience, 
while fear makes people more attentive, more obedient, and more orderly.’1  Xenophon 
himself also recorded the transformation of the Athenian demos from a lawless mob in the 
trial of the generals in 406 to virtuous people after suffering the tyranny of the Thirty in 403.  
This theory of history enabled him to criticize Athenian democracy without losing sight of its 
achievement in law and domestic harmony. 
Finally, Xenophon would have reservation about the view that the Athenian demos was liable 
to manipulation by passion and demagogy.  As mentioned above, he believed that the demos 
had the capability to learn and, in turn, became more disciplined.  He also believed that the 
demos could distinguish good politicians from bad ones.  He was optimistic that the demos 
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would finally reward their leaders for their honesty and efforts to improve common interests, 
while demagogues would soon be punished for their deception and unrealistic promises. 
Athens is but one of the issues in Plato’s works, and his attitude toward its democracy in 
general is probably much more hostile than Xenophon’s; yet there are still passages that 
indicate his recognition of the success of Athenian democracy and the failure of Socratic 
philosophy.  Regarding the Athenian law reform, we find in the Laws his recognition of 
certain democratic institutions and practices such as the assembly, the people’s law court and 
the use of rhetoric, though his consideration there is neither from a democrat’s perspective, 
nor is it without reservation.  He puts up a substantial argument for the democracy’s use of 
written laws in the Statesman.  The people trust neither governing officials’ expertise nor their 
integrity.  Therefore, the people prefer to make laws by themselves, to write them down, and 
to order their government to following the written laws as strictly as possible.  Thus, the abuse 
of political power would be prevented.  Plato agrees that these are reasonable measures.  
Democratic governments, he argues, have an additional advantage that their laws are much 
more stable than those of monarchies and oligarchies because of the fragmentation of 
legislative power in their governments.  Thus, he classified democratic regimes by the written 
laws as a desirable form of government in the Statesman. 
In the Menexenus we find Plato’s praise of the reconciliation.  He agrees that the 
reconciliation was an exceptional success that made other Greek cities envious.  He ascribed 
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its success to the popular myth of common ancestry, an explanation that was welcome among 
the Athenian demos.  However, there is a subtle difference between his account and popular 
versions of the civil war.  In the popular memory, the oligarchic supporters of the Thirty took 
the full responsibility for the civil war while the democrats were credited with the 
reconciliation.  According to Plato’s account, the civil war in 403 was not any Athenian’s 
fault, but caused by sheer misfortune, while the reconciliation was due to the common efforts 
of all the Athenians, including the oligarchs.  Thus, Plato was aiming to remove the blame on 
the oligarchs for the civil war.  He appears to urge the Athenian demos that the democracy 
should not only forgive the supporters of the Thirty, but also remember them as equally 
patriotic citizens to the democrats.  Thus, Plato suggested, the Athenian oligarchs would no 
longer live in shame, and the true reconciliation would be achieved. 
As to the trial of Socrates, Plato reconsiders this infamous event from three perspectives that 
differ from that of his Apology.  Firstly, a passage of the Protagoras reveals a sympathetic 
understanding of human imperfection and recognition of patriotic obligation.  It is argued in 
this passage that a good citizen, rather than criticizing his country from a moral high ground, 
should reconcile himself to his fatherland whatever its wrongdoing is.  Though it may not 
represent Plato’s attitude, this passage gave us an alternative view in Plato’s time on the issue 
of philosophy and democracy. 
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Secondly, Plato discussed the side-effects of Socratic philosophy in the Republic.  He admits 
that the Socratic way of radical questioning, having discredited the validity of common norms 
and beliefs, might lead its practitioners down the route of nihilism or tyranny.  This 
consideration is one of the main reasons that in both the Republic and the Laws philosophy is 
no longer a common practice for all, but the most selective training for a small group of elite 
citizens alone. 
Finally, Plato considers in the Statesman and Crito the need to maintain the authority of law 
even though there might be gaps between the laws and justice.  The Athenian jury’s verdict on 
Socrates might not be just, but there is no evidence to question its legality.  Can one disobey 
an unjust but legal decision of the law court?  Plato’s answer in these two dialogues is 
negative.  He is concerned that any theories of disobedience might destroy the authority of the 
laws, since they might be used to justify all kinds of unlawful behaviour.  Besides, the 
Athenian laws were not intolerant.  Socrates not only had the right to persuade the city but 
also had the freedom to leave for another city.  He knew the problems of democracy, but 
chose to stay in Athens receiving the care and protection provided by the laws and the city.  It 
is therefore unjust, the Athenian Laws argued in the Crito, for citizens like Socrates to 
disobey the legal decision of the city. 
The discussion of Plato’s concession to Athenian democracy indicates significant differences 
from his basic position of intellectual elitism that denies the demos’ role in politics because of 
 319 
their ignorance.  The first difference comes from Plato’s revision of his intellectualist position.  
He points out some of its problems.  The first is about its feasibility.  The knowledge that 
guides a political community towards perfection seems far beyond human intelligence.  It 
would be extremely difficult for people to recognize such expertise, and it is even more 
difficult, if not impossible, for them to learn it.  Another problem is the power of 
intellectualism to understand political reality.  Platonic intellectualism tends to presume a 
certain intellectual quality as a prerequisite of stable government.  This approach has 
difficulty in explaining why some regimes such as the Athenian democracy, though not 
equipped with such qualities, actually existed for a long period of time.  The third problem 
comes from the dangerous side effects of its training method or Socratic elenchus.  Plato asks, 
what would a person become but a nihilist or tyrant who shows no respect for the norms of 
this world if all the beliefs that he could find are doomed to contradiction and ridicule under 
the storming of Socratic elenchus? 
By contrast, Plato starts to incorporate some democratic values and practices into his 
theorizing of politics.  He recognizes the political role of the demos by raising the status of 
popular wisdom.  The people are qualified for philosophical persuasion, since they are able to 
follow their true interests.  Their consent, therefore, becomes a condition of governing 
legitimacy.  This is a democratic development following his intellectualist way of thinking. 
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 There are also considerations perspectives other than intellectualism.  Plato recommends the 
use of written laws by Athenian democracy to control the power of governing officials.  He 
also finds that the extreme fragmentation of political power in direct democracies may help 
support legal stability.  These views suggest a switch of emphasis in Plato’s political thought 
where political communities, rather than educational systems that aim to improve members’ 
knowledge, are considered organizations that provide stability and protection from abuse of 
political power. 
Communitarianism is another non-intellectualist perspective that we have found in our 
discussion of Plato.  He considers the improvement of common interests as an essential 
condition of laws.  Common ancestry, in his view, is the cause of reconciliation between 
Athenian democrats and oligarchs.  He describes citizens’ obligation to obey their cities with 
the metaphor of parents and children.  All of these positions reflect certain communitarian 
values that were prevalent in democratic Athens.  Yet, the most revealing case should be his 
justification for citizens’ rights to be involved in the local judicial process.  He argues that all 
citizens should participate in the law courts as much as possible simply because they are 
members of the community.  No one should decide for other citizens even if he is the wisest. 
We have put up a defence for Athenian democracy against established negative views.  It 
points out the democracy’s success in law reform and reconciliation at the end of the fifth 
century B.C. which laid down the foundation of post-war stability in fourth century Athens.  It 
 321 
draws attention to the legality of the democracy’s trial of Socrates and the reasons for the 
jury’s decision.  It also finds recognition of the democracy in the works of Xenophon and 
Plato.  It is therefore problematic to reject Athenian democracy either with the testimony of 
Socrates’ pupils or with the reason of the democracy’s decline after the Peloponnesian war, as 
many scholars often did. 
What have been discussed in this thesis are only a decade of Athenian history and an aspect of 
its philosophy.  Yet, it is hoped that by challenge the stereotype of Athenian democracy this 
discussion could reopen the debate on Athenian politics and philosophy, especially in the 
realm of democratic theories.  Athenian democracy is a great political experiment in human 
history, as many of its deeds defy our common understandings.  It is still worth asking how a 
group of people organized themselves successfully into a stable government and maintained 
the highest degree of equality and freedom that we have ever heard of, and for what reason the 
Athenians went to such lengths as to make sure that they were ruled solely by themselves. 
We have seen the establishment of the rule of law through the collective efforts of Athenian 
citizens.  The authority of law was imposed in Athens by neither the forceful leadership of 
politicians, nor the professional instruction of jurists.  Instead, it was based directly on the 
common citizens’ own political experience and judgement.  This is at odds with our 
impression of the tyranny of the majority, and does not fit our common belief of 
constitutionalism that, to maintain the legal order of a society, the laws should be guarded by 
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impartial jurists and be independent of popular interference.  We have also seen in the 
Athenian reconciliation how the popular nationalistic sentiment overcame the destructive 
effects of civil strife.  It presents a challenging case for the study of human society that often 
presumes the egoistic aspect of human nature and expects conflict rather than cooperation in 
Athens. 
Athenian politics is full of wonders, and not only to the modern readers.  Even its 
contemporary great writers, Xenophon and Plato, puzzled over the nature of its democratic 
order.  Many scholars tried to make this amazing phenomenon comprehensible by using 
established conceptual frameworks, such as modern constitutionalism and models of political 
struggle.  However, in the process, the peculiarity of Athens is often missing.  The strangeness 
of Athenian democracy should be kept in our mind as a source of inspiration.  We may 
compare it to a special kind of wonder that, as Aristotle said of the First principles, makes us 
realize our ignorance and start to philosophize.2 
Athenian politics is full of wonders, and not only to the modern readers.  Even its 
contemporary great writers, Xenophon and Plato, puzzled over the nature of Athenian 
democratic order.  Many historians and political theorists, as shown in this thesis, try to make 
Athenian democracy comprehensible by putting it into established conceptual frameworks, 
such as modern constitutionalism and models of political struggle.  However, in the process, 
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the strangeness of Athenian culture is often missing.  If it is allowed, we may preserve this 
peculiar feature of Athenian politics by comparing it to a special kind of wonder that, as 
Aristotle said of the First Principles, makes us realize our ignorance and, start to 
philosophize.3 
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